

༄༅། །མཇུག། །

mandel

།ས་གཞི་སྒྲོམ་གྱིས་བྱུགས་ཤིང་མི་ཏོག་བཟམ།

sashi pukyi jukshing metok tram,

།རི་རབ་སྒྲིང་བཞི་ཉི་ལྷས་བརྒྱན་པ་འདི།

rirab lingshi nyinde gyenpa di,

།སངས་རྒྱས་ཞིང་དུ་དམིགས་ཏེ་དབུལ་བར་བགྱི།

sangye shingdu mikte ulwar gyi,

།འབྲོ་ཀུན་རྣམ་དག་ཞིང་ལ་སྦྱོད་པར་ཤོག །།

drokun namdak shingla chupar shok.

།ཨི་དྲི་གུ་རུ་རྩ་མཇུག་ལ་ཀེ་རྩུ་ཏ་ཡ་མི། །

Idam guru ratna mandalakam niryatayami.

Offering the Mandala

Here is the great Earth,
Filled with the smell of incense,
Covered with a blanket of flowers,

The Great Mountain,
The Four Continents,
Wearing a jewel
Of the Sun, and Moon.

In my mind I make them
The Paradise of a Buddha,
And offer it all to You.

By this deed
May every living being
Experience
The Pure World.

Idam guru ratna mandalakam niryatayami.

༄༅། །སྐབས་འགྲོ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད། །
kyabdro semkye

།སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེས་དང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་མཚོག་རྣམས་ལ།
sangye chudang tsokyi choknam la,

།བྲུང་རྒྱུ་བར་དུ་བདག་ནི་སྐབས་སུ་མཆིས།
jangchub bardu dakni kyabsu chi,

།བདག་གིས་སྤྱིན་སོགས་བགྱིས་པའི་བསོད་ནམས་ཀྱིས།
dakki jinsok gyipay sunam kyi,

།འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་ཕྱིར་སངས་རྒྱས་འགྲུབ་པར་ཤོག །།
drola penchir sangye druppar shok.

Refuge and The Wish

I go for refuge
To the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha
Until I achieve enlightenment.

By the power
Of the goodness that I do
In giving and the rest,

May I reach Buddhahood
For the sake
Of every living being.

༄༅། །བཟླ་བ། །

ngowa

།དགེ་བ་འདི་ཡིས་སྐྱེ་བོ་ཀུན།

gewa diyi kyewo kun,

།བསོད་ནམས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཚོགས་ཚྲིགས་ཤིང་།

sunam yeshe tsok-dzok shing,

།བསོད་ནམས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལས་བྱུང་བའི།

sunam yeshe lejung way,

།དམ་པ་སྐྱུ་གཉིས་འཕྲོ་བ་པར་ཤོག །།

dampa kunyi topar shok.

Dedication of the Goodness of a Deed

By the goodness
Of what I have just done
May all beings

Complete the collection
Of merit and wisdom,

And thus gain the two
Ultimate bodies
That merit and wisdom make.

ལྷོ། །མཚོད་པ། །
chupa

།སྟོན་པ་སྣ་མེད་སངས་རྒྱལ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
tonpa lame sanggye rinpoche,

།སྐྱོབ་པ་སྣ་མེད་དམ་ཚཱ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
kyoppa lame damchu rinpoche,

།འདྲེན་པ་སྣ་མེད་དགའ་འདུན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
drenpa lame gendun rinpoche,

།སྐྱབས་གནས་དཀོན་མཚོག་གསུམ་ལ་མཚོད་པ་འབྲུལ།
kyabne konchok sumla chupa bul.

A Buddhist Grace

I offer this
To the Teacher
Higher than any other,
The precious Buddha.

I offer this
To the protection
Higher than any other,
The precious Dharma.

I offer this
To the guides
Higher than any other,
The precious Sangha.

I offer this
To the places of refuge,
To the Three Jewels,
Rare and supreme.



The Asian Classics Institute

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Level Two of Buddhist Logic and Perception (Pramana)

Course Syllbus

Reading One

Selection from the collected topics: Why study the art of reasoning?

Readings: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs)*, by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901); ff. 1A-2A and 10A-10B

The Greater Compendium of All the Sutras (Mahāsūtra-samuccaya, mDo kun las btus-pa chen-po), by Lord Atisha (982-1052); ff. 20A-22A

Formal logic subject: The definition of a reason

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning*, f. 2A

The forms of debate: The motivation for debating, and how to begin a debate

Reading Two

Selection from the collected topics: An Outline of All Existing Things

Reading: *An Outline of All Existing Things (gZhi-grub kyi rnam-bzhag)*, from *An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam chung-ngu'i rnam-par bshad-pa)*, by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 5A-8B

Formal logic subject: The subject, the quality to be proven, and the quality denied in a logical statement

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning*, ff. 2A-3A

The forms of debate: Posture, the use of a rosary, and formulating the statement of a reason in three parts

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Course Syllabus

Reading Three

Selection from the collected topics: Quality and Characteristic

Reading: *A Presentation of Quality and Characteristic (sPyi dang bye-brag gi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 19A-22A*

Formal logic subject: Similar cases, dissimilar cases, and "examples of the combination" in a logical statement

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 3A-5B*

The forms of debate: The two responses to the statement of a reason

Reading Four

Selection from the collected topics: Cause and Effect

Reading: *An Elementary Presentation of Cause and Effect (rGyu-'bras kyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 14B-19A*

Formal logic subject: The definition of a correct logical statement, and the three relations

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 5B-7B*

The forms of debate: Formulating a statement of necessity

Reading Five

Selection from the collected topics: Subjects and Objects

Reading: *A Presentation of Subject States of Mind and their Objects (Yul and yul-can gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trash, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721); ff. 30A-38B*

Formal logic subject: An introduction to the types of correct logical statements, and a discussion of the first: the logical statement using a result

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 8A-9A*

The forms of debate: The two responses to a statement of necessity

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Course Syllabus

Reading Six

Selection from the collected topics: Negative and Positive

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Negative and Positive (dGag-sgrub kyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son, ff. 131B-136B.*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of the second type of correct logical statement: the logical statement using a nature

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 9A-10A*

The forms of debate: Using scriptural authority

Reading Seven

Selection from the collected topics: Contradiction and Relationship

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship ('Gal-'brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam 'bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 26B-31B*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of the third type of correct logical statement—the logical statement to prove an absence of something—and the first category of this type of statement, which involves something that is not normally perceptible

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 10A-12A*

The forms of debate: Some debating tactics

Reading Eight

Selection from the collected topics: Definitions and the Things They Define

Reading: *A Presentation of Definitions and the Things They Define (mTsan-mtson gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 33B-39A*

Formal logic subject: The category of the third type of correct logical statement which involves something that is normally perceptible

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 12A-16A*

The forms of debate: Different types of ritual debates

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Course Syllabus

Reading Nine

Selection from the collected topics: The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Elimination in Perception (gZhan-sel gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son, ff. 136B-138B.*

Formal logic subject: Identifying elements of a logical statement; classifying correct logical statements by means of the quality to be proven; classifying them by means of the manner of proof; by means of what is to be proven; by means of the similar cases; and by means of the debater involved

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 16A-20A*

The forms of debate: The traditional debating classes and subjects

Reading Ten

Selection from the collected topics: The Concept of Time

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdus-grva), by Master Chok-hla U-ser (about 1500 AD); ff. 101B-106B, 111A-112A*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of incorrect logical statements

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 20A-24A*

The forms of debate: The traditional debate year

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading One: Why Study the Art of Reasoning?

Selection from the collected topics:
Why study the art of reasoning?

The first two selections here are from a monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine"—a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). This text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Between the two sections is a very relevant snippet from the Overview of the Perfection of Wisdom, composed by the great writer of textbooks for Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery named Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568).

Our first selection discusses the importance of learning how to reason well:

།སྐྱེ་མ་དང་མགོན་པོ་འཇམ་དཔལ་དབྱུངས་ལ་ཕུག་འཚལ་ལོ།

I bow down to my Lama and my Protector, the glorious Gentle Voice (Manjushri).

།འདིར་རིགས་པའི་སྒོ་འབྱེད་བསྐྱེད་གྲུབ་ལྷ་མོ་ལ་འཇམ་དཔལ་གྱི་ལྷ་
མིག་ལས་རིགས་ལམ་ཆེ་བ་རྟགས་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

Here begins *An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics* which opens the door to the art of reasoning.

ཚད་མར་གྱུར་པ་འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་བཞེད་པ། ལྷོན་པ་བདེ་གཤེགས་སྐྱོབ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་
ལོ། །ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་འདིས་བདག་ཅག་གི་ལྷོན་པ་ཕྱི་རོལ་པའི་ལྷོན་པ་ལས་བྱུང་པར་
དུ་འཕགས་པའི་ལྷོན་པ་ཚད་མར་བསྟན་ཏེ། འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་བཞེད་པ། ཞེས་པས། རང་
སྐྱོབ་པའི་སྐྱོར་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ལས་འབྲུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བསྟན།

Let us consider first the quotation [from Master Dharmakirti's *Commentary on Valid Perception*] which says:

I bow down to the Teacher, the One Who has Gone to Bliss,
To the Protector, the one who is totally correct,
Who undertakes to benefit every living being.

The purpose of these lines is to show that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct (Tib: *tsad-ma*; Skt: *pramana*), and a teacher who is infinitely superior to those of non-Buddhist traditions. The reason here is that he "undertakes to benefit every living being"; which is to say, he was created by a very special cause—consummate thoughts and actions.

འོན་རང་རའི་ལྷོན་པ་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་རི་ལྷ་བུ་མངའ་ཞི་ན། བདེ་གཤེགས་སྐྱོབ་ཞེས་པས།
རང་དོན་སྤངས་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་དང་། གཞན་དོན་རྟོགས་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མངའ་
བས་ན་སྐྱོབ་པ་སླ་ན་མེད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲུལ་ལས། རྟོག་པའི་དྲ་བ་
རྣམ་བསལ་ཞིང་། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Just what," one may ask, "are the extraordinary qualities which our own Teacher possesses?" This is answered in the words "the One Who has Gone to Bliss, the Protector." Our Teacher possesses both a consummate form of all that will benefit himself—that is, he has eliminated every negative thing within himself; and he possesses as well a consummate form of all that will benefit others—which is to say, he has realized all knowable things. As such he is said to be a Protector surpassed by none other; for as the *Commentary [on Valid Perception]* says, "He has smashed the web of ideas, and..."

དེ་ལྟར་རང་རེའི་སྟོན་པ་ནི་སྟོན་པ་ཚད་མ། དེའི་ལྷུང་ཏོགས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་ནི་བསྟན་པ་
རྣམ་དག། །དེའི་ལྷུང་ལས་གསུང་པའི་ཚད་མ་མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་ནི་འཇུག་བྱའི་ཚད་
མ་རྣམ་དག། །

And so it is that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct; and that his teaching is a teaching which is totally pure; and that the correct perceptions described in his words—that is, the pair of direct and deductive perception—are totally pure and correct methods of perception for us to use.

རྒྱ་བསམ་སྟོར་ཡུན་ཚོགས་ནི་ཉམས་སུ་སྤང་བྱའི་ལམ་རྣམ་དག་ཏུ་ཏོག་གའི་ཚོག་དོན་
བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་སྟོན་སྐབ་པར་མཛད། དེས་ན་སྐབ་དག་དང་། སུན་འབྱིན་གྱི་རྣམ་
བཞག་ལ་མཁས་པའི་སྟོན་སྐབ་བའི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན་པ་དེ་ནི། བསྟན་འཛིན་གྱི་གཙོ་
བོ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་གཉེར་ལས། དེ་ལྟ་སྐབ་དང་སུན་འབྱིན་གྱི། །རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་
ལུགས་གང་གིས་ཤེས། །མཁས་པ་དེ་ནི་རྫོགས་པ་ཡི། །སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ནི་བསྟན་པ་
འཛིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The causes that create the Buddha are consummate thoughts and actions. Proving that these constitute a totally pure path that we should practice is accomplished by using the eight different forms of logic. As such there is but one main way of keeping the teachings of the victorious Buddha safe in the world, and this is to become a master of the logical forms used to prove some things and to disprove others. As the *Goldmine of Reasoning* [by the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251)] says,

Suppose a person comes to understand
The scriptural tradition for how to reason:
This art of proving or disproving things.
A master like this is a person who keeps
The teachings of the totally enlightened
Buddhas safe here in the world.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

The role of faith versus the understanding that is born from the ability to reason properly is stated clearly in many scriptures on the perfection of wisdom, including the following:

གདུལ་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཡུམ་ལ་དང་བ་སྐྱེ་ཚུལ་དགོས་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་འཆད་པ་དང་།
གཞི་ལམ་རྣམ་གསུམ་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མེད་ཀྱི་དོན་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

Here our discussion will have two parts: a description of the different ways in which people gain feelings of admiration for the Mother [of the Buddhas—that is, the perfection of wisdom] along with a discussion of the need to reach this emotion; and an explanation of what it means when we say that developing the three kinds of high knowledge—foundation knowledge, path knowledge, and omniscience—has no true existence.

དང་པོ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །རི་ཞིག་དད་པའི་ཇེས་སུ་འབྲང་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་འདི་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་མེད་
པར་སྐྱུར་དུ་རབ་ཏུ་དང་བ་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱབས་ནས་དངོས་བསྟན་གྱི་རྒྱན་གྱི་གདུལ་
བྱ་དབང་རྟུལ་དད་པའི་ཇེས་འབྲང་དེ། རྒྱན་གྱི་ཆེད་དུ་བྱ་བའི་གདུལ་བྱ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Here is the first of the two. Suppose someone makes the following claim:

Consider the section where the commentary makes this statement: "At this particular point at least, those who follow after faith develop, quite quickly, strong feelings of admiration for it, beyond all doubt." There is a certain kind of disciple being referred to directly here, and that is the one who is studying the *Ornament* [of *Realizations* by Maitreya] and who is poor in his intellectual capacity—the kind that follows a teaching because of his or her faith alone. It is this kind of disciple for whom the *Ornament* was designed.

དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱན་གྱི་ཆེད་དུ་བྱ་བའི་གདུལ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རིགས་
ཅན་དབང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣོན་པོ་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱབས། ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རིགས་ཅན་དབང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་
རྣོན་པོ་ལམ་མ་ཞུགས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མཐུན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་བརྗོད་པའི་ཚིག་ཙམ་རྒྱ་
མཚན་དུ་བྱས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཞི་ལམ་རྣམ་གསུམ་གང་ཟག་དང་། ཚོས་གྱི་བདག་

མིང་པ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གིས་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་ནས། ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་
ཡུམ་མཁུན་གསུམ་ལ་དང་བ་དང་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་དད་པ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But you are wrong in your assertion. It is always the case that, if a person is one of those disciples for whom the *Ornament* was designed, then he or she is a person who belongs to the greater way, and who possesses intellectual abilities which are extremely high. Think about these people—the ones who belong to the greater way and who possess an intellect which is very great. They don't begin to feel admiration for the three kinds of high knowledge simply based on the fact that someone has described to them the extraordinary qualities that these three possess. Rather they use correct forms of reasoning to come to a clear understanding of what the three—that is, foundation knowledge, path knowledge, and omniscience—really are, and they do the same to establish in their own minds the fact that neither people nor their "things" [or parts] have any nature of their own. When they have in this way come to actually see things through a valid form of perception, then they begin to have feelings of admiration for the Mother, for the three types of high knowledge—it is only then that they begin to have the kind of faith which believes in the good qualities of its object.

The second selection is a very famous quotation from scripture which is memorized by every young monk who begins the geshe course in a Tibetan monastery. It describes one of the ultimate reasons for studying the art of reasoning:

མདོ་ལས། གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱ་སྟེ། ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་
ཏེ་རེ། ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གྱིས་གཞན་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་མིང་ཅེས་འཆད་
མི་རིགས་པའི་དོན་སྟོན་པ་ལ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཚད་མ་རྣམས་ནི་མི་འདུག་པ།
མིང་ལ་མི་འདུག་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན།

There is a sutra where it says,
No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

The full story behind this quotation is not often told in traditional Tibetan monasteries. It appears as an important section of the Greater Compendium of All the Sutras (Mahāsūtrasamuccaya, mDo kun las btus-pa chen-po), compiled by Lord Atisha (982-1052), and is translated here in full:

།དེ་བཞིན་གཤམ་པ་དེ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྤྲོད་ན་ལས་འདས་ནས་ལོ་སྟོང་དུ་དམ་པའི་ཚོས་
གནས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་སྤྱིན་ཆད་སྤྱོད་དེ་དག་གྲུང་ཤིང་དེ་དག་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་
གྱུར་ཏེ།

[Lord Buddha is speaking to his disciples, and describing a Buddha who had come before him:]

"The holy Dharma survived in the world for a thousand years after this Buddha, the One Gone Thus, had passed into his final nirvana. After that, those special sounds that came from the trees and spoke the Dharma to people disappeared as well.

།རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་བཞིན་གཤམ་པ་དག་བཅོམ་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་
རྒྱལ་འོ་རབ་ལྟར་མངོན་པར་འཕགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་དེས་ཡང་དག་སྟོང་ཚོས་སྤྱོད་
པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་ཞིས་བྱ་བ་དམ་པའི་ཚོས་ཡོངས་སུ་འཇིན་པར་བསྐྱོས་ནས།
ཡོངས་སུ་སྤྲོད་ན་ལས་འདས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. That Buddha—the One Gone Thus, the Destroyer of the Foe, the Totally Enlightened One whose name was 'Towering like the Mountain at the Center of the World'—passed into his final nirvana only after he had appointed a certain monk, a teacher of the Dharma by the name of 'Pure Life,' to protect the teachings in this world.

།དེའི་ཚེ་དགེ་སློང་སློང་པའི་སློ་གྲོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཞིག་བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་ནི་ཚུལ་བྲིམས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་
པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་དང་ལྡན་ཞིང་། འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་མངོན་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལྷ་ཐོབ་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། འདུལ་བའི་སྡེ་སྡོད་ལའང་མངོན་དུ་བྱུང་བར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"In those days there came another monk, one whose name was 'Intellect of Action.' He was possessed of a veritable mountain of morality, and had as well attained the five different kinds of worldly clairvoyance. He was moreover well versed in the scriptural collection concerning the subject of vowed morality.

།དགེ་སློང་དེ་ནི་དཀའ་ཐུབ་ཀྱི་མཚོག་དང་ལྡན། ངན་ངོན་ལ་མོས་པ་འཁོར་གྱི་ནང་ན་
སློང་བ་སྟེ། དེས་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་ཅིག་བརྗིགས་ནས་དེ་ན་གནས་ཤིང་དེའི་འཁོར་དུ་
གྱུར་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་། ཚུལ་བྲིམས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་དག་པ་ལ་བཀོད་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།
སྤངས་པའི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་སྡེ་པ་ལ་མོས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"This monk lived with a group of followers who were the highest masters of an ascetic way of life, and who had found joy in living with nothing but the worst of food and lodging. They all built themselves an abbey in which to stay, and there Intellect succeeded in bringing his followers to a very high and pure level of moral living. They came to have a deep love for the way of vows, for the way of life that leads of purification.

།དགེ་སློང་དེ་ནི་བཙོན་འགྲུས་བརྩམས་ཤིང་རྟག་པར་བྱང་རྒྱུ་གྱི་སེམས་ལ་གནས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །བྱང་རྒྱུ་སེམས་དཔའ་གཞན་དག་ཀྱང་། སློང་ལམ་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ཡང་
དག་པར་བསྐྱུལ་ཏེ། དམིགས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ལྷ་བ་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་བསྐྱུལ་ལོ།

"This monk, Intellect, spent his days making great efforts in the spiritual life, and in his heart he kept to the Wish for enlightenment. He was continually urging all the other aspiring bodhisattvas to live this way of life as well, and to keep up a worldview, a way of looking at things, which was pure and correct.

དེའི་འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་མི་ཉག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། །འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་
ཅད་སྐྱབ་བསྐྱལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། །འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་བདག་མེད་
ཅིས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། །དགོ་སློང་དེ་ནི་ཉིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།
འབྲང་རྒྱུ་སེམས་དཔའི་སློང་པ་ལ་མཁས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དགོ་བའི་རྩ་བ་དང་ལྷན་པར་
གྱུར་ཏེ།

"He succeeded in bringing the others to believe in that part of the view which states that all things with causes are impermanent. He succeeded in bringing them to believe that all things with causes are suffering. He succeeded in bringing them to believe that nothing with a cause has any nature of its own. He became a great master of single-pointed meditation. He became a great master of the deeds of a bodhisattva, and he came to possess a great store of good karma within him.

[Our reading here reverses the negative particle *ma* in the Tibetan, which seems to be a printing error, given the context.]

འདགོ་སློང་ཚོས་སྐྱབ་སྐྱེད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་དེ་ནི། སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོ་
མཚོག་དང་ཐ་མ་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དེའི་འཁོར་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཇི་སྟེད་པ་དེ་
དག་ཀྱང་། སྐྱངས་པའི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་སློམ་པ་ལྟར་ལོན་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། མི་དམིགས་པའི་
བཟོད་པ་ཅན་ཐབས་ལ་མཁས་པ་དག་ཏུ་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"Now that other monk named 'Pure Life,' the teacher of the Dharma, came to be a great master in being able to understand the needs of other living beings, whether they were of the very highest or the very lowest of intellectual capacity. He and every one of his followers reached a point of true fluency in the way of life which leads to purification: they became well versed in the meaning of the invisible [that is, emptiness], and learned as well the art of acting in unexpected ways to help others.

འདིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་ནས་ཚོས་སྐྱབ་སྐྱེད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་འཁོར་དང་བཅས་ཏེ། དགོ་

སྣོད་སྣོད་པའི་སྣོ་གྲོས་གང་ན་གནས་པའི་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་དེར་ཕྱིན་ནས་དེ་ན་གནས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་དེ་ནས་ཡང་དང་ཡང་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་སྣོད་
བརྗེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། གྲོང་དུ་འགོ་ཞིང་དེ་དག་ཏུ་ཟས་ཀྱི་བྱ་བ་བྱས་ནས་ཕྱིར་འོང་བར་གྱུར་
ཏོ། །དེས་དེ་དག་ཏུ་རིགས་བརྒྱ་སྣོད་དུ་མ་དད་པར་བྱས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. There came a day when the teacher, Pure Life, came with his followers to the abbey where the monk Intellect was staying. They took up residence there. Pure Life, out of compassion for those living in the nearby towns, would often leave the abbey and go to take his food with the people. Then he would return home to the abbey. There in the homes of the people he was able to bring many hundreds, nay—many thousands, of families to have faith in the Dharma.

།དའི་འཁོར་ཇི་སྣོད་པ་དེ་དག་གྲང་ཚུལ་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །དེ་དག་གྲང་དེ་དག་
ཏུ་དོང་ཞིང་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་ཚོས་སྣོན་ཏེ། དེ་དག་གིས་གྲང་སློབ་ཆགས་བརྒྱ་
སྣོད་མང་པོ་སླ་ན་མེད་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་ཇོགས་པའི་བྱང་ཚུབ་ཏུ་བཀོད་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"All of Pure Life's followers came to be masters too in this way of helping others. They would also go to the towns, and teach the Dharma to the beings who lived there. They too brought many hundreds, nay—many thousands, of living creatures to the unsurpassed state of a purely and totally enlightened being.

།དགོ་སྣོད་སྣོད་པའི་སྣོ་གྲོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་དེ་དག་ནི་བསམ་གཏན་ལྗུར་ལེན་ཅིང་གྲོང་དག་
ཏུ་ཡང་འཁོར་བར་མི་འདོང་ངོ། །དེ་ནས་དགོ་སྣོད་སྣོད་པའི་སྣོ་གྲོས་ཀྱིས་བྱང་ཚུབ་
སེམས་དཔའ་གཞན་དག་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས། དེ་དག་ནི་གྲོང་དུ་ཡང་
དང་ཡང་འཇུག་གོ་ཞེས་དེས་གཞི་བརྟུངས་ཏེ། དགོ་སྣོད་གི་དགོ་འདུན་བསྐྱུས་ནས་
བཅའ་བ་བྱས་པ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

"All the followers of the monk Intellect devoted themselves to meditating, and never went into the towns. There came a time when the monk Intellect began to lose his faith in those other bodhisattvas. He began to talk about how they were always going into the towns, and finally ordered that the *gandi* stick be beaten, to announce an assembly of the community of monks. When they had all come together, he gave the following order:

བདག་ཅག་གི་ནང་ནས་སྐྱུ་གུང་གྲོང་དུ་འཇུག་པར་མི་བྱའོ། །སྲོད་ནི་ཤེས་བཞིན་
མེད་པར་སྲོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཉུང་དུ་སྐྱབ་མ་ཡིན་གྱིས་སྲོད་གྲོང་དུ་འགོ་བས་ཀྱང་ཅི་
ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། དགོན་པ་ལ་གནས་པ་ནི། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་གནང་ཞིང་བསྐྱབས་
པ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྲོད་གྲོང་དུ་མ་འདོང་བར་བསམ་གཏན་གྱི་བདེ་བས་རྣམ་པར་སྲོད་ཅིག་ཅེས་
བསྐྱོའོ།།

"None of us is allowed to go to the towns any more,' he said. 'You are behaving carelessly. And what need is there anyway for those who are supposed to speak little to go to town? Staying in the monastery is an activity which Lord Buddha has clearly allowed us, and which He has recommended for our way of life.

"And so did he command them: 'You must stop going into the towns now. Spend your days here, wrapped in the pleasure of meditation.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་སྲོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པས་དེའི་འཁོར་གྱིས་དེ་ཟེར་བ་ལྟར་མ་
མཉམ་ཏེ། ཡང་དང་ཡང་གྲོང་དག་ཏུ་འདོང་བར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དག་
སྲོང་དེ་དག་ནམ་གྲོང་ནས་སྤྱིར་འོངས་པར་གྱུར་པ་དེའི་ཚེ། དག་སྲོང་སྲོད་པའི་སློ་
གྲོས་གྱིས་ཡང་གཞི་བརྟུངས་ནས། དག་སྲོང་གི་དག་འདུན་བསྐྱུས་ཏེ། འདི་རྣམས་དུ་
གལ་ཏེ་ད་སྤིན་ཆད་སྲོད་གྲོང་དུ་འདོང་དང་། སྲོད་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་འདི་ན་མ་གནས་
ཞེས་བསྐྱོའོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Pure Life and his followers refused to follow the order, and continued to go frequently into the towns. Once, when they

had returned to the abbey, the monk Intellect again had the *gandi* stick beaten, calling an assembly of the monks. There in the assembly, Intellect made the following declaration: 'From now on, anyone who goes to town is prohibited from staying in our abbey.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་ནས་དགོས་ཚེས་སྐྱབ་སྐྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པས། དགོས་ཚེས་དེའི་
སེམས་བསྐྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་འཁོར་རྣམས་བོས་ཏེ་འདི་སྐད་དུ། བྱིད་གོང་དུ་སྐྱུ་
ཡང་མ་འདོད་ཅིག་ཅེས་སྐྱས་སོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. The monk Pure Life—this teacher of the Dharma—determined that he would try to protect Intellect from wrong thoughts, and so he called together all his followers, and said to them, 'Now none of you should go to town.'

དེ་ནས་དེའི་ཚེ་དགོས་ཚེས་དེ་དག་གིས་སེམས་ཅན་གང་ཇི་སྟེན་ཅིག་སྟོན་པར་བྱས་པ་དེ་
དག་དགོས་ཚེས་དེ་དག་དང་མ་ཕྱད་པས། ཤིན་ཏུ་མི་དགའ་བར་ཡང་གྱུར། དགོ་བའི་
རྩ་བ་ཡང་ཡོངས་སུ་འགྲིབས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།།

"But then came a problem with all the people whom these monks had sought to develop spiritually. Because they no longer had any contact with the monks, these people began to be very upset, and a dark cloud began to form over all the good karma they had collected up to that time.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་ནས་དགོས་ཚེས་སྐྱབ་སྐྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་ཟླ་བ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་
དག་འདས་ནས། གཞུགས་ལག་ཁང་དེ་ནས་གཞུགས་ལག་ཁང་གཞན་དུ་འཕྲོས་ནས།
གོང་དང་། གོང་གྱིར་དང་། རྫོང་ས་དང་། ཡུལ་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོའི་ཕོ་བྲང་འཁོར་
དག་ཏུ་འགོ་ཞིང་། སེམས་ཅན་དག་ལ་ཚེས་སྟོན་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Three months passed this way, and then the monk, that teacher of the Dharma, Pure Life, moved away from this abbey and went to live in another. From there he would go to the towns, and to the cities, and to whole areas and other lands, and so too among those who lived in the palaces of kings, and taught the Dharma to the people.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་ནས་དགོ་སྤོང་སྤོང་པའི་སློབ་གྲོས་ཀྱིས་ཚོས་སྐྱབ་སྤོང་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་
པ་ཡང་དང་ཡང་དུ་འགོ་བ་ཡང་མཐོང་། དེའི་འཁོར་རྣམས་ཀྱང་སྤོང་ལམ་ཐ་མལ་པ་
ཅན་དུ་མཐོང་ནས་དེས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དགོ་སྤོང་
འདི་ནི་རྒྱལ་གླིངས་འཆལ་པ་ཅན། རྒྱལ་གླིངས་ལོག་པ་ཅན་ཏེ། འདིས་བྱང་རྒྱལ་ག་
ལ་འཐོབ། དགོ་སྤོང་འདིའི་བྱང་རྒྱལ་ནི་རྒྱང་རིང་དོ། །དགོ་སྤོང་འདི་ནི་འདུ་འཇོར་
གནས་པའོ་ཞེས་འགོ་བ་མང་པོ་དག་ལ་དེ་སྐད་ཅེས་བཟླ་དེད།

"Listen, o child of noble family. The monk Intellect saw the teacher of the Dharma, Pure Life, going out all the time. He also saw this teacher's followers acting in ways that seemed worldly to him, and he began to lose faith in them as well. And then he began to criticize the monk widely, in the following words: 'This monk has lost his morality; he is corrupt. How could he ever achieve enlightenment this way? He goes further and further from enlightenment. There he is, living in the hustle and bustle of the everyday world.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེ་ནས་དུས་གཞན་ཞིག་ན་དགོ་སྤོང་སྤོང་པའི་སློབ་གྲོས་དེ་འཆི་བའི་དུས་
བྱས་པར་གྱུར་ནས། དེ་དེ་ལྟར་འཆི་བའི་དུས་བྱས་པ་དང་། ལས་དེའི་རྣམ་པར་སློན་
པས་མནར་མེད་པའི་སེམས་ཅན་དམྱལ་བ་ཆེན་པོར་ལྷུང་དོ། །

"Listen, o child of noble family. Later on there came a day when this monk named Intellect breathed his last. As soon as he died, the karma of his actions ripened, and he dropped to the hell we know as 'No Respite.'

དེ་བསྐྱལ་པ་བྱེ་བ་ཞབས་ཞིག་དགུ་བཅུ་ཙུ་དགུར་སེམས་ཅན་དམྱལ་བ་ཆེན་པོར་སྐྱབ་
བསྐྱལ་གྱི་ཚོར་བ་སྤོང་བར་གྱུར་ནས། ཚོར་བས་དུག་ཅུར་མི་སྐྱན་པར་བཟླ་དཔ་ཐོབ་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། །ཚོར་བས་སྤོང་སྤོང་སྐྱབ་ཅུ་ཙུ་གཉིས་སྐྱབ་པ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བ་ལས་སྤྱིར་
བབས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

"Intellect remained in this great hell, experiencing each of its torments, for 99 periods that each went on for a hundred billion periods of ten million eons each. Then he spent sixty lives constantly slandered by others. And for 32,000 lifetimes he was a monk who lost his robes.

ལས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིབ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྷན་མས། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་དག་བཙམ་པ་ཡང་དག་
པར་རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་འོད་འཕྲོ་བྱི་མ་མེད་པའི་གསུང་རབ་ལ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བར་
བྱུང་ཏོ། །དེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་ནས་ལོ་བྱེ་བ་བརྒྱ་སྟོང་ལྷན་ཏུ་མགོའི་ཐོད་ལ་མེ་འབར་
བ་ལྟར་རྣམ་པར་སྤྱད་ཀྱང་། མཐུན་པའི་བཟོད་པ་ཙམ་ཡང་མ་ཐོབ་སྟེ། ཚེ་རབས་
བརྒྱ་སྟོང་མང་པོར་དབང་པོ་རྟུལ་པོར་བྱུང་ཏོ། །

"When all these karmic obstacles had befallen him, there was some karma still remaining. These led him to a birth in the days when the Destroyer of the Foe, the Totally Enlightened One, the Buddha named Immaculate Shining Light, was teaching in the world, and he took ordination in His way. He made incredible efforts, exerting himself with the same effort that a person would if his hair had caught on fire, for sixty thousand periods each made of a hundred periods of ten million years each. And yet he was unable to reach even the level known as 'mastery,' which leads into the realization of selflessness. He spent many hundreds and thousands of lifetimes as a person with the dullest of intellect.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེའི་དུས་ན། དགོ་སྟོང་ཚོས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་ཞེས་
བྱ་བ་དེ་གཞན་ཡིན་པར་སེམས་ན་དེ་ལྟར་མི་བཟོ་སྟེ། དེ་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། དེ་བཞིན་
གཤེགས་པ་མི་སྤྱུལ་བ་ནི། དེའི་ཚེ་དེའི་དུས་ན་དགོ་སྟོང་ཚོས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་
དག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་བྱུང་ཏོ། །

"Listen, o child of noble family. You may think that the one monk, the teacher of the Dharma, the one named Pure Life in those days, was just any person at all. But don't think that way. Why do I say this? Because it is the One Gone Thus, the Buddha whom we know as Unshakable, who was in those days that monk, the teacher of the Dharma, by the name of Pure Life.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེའི་དུས་ན། དག་སྟོང་ཚོས་སྐྱ་བ་སྟོད་པའི་སྟོ་བོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་
གཞན་ཞེས་ཡིན་པ་སྐྱམ་དུ་སེམས་ན་དེ་སྐྱམ་དུ་མི་བཟོ་སྟེ། དེ་ཅིའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ང་ཀི་
དག་སྟོང་ཚོས་སྐྱ་བ་སྟོད་པའི་སྟོ་བོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་གྱུར་ཏེ། ང་ཡང་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཐབས་
སྤོ་མོས་དེ་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་དེ། ལས་ཀྱི་སྐྱིབ་པ་མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱས་པས་
སེམས་ཅན་དཔྱལ་བ་དག་ཏུ་ལྷུང་བར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. You may think that the other monk, the one named Intellect, also a teacher of the Dharma, was just any person at all. But don't think that way. Why do I say this? Because it is I myself who was that teacher, the one named Intellect. And it was I who—due to some small incident—came to lose my faith. It was I who created the karmic obstacle. And it was I who, because of it, fell down to hell.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ལྟར་སྤྲོ་བ་ཀི་ལས་ཀྱི་སྐྱིབ་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ལས་ཀྱི་སྐྱིབ་པ་དེ་
ལྟ་བུ་མི་འདོད་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་གཞན་གྱི་སྟོད་པ་ལ་ཁོང་ཁྱོད་བར་མི་བྱའོ། །དེའི་སྟོད་པ་
ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་པར་བྱའོ། །འདི་སྐྱམ་དུ་པ་རོལ་གྱི་སེམས་ནི་བདག་གིས་མི་
ཤེས་ཏེ། སེམས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟོད་པ་ཀི་ཤེས་པར་དགའོ། །དེ་སྐྱམ་དུ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་པར་
བྱའོ།།

"Listen to me, o child of noble family. Speaking in a way that will split up other people is a great karmic obstacle. Listen, o my child. Anyone who wants to avoid this obstacle must never feel anger about what others may do. They must trust in all that others do. They must think to themselves, 'I cannot know what this other person is really thinking. It is a difficult thing to understand all that others do.' They must come to develop this way of thinking.

དོན་གྱི་དབང་དེ་གཟིགས་ནས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་འདི་སྐྱད་དུ་ཚོས་བསྟན་ཏེ།
གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱའོ། །གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་ལ་

ཚོད་བཟུང་ན། མ་འགྲུང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ང་འཇག་གཞན་ཡང་ང་དང་འདྲ་བ་དག་གིས་
གང་ཟག་ལ་ཚོད་བཟུང་བའོ།།

And because He had grasped this king of all ideas, the One Gone Thus then spoke the following, and thus taught the holy Dharma:

No person should ever judge another. Those who do try to judge another will only hurt themselves. Only I, or someone like me, is able to judge another.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་སྐྱ་བདག་བསྐྱུང་བར་འདོད་པ་དེས་གཞན་སུའི་སྲོད་པ་ལ་ཡང་བརྟག་པར་
མི་བྱའོ། །དེ་དག་ལ་འདི་ནི་འདི་འདྲའོ། །འདི་ནི་འདི་འདྲའོ་ཞེས་དཔུ་བར་མི་བྱའོ།
ཉིན་མཚན་དུ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ལ་བརྩོན་པར་བྱའོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Those who wish themselves well should never spend their time examining what anyone else at all is doing. They should never criticize another, saying 'Those people are doing this and that. This person is doing such and such.' Rather they should spend all their day, and all their night, in trying to practice the teachings of the Buddha.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བུ་ཚེས་ལ་བསྐྱོམ་པའི་ཡིད་ཀྱིས་བསམ་པ་ཐག་པ་ནས་ཡང་དག་པར་
ཞུགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱང་རྒྱལ་སེམས་དཔའ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་དཔུ་བར་བརྩོན་པར་མི་གནས་
སོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. A bodhisattva should never spend his time working to criticize others, for he or she must devote their whole heart to living in a pure way themselves, immersed in thoughts of the Dharma."

Formal logic subject:
The definition of a reason

དང་པོ་ལ། རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་

པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first part of our discussion. The definition of a reason is "Anything put forth as a reason." The definition of a reason in any particular logical statement is, "Anything put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement."

ཡོད་མེད་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པས་བྱབ་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། རི་བོང་རུ་དེ། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་
སྟེ། རི་བོང་རུ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

It doesn't even matter if something exists or not, it can always be a reason in any particular logical statement. This is because of the fact that, no matter what something may be, it can still always be put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement. And this is true because even the horns of a rabbit can be put forth as a reason, in the following way:

Consider anything, whether it exists or not.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is the horns of a rabbit.

སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་
པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། བྱས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་
པ། བྱས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་
གཞན་ལ་ཡང་སྟོར་ཚུལ་རིགས་འདྲའོ།

The definition of the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is a changing thing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." The definition of the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." This same pattern applies to all other cases as well.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

The forms of debate:
**The motivation for debating,
and how to begin a debate**

Monks in a monastery such as Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery in south India follow a rigorous schedule of debate. At around age twelve, young monks begin to study formal logic (*takrik*) and the basic related topics (*dura*) with their house teacher. By age fifteen, if their progress is satisfactory, they are allowed to enter the debate courtyard and participate in the debates.

At Sera Mey, debates are held twice a day on every other day, once in the morning and once at night. On the remaining days, with the exception of Tuesday (which is market day), debating is held only at night, so that monks can attend extra classes with their scripture teachers in the morning.

Debate is an incredibly powerful tool for reviewing and digging deeper into the subjects learned during classes each day. During a typical day, a monk will spend the early morning in prayers at the assembly hall, and then go home to memorize scripture in his room. Later in the morning he attends either debate or his regular classes. This is followed by a break for lunch, a rest, and personal study. The afternoon is spent in two or three classes with five to twenty other students, in the room of a scripture master.

After an evening meal, monks study on their own. Around six o'clock, a gong called a *ka-nga* (sky-drum) is beat from atop the main temple of the monastery. This is the call to the debate courtyard. The beat begins slow, and then speeds up to a quick pulse. By the time it reaches its crescendo, all monks are expected to be ready in the courtyard, sitting in rows around the platform and throne (called a *shuktri*) where the great debates are centered.

No books are allowed in the debate courtyard; the feeling as you sit in your room and hear the gong beaten is that you will be completely naked, and armed only with your own knowledge. You straighten your robes, grab your monk's shawl and your rosary, and slip a small Tibetan rug under your arm. This carpet will keep your bottom warm through the many hours ahead, exposed to the night, sitting on the flagstones of the courtyard. Until recently, the debate courtyards in south India had no electricity; it still fails frequently, and some of the most pleasant hours of a monk's day are spent out on the courtyard, under the stars, in the sound of the debates and a soft wind blowing past.

The debate master, known as the *giku*, supervises the debates, walking around the courtyard answering questions, urging the debaters on, and enforcing discipline with an occasional hearty swing of his rosary. He is normally a

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

senior *geshe*, and serves as vice-abbot of the entire monastery, representing the abbot whenever he is unable to attend a function.

A senior student in the debate courtyard, one with a good voice and memory, begins to recite the *kurim* (*sku-rim*), or opening prayers. No debate session is begun without at least a brief version of the opening prayers. This is a time for every monk to sit quietly, chanting and reviewing his motivation for the debates. It is considered extremely important to think carefully during these prayers, and to remove any emotions of competitiveness or pride for the coming debates. We debate so that we can help the others around us, and to examine what we believe, so that we can become enlightened more quickly, and therefore be of ultimate help to all living beings.

Once a week, an extensive evening *kurim* is held. The entire nighttime debating session is devoted to prayers for the benefit of beings, for everyone's successful practice of the Dharma, for proper motivation, and to prevent obstacles. Here is a list of the prayers that are currently recited in the extensive *kurim*; a few of the items have changed from the days in Tibet:

- 1) The Extensive Verses on Going for Refuge and Thinking about the Wish for Enlightenment

སྐབས་འགྲོ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་རྒྱས་པ།

- 2) The *Thousand Angels of the Heaven of Bliss* (*Ganden Hlagyama*)

དགའ་ལྗན་ལྟ་བུ་མ།

- 3) Three repetitions of the *Lady of Liberation* (*Drolma*, or *Tara*) from *Potala*

པོ་ཏ་ལ་ཡི་སྐྱེལ་མ།

- 4) *Reverence to the Goddess, a Praise of the Lady of Liberation*

ལྷ་མོལ་གུས།

- 5) The *Twenty-One for the Holy and Realized Being, the Lady of Liberation*; twenty-one verses of praise to the twenty-one forms of Tara, consisting of twenty-one prostrations and recited twenty-one times

སྐྱེལ་མ་ཉིར་གཅིག།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

- 6) The *Prayer of the Holy and Conquering Angel, Verses in Praise of the Lady of Liberation*; this is sometimes alternated with another praise of Tara, *The Glorious Queen of the Divine*

རྗེ་བཙུན་བཙུང་ལྷན་མ།

ལེགས་བྲིས་དཔལ་མ།

- 7) The *Prayer of the Angel of the White Parasol (Dukkar, or Sita Tapatra)*

གདུགས་དཀར།

- 8) The *Seventy Million Victors, in Praise of the Angel of the White Parasol*

རྒྱལ་བ་བྱེ་བ།

- 9) Three repetitions of the *Essence of Wisdom ("Heart Sutra")* —this can be done either in a very quick version, or in a very slow version to a beautiful tune; on special occasions, 17 of the quicker version and one of the slow are done

ཤེས་རབ་སྣང་པོ།

- 10) The *Prayer of the Angel with the Face of a Lion (Senggey Dongchen, Simha Mukhi), for Preventing Every Obstacle*

སིང་གདོང་མ།

- 11) The *Tree of Sandalwood, a Prayer to the Wishing Jewel, the White Protector (Gunkar Yishin Norbu, Sita Chintamani Mahakala)*

ཅན་དན་ལྷོན་ཤིང་།

- 12) The *Servant of Gentle Voice (Manjushri)*

འཇམ་དཔལ་བཀའ་ཉན།

- 13) The *Powerful One from the Burial Ground of Maru, a Prayer to the Protector Known as Chamsing*; Chamsing is an early major protector for Sera Mey Monastery, and is shared with other monasteries

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

དབང་ལྷན་མ་རུ།

Please note! The protectors mentioned here have nothing to do with the object of the current protector controversy.

- 14) *The Palace Built of Bliss, a Prayer to the Protector Known as Taok*; Taok is a unique protector who watches over Sera Mey, and who appeared after Chamsing

རང་བཞིན་བདེ་བ།

- 15) *The Blaze of the Teachings, a Prayer that the Teachings of the Buddha Remain Strong in our World*

བསྐྱེད་འབར་མ།

- 16) A variety of different verses of auspiciousness

བཀྲ་ཤིས་ཚིག་བཅད།

On other days, a different *kurim* is done in the morning and the evening. The following is a typical morning *kurim*:

- 1) Three repetitions of the *Essence of Wisdom* ("Heart Sutra")

ཤིས་རབ་སྣང་པོ།

- 2) *A Supplication to the Lamas of the Lineage of the Debate Tradition*, which is "updated" by the great lamas of subsequent generations to include the great figures of the Sera Mey debate tradition; when His Holiness the Dalai Lama appointed our root Lama, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin, to be abbot of Sera Mey, he told Rinpoche: "Oh, I really wanted to get your name into the lineage!"

ཚེས་གྲ་སྒྲ་བརྒྱད།

The *kurim* in the evening of the same day would be as follows:

- 1) *A Supplication to an Eminent Lama of the Debate Tradition of Sera Mey, Kedrup Tenpa Dargye*

མཁམ་གྲུབ་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་རྒྱས་ལ་གསོལ་འདེབས།

2) *Chanting the Names of Gentle Voice (Manjushri)*

འཇམ་དཔལ་མཚན་བརྗོད།

3) *Chanting the Longer Incantation of the Woman of Total Victory (Namgyalma, or Vijayi);* this prayer is used for both protection and for a long and healthy life

རྣམ་རྒྱལ་མའི་གཟུངས་རིང་།

4) A single recitation of the *Essence of Wisdom ("Heart Sutra")*

After the *kurim* is completed, the monks break out in a kind of victory cheer using the sound *dhi!*—the root syllable of Gentle Voice, the embodiment of the Buddha's intellect and wisdom—to celebrate the beginning of another debate session. Each monk then stands up and mills around the debate courtyard, looking for another monk with whom to debate one-on-one. This is an opportunity for monks from different classes (like freshmen and sophomores in high school) to challenge each other.

Since each class is debating a completely different subject, this is an excellent time for the older monks to review what they have already learned, by choosing a partner from one of the lower classes. The younger monk, in turn, has a chance either to go through his class's current topic with a more experienced debater, or to hear a little bit about a topic which he will have to debate in the coming years.

The two monks decide on who will be the attacker, and who the defender. The defender throws his carpet down on the flagstones, often near a wall where he can lean, and seats himself. The attacker stands facing his opponent, thinking furiously of a subject from which to begin. He then unfolds part of his monk's shawl and drapes it over his left shoulder from the back, a sign of respect that has been followed since the time of Lord Buddha.

The attacker bows close to his opponent's face and claps his hands, simultaneously whispering, *Dhi jitar chuchen!*—which means: "*Dhi!* So what do you think about this one?" He begins the debate then normally by making a statement which is false, to see if his opponent can disprove him. A typical statement of this kind might be, "There is no logical reason why Lord Buddha repeated himself in the *Heart Sutra*, where he says 'Well done! Well done!'"

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

This naturally becomes the starting point of a heated argument, which might last for hours.

The attacker in the debate will accompany his salvos with vigorous body language like stamping and clapping, as well as shouts and taunts. None of this is meant in a competitive or insulting way, but only as a way of breaking the concentration of the opponent. Monks trained in the debate courtyard thereby learn to concentrate deeply, and to stay free of distraction even with hundreds of screaming debaters all around them. This will be a great asset to them when they must sit in their rooms and think out difficult texts, or as they answer future students in different parts of the world, as they present their objections or difficult questions on specific points in the Buddha's teachings.

After about an hour or so, the debate master walks through the midst of the debaters, waving the end of his monk's shawl. This is a sign for the various classes to group together for the second stage of the debates; all the monks studying Middle-Way philosophy, for example, move quickly (for fear of the debate master's rosary) to sit together in a particular corner of the debate ground.

Here the monks of each class sit in two groups facing each other, with a narrow corridor left between the two groups. The groups themselves form into rows, perhaps three or four deep in a larger class, so that every monk can watch the debate. Each class has a class leader, known as a *kyorpon* (or "recitation leader"), who is chosen in the first year that the class is formed, and who will serve in his position until the members of the class take their geshe examinations some 18 years later.

Each member of the class throws his rosary into a pile on the flagstones in the open space between the two groups of monks. The class leader picks all the rosaries up in his hands, and tosses the whole bunch into the air. He closes his eyes and grabs one of the rosaries as the bunch falls to the ground. The owner of this rosary will be the defender in the first debate of the session. This process is repeated for the attacker, and usually for an "assistant" defender. Monks who enjoy debate bring huge, long rosaries to the courtyard, and the lazy ones buy a tiny one.

The two defenders seat themselves on their mats at the head of the corridor between the two groups of monks, and the attacker comes and stands within the corridor. He begins a debate as before. After a few minutes, any monk who has a good idea to bring up might start to yell it at the defenders as well, and will often stand up and push his way past the original attacker. Within about a half an hour, a whole group of attackers may be pushing and shoving to get to the front and scream their question at the defenders. This part can

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

be very physical, but it is extremely rare to see anyone in the debate courtyard actually lose their temper.

The tempo of a debate is very fast, with heavy philosophical concepts flying by in a clipped mixture of modern slang and ancient literary Tibetan. The audience has to listen carefully to follow where the debaters are running. It takes only a few minutes to tear through a difficult concept in a way so thorough that it could never be accomplished even in hours of classroom time or reading in one's room. There is probably no more powerful tool for learning the great ideas of Buddhism.

Selecting a topic, and maintaining a good motivation, are the two keys in getting the most out of the wonderful opportunity of a debate. An experienced debater, like any good Buddhist, learns to bring up the difficult points that he or she is unsure of—it is less comfortable than debating what you already understand clearly, but within a few minutes you will have deep insights into your question that you could never come up with on your own. Most nighttime debates last for four or five hours, and it is not unusual for a class to get engrossed and go on for most of the night. The level of understanding which monks reach this way is extraordinary.

It is important to give up any feeling of being self-conscious or embarrassed about debating. Say what you think, and say it with power! If you're wrong, you'll learn something new, and you can only be the better for it. Remember that your whole motivation is to become enlightened as quickly as you can, and be able to lead others to the paradise of enlightenment too. For this you will have to know your stuff well—you will have to know what you believe, and know why you believe it, and be able to express it clearly and defend it, especially in a country where Buddhism is just beginning.

It is essential for American Buddhists to believe in the Dharma only when it makes perfect sense to them, and not because of blind faith or tradition. Only then will the Dharma take strong root in this country, and only then will millions be able to follow it, and reach the goal of deathless bliss. You will have no trouble debating if you remember this—you are debating to save the lives of others.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Two: An Outline of All Existing Things

Selection from the collected topics:
An Outline of All Existing Things

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are those made by the opponent. The logical statements in brackets are understood responses that are often left out of the text.

༘ །གཉིས་པ་གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་སྔོང་གསུམ་ལས།

Here is the second section, an outline of existence. Here we will refute the position of our opponents, present our own position, and then finally disprove their rebuttal.

དང་པོ་ལ། །འཕྱི་བ་ན་རེ། །གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། །རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing can be established as existing, then it is necessarily an unchanging thing.

བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ལས།

Consider then a water pitcher.
So is it an unchanging thing?
Because it can be established as existing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་སྟེ།
ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say a water pitcher can be established as existing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher can be established as existing].
It is so [something that can be established as existing],
Because it is established through a valid perception.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,
Because "that which is established through a valid perception" is the definition of a thing which can be established as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the water pitcher is an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a water pitcher is an unchanging thing].
Consider the water pitcher.
It isn't so, that it's something unchanging;
Because it's a thing that changes.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

[It's not correct to say it's a thing that changes.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's a thing that changes].
Consider this same thing.
It is so [something which changes],
Because it's something that lasts only for a moment.

བྱུང་སྐྱེ། རྣམ་ཅིག་མ། མི་དྲག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,
Because "anything that lasts only for a moment" is the definition of a changing thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱུང་རྣམ་པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། འཇིག་པ། འདུས་བྱས་ཀྱི་
མཚན་ཉིད། རྐྱེས་པ། བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not true that this is the definition of a changing thing.]

It is so the definition of a changing thing,
Because "anything that performs a function" is the definition of a working thing; "anything that stops" is the definition of a produced thing, and "anything that starts" is the definition of a made thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing is something which exists,
Then it must always be a working thing.

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider empty space, the space which is unproduced.
So is it then [a working thing]?
Because it is [something which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is something which exists].
Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists],

Because it can be established as existing through a valid perception.

མ་ཁྲུབ་ན། དེ་ལ་ཁྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ། ཡོད་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does so [necessarily follow,]

Because "anything which can be perceived through a valid perception" is the
definition of an existing thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: empty space is a working
thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

Isn't it so, that it is not a working thing?

Because it is a thing which has no work.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་སྟོང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is a thing which has no
work].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which has no work],

Because it is void of the quality of performing a function.

ལྷན་ལྟེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་འཇིག་པ་འདུས་མ་གུས་
གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མ་སྐྱེས་པ། མ་གུས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "anything which is void of the quality of performing a function" is the definition of a thing which has no work; and "anything which never stops" is the definition of a thing which was not produced; and "anything which never starts" is the definition of a thing which was not made.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་ན། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་ལྟན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Knowable things must always be knowable things which can be.

ཀ་གུམ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So are they [a knowable thing which can be]?

Because they are [knowable things].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are knowable things].

They are so [knowable things],

Because they are things which exist.

ལྷན་ལྟེན་ ཤེས་བྱ། ཡོད་པ། གཞལ་བྱ། གཞི་གྲུབ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "knowable thing," "something which exists," "something which can be apprehended," and "something which can be established as existing" are all different names for the same thing.

ཕྱ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡིན་པ་
མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are a knowable thing which can be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider these same things.
It isn't so, that they are a knowable thing which can be,
Because they are knowable things which cannot be.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་སྲོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things which cannot be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are knowable things which cannot be].
Consider these same things.
They are so [knowable things which cannot be],
Because (1) they are knowable things and (2) there doesn't exist a thing which is them.

གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཅིག་དང་
ཐ་དད་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that the first is not correct.
Consider these same things.
They are so [knowable things],
Because they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things,]

Because they are separate things.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བན་ཚུན་ཐ་དང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are separate things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [separate things],

Because they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་པན་ཚུན་ཐ་དང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀ་བ་བུམ་པ་དང་ཐ་དང་།

བུམ་པ་ཀ་བ་དང་ཐ་དང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are separate in a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other].

It is so true, that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other,

Because to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher, and to be a water pitcher is not to be a pillar.

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་ཚེས་ཅན། བུམ་པ་དང་ཐ་དང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་

ཞིག་བུམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say the first, [that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Consider a pillar.

It is so true, that to be it is not to be a water pitcher,

Because (1) it exists and (2) it is not automatically a water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something exists,
It must always be something which exists and which cannot be.

དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་སྲིད། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.
So is it then something which exists and which cannot be?
Because it is [a thing which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་དངོས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད་ཏེ། དངོས་
པོ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a thing which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a thing
which exists].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a thing which exists],
Because it's either an unchanging thing, a working thing, or both;
Because it's a working thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡིན་
པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing is something
which exists and which cannot be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.
It isn't so, that it's something which exists and which cannot be,
Because it's something which exists and which can be.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་བཅའ་ཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་
གསུམ་སྟོད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists and which can be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's something which exists and which can be].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists and which can be],

Because (1) it is something which exists; and (2) the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of it.

ཕྱི་མ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བཅའ་ཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to make the latter statement: that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to make the latter statement: [the statement that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things].

Consider the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter.

They are so working things,

Because they are (1) things which exist and (2) are not things which are unchanging.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ན། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པས་སྟབས་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is not a working thing, it must always be an unchanging thing.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider a rabbit's horns.

So are they [an unchanging thing]?

Because they are [something which is not a working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་དངོས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not a working thing],

Because they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].

Because they are not something which exists.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which exists].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which exists],

Because they are something which does not exist.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say they are something which does not exist.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are something which does not exist].

They are so [something which does not exist],

Because their existence cannot be established by a valid perception.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a rabbit's horns are an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a rabbit's horns are an unchanging thing.]

Consider this same thing.

It's not so, that they are an unchanging thing,

Because they are not something which exists.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which exists.]

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which exists],

Because they have no existing nature.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་འཇིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing nature].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [something that has no existing nature],

Because they are not something which holds any existing nature.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature].
Consider this same thing.
They are so [not something which holds any existing nature],
Because they are not a thing (a *dharma*).

ལྷན་སྒྲིག་ལ། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་འཛིན་པ། ཚེས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which holds an existing nature" is the definition of a "thing" (or *dharma*).

[This definition by the way reflects an etymological explanation in the Sanskrit, since the verbal root for "to hold" is *dhṛ*, which is also the root for *dharma*.]

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཚེས་ཡིན་ན། དགག་གཞི་ཅན་གྱི་ཚེས་མ་ཡིན་པས་ལྷན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a thing, it can never be a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.

གུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། ལྷན་པ་ཁས།

Consider a water pitcher.
So is it then [not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist]?
Because it is [a thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། འདུས་གུས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing],

Because it is a thing which is produced.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which is produced.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which is produced].

It is so [a thing which is produced],

Because it is a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a working thing].

It is so [a working thing],

Because it is a thing which performs a function.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ལྗོ་ལྗིར་ཞབས་ཞུམ་ཚུ་སྐྱོར་གྱི་དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which performs a function.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which performs a function].

It is so [a thing which performs a function],

Because it is an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water.

དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

It is so [an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water],
Because it's a water pitcher.

བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་བུམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because that is the classical definition of a water pitcher.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དགག་གཞི་ཅན་གྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་
དགག་གཞི་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་བྱོད་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist].
It is so [a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist],
Because (1) there does exist a place where it doesn't exist, and (2) it is a thing.

གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པའི་དགག་གཞི་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་མེད་
པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that the first is not correct.
It is so true [that there exists a place where a water pitcher doesn't exist],
Because there exists a location where there is no water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བུམ་པ་ཡོད་པས་མ་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is a location where there is no water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is a location where there is no water pitcher].
It is so true [that there is a location where there is no water pitcher],
Because if any particular thing is such that it has no self-nature, then it is not always the case that a water pitcher has to be there.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་དེ། རང་མཚན་ཡིན་ན། ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

If something is a thing which exists in and of itself, then it must always be mental.

བེད་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་སྤྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider the two of matter and mind.

So are they then [something mental]?

Because they are [things which exist in and of themselves].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྣང་ངོར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind are things which exist in and of themselves.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind are things which exist in and of themselves].

Consider these same things.

They are so [things which exist in and of themselves],

Because they can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྣང་ཡུལ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind can be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind can be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception.]

Consider these same things.

They can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception],

Because they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.]

They are so [objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception],
Because they are working things.

བྱུང་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྣང་ཡུལ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་དོན་གཅིག་ །རྟོག་པའི་སྣང་
ཡུལ་དང་། རྟོག་པ་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because the terms "object which presents itself to direct, valid perception" and "working thing" are synonyms. And the terms "object which presents itself to conceptual thought" and "unchanging thing" are also synonyms.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Consider these same things.

It's not so, [that they are something mental],

Because they are active things which are neither mind nor matter.

བྱུང་སྟེ། བཅས་ཤེས་ལྷན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་པོ་ནང་པན་རྒྱན་འགལ་བ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because these three—matter, mind, and active things which are neither mind nor matter—are always mutually exclusive.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྟོག་གྱུར་ཡིན་ན། སྤྱི་མཚན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བཟེན་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something belongs to hidden reality, it must always be an idealization.

གསེར་བུམ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider a pitcher made of gold.

So is it then [an idealization]?

Because it is [something that belongs to hidden reality].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་འཇིན་ཏོག་པས་རྟོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་
གྱིས་ཏོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to hidden reality],

Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.

བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because that is the definition of what it is [to be something which belongs to hidden reality].

གོང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་འཇིན་རྟོག་པས་སྐྱོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་
རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་འཇིན་རྟོག་པའི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [that is, that it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden].

Consider this same thing.

It is so something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden,

Because it is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it],

Because it is something which can be established as existing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷི་མཚན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pitcher made of gold is an idealization.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a pitcher made of gold is an idealization].

It isn't so, [that it is an idealization],

Because it exists in and of itself.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

[It's not correct to say that a pillar is something which belongs to obvious reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pillar is something which belongs to obvious reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to obvious reality],

Because it's a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception.

ལྷ་རྒྱུ་མཐོན་སྐྱེས་གྱི་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ། མཐོན་གྱུར་གྱི་མཚན་
ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception" is the definition of a thing which belongs to obvious reality.

གོང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། མཐོན་སྐྱེས་གྱི་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་
ཡིན་པར་བཤད། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pillar is a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [suppose you say that a pillar is not a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception],

Because it is a working thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། ལྷ་རྒྱུ་མཐོན་སྐྱེས་ཡིན་པར་བཤད། རང་འཇིན་རྟོག་པས་ལྷ་རྒྱུ་
རྩ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟོགས་བསྐྱབ་ཅིན།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pillar is something that could never belong to hidden reality.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing.
It is so something which can belong to hidden reality,
Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind
as something which is hidden.
The reason has already been proven.

གཉིས་པ་རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is the second major part, where we present our own position.

There does exist a definition for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because "that which can be established by a valid perception" is the definition.

གཞི་གྲུབ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་པ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist two different categories for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because there exist the categories of "unchanging things" and "working things."

རྟག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཚོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ།
རྟག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "unchanging thing,"
Because "one object which is both a thing and which is not such that it only
lasts for a moment" is the definition of an "unchanging thing."

རྟག་པ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་
པའི་རྟག་པ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Things which are unchanging can be divided into two different types:
unchanging things which can be, and unchanging things which cannot
be.

ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཡིན་པ་མི་

སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that can be,
Because "knowable things" is it.
There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that cannot be,
Because "the two of unchanging things and changing things" is it.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of "working thing,"
Because "anything which performs a function" is the definition.

དངོས་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། བམ་ཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There exist three different kinds of working things, for there are the three of
matter, mind, and active things which are neither matter nor mind.

བམ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "matter,"
Because "something made of tiny physical particles" is the definition.

བམ་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཕྱིའི་བམ་པོ་དང་། རང་གི་བམ་པོ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There are two different kinds of matter, for there are the two of outer physical
matter and inner physical matter.

ཕྱིའི་བམ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྐྱེས་བུའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་མ་བསྐྱུས་པའི་རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "outer physical matter," for "something which
is made of tiny physical particles, but which is not subsumed by the awareness
of a being" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ། ཀ་བ། ས་རྒྱ་མི་རྒྱུད་བཞི་པོ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

There do exist classical examples of outer physical matter, for a water pitcher, a pillar, and the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind are just such examples.

ནང་གི་བཅའ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱེས་བུའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བསྐྱེས་པའི་རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

There does exist a definition for "inner physical matter," for "something which is made of tiny physical particles, and which is subsumed by the awareness of a being" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཟག་བཅས་ཉིད་ལེན་གྱི་གཟུགས་ལུང་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

There does exist a classical example of inner physical matter, for the impure heap of physical form is just such an example.

ཤེས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

There does exist a definition for "something mental," because "anything which is both invisible and aware" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། མིག་ཤེས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

There does exist a classical example of something mental, because visual consciousness is just such an example.

ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བཅའ་ཤེས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འདུས་
བྱས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

There does exist a definition for an "active thing which is neither matter nor mind," because "any produced thing which is neither matter nor mind" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྟ་དང་བ་སྐྱང་སོགས་གང་
ཟག་རྣམས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

There do exist classical examples of active things which are neither matter nor mind, because "working thing" and "changing thing" and persons such as horses or cattle are just such examples.

ཡང་གཞི་གྲུབ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist another way of dividing up those things which can be established as existing, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of being either one thing or separate things.

གཅིག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སོ་སོ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཚུལ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of "being one thing," because "being a thing which is not individual things" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ། རྟག་པ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist classical examples of being one, because there are the examples of "all knowable things," "all unchanging things," and "all working things"—each considered as a separate unit.

ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སོ་སོ་བའི་ཚུལ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "being separate things," because "being individual things" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས། མཚན་མཚོན་གཉིས། ཀ་བུ་གཉིས།

གསེར་བུ་དང་ཟངས་བུ་གཉིས་རྣམས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist classical examples of things that are separate things, because there are "the two of unchanging things and changing things," and "the two of definitions and the things they define," and "the two of a pillar and a water pitcher," and "the two of a pitcher made of gold, and a pitcher made of brass."

ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་མཚན་དང་སྟེ་མཚན་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

There does exist another way of dividing up knowable things, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of things which exist in and of themselves, and conceptualizations.

རང་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱོད་ལྟོག་གིས་བཏགས་པ་ཅམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་རང་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཚོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "thing which exists in and of itself," because a "thing which exists of its own accord, and which is not just something made up with a name or an idea" is the definition.

སྐྱི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱོད་ལྟོག་གིས་བཏགས་པ་ཅམ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་རང་མཚན་དུ་
མ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ། སྐྱི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "conceptualization," because "anything which is just something that is made up with a name or an idea, and which has no existence in and of itself" is the definition of a conceptualization.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་ལུས་པའི་ཚོས། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Just so, the definition of a "thing which is ultimately real" is "anything which is, ultimately, able to perform a function."

དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་མི་ལུས་པའི་ཚོས། ཀྱུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ།

The definition of a "thing which is deceptively real" is "any thing which is, ultimately, unable to perform a function."

ཚོད་པ་སྐྱོང་བ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྐྱོད་ལུས་དུ་བྱ་རུང་། ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་

ཐལ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་སྐྱོད་ལུས་དུ་བྱ་རུང་། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་

མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན་”

Here is the third major part, where we disprove any rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and claims,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

It isn't so, that "anything which can be an object of the mind" is the definition of a "knowable thing,"

Because "anything which can be the object of a mind that can be" is not the definition of a "knowable thing that can be."

མ་ཁྲུབ་སྟེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན་ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་སྟོང་ལྷུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་
སྲིད་པའི་སྟོང་ལྷུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན།
ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྣམ་མཁྲུན་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་རྣམ་མཁྲུན་གཉིས་ཀའི་
གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it doesn't necessarily follow,
Because if something can be established as existing, it is always both (1)
something which can be the object of a mind that can be; and (2)
something which can be the object of a mind that cannot be.
And this is true because anything which can be established as existing is
always something which can be apprehended by both that omniscience
which is, and by that omniscience which is not.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྟག་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་
དང་། རྟག་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose another person comes, and makes another claim:

It is so, that there exists one object which is both changing and
unchanging,
Because sound is both changing and unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན། སྐྱ་མས་
རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་ལན་འདེབས་སོ།།

[It's not correct to say that sounds are both changing and unchanging.]

It is so, [that sounds are both changing and unchanging],
Because what you call "sound" is something which is both (1) changing
and (2) unchanging.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

At this point you should use the following answer: "Your combined reason is not correct."

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་འདུས་མ་གུས་གྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྣང་ངོར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Consider empty space—space which is unproduced.
So does it then belong to ultimate reality?
Because it can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct,
valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྣང་ངོར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception].
Consider this same thing.
It can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception],
Because it exists to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ངེས་ངོར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་
བྱུང་།

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space exists to the state of mind of direct, valid perception].
Consider this same thing.
It does so [exist to the state of mind of direct, valid perception],
Because it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception.

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྣམ་མཐུན་གྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་

ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception.]

It is correct [to say that it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception],
Because it's something that is apprehended by direct, valid perception;
And this is true because it is something apprehended by omniscience.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་
བདེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

And suppose you say that our point above is correct.
Consider this same thing.
It isn't so, that empty space belongs to ultimate reality,
Because it belongs to deceptive reality.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

[It's not correct to say that empty space belongs to deceptive reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space belongs to deceptive reality.]
It is so [something that belongs to deceptive reality],
Because it is unchanging.

*Formal logic subject:
The subject, the quality to be proven,
and the quality denied in a logical statement*

།གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ། དེའི་ལྷོག་ལྷོགས་ཏྲགས་
ལྟར་སྣང་བཤད་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ལྷོས་གཞི་དང་། མཚན་
ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Here is the second part, which is an explanation of the different kinds of reasons. Here there are two divisions: an explanation of correct reasons, and an explanation of the opposite; that is, incorrect reasons. The first comes in three steps of its own—explanations of the pivotal objects for a correct reason; of the definition of a correct reason; and of the different types of correct reasons.

དང་པོ་ལ། ལྷོགས་ཚེས་ཀྱི་ལྷོས་གཞི་ལེས་འདོད་ཚེས་ཅན་བཤད་པ་དང་། ལྷོས་གཞི་མཐུན་ལྷོགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་ལྷོགས་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

The first of these has two further sections: an explanation of the subject (the basis of the opponent's doubt)—which is the pivotal object in the relationship between the subject and the reason; and an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases.

དང་པོ་ལ། ལེས་འདོད་ཚེས་ཅན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། ཞར་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཚེས་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་དང་གསུམ།

We will present the first of these in three parts: the definition of the subject, a classical example of a subject, and then—as an incidental point—identifying the quality to be proven.

དང་པོ་ལ། ལྷོད་བྱས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚུད་གཞིར་བཟུང་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན། ལྷོད་བྱས་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་ནས། ལྷོད་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་ལེས་
འདོད་ལྷགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་སྲིད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། ལྷོད་
བྱས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལེས་འདོད་ཚེས་ཅན་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཡིན་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The following is the definition of a "flawless subject in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things":

It must exist as one object which combines both of the following qualities:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

It must first of all be something which is considered the basis of contention in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things.

There must also be possible a person who, once they have ascertained that it is something which is made, still entertains doubts about whether it is unchanging or not.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། སྐྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན། དེ་འདྲའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་དེ་ཡིན་ན་སྐྱ་
དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བོ།

Here secondly is the classical example; and this "sounds." Anything which is this particular subject in a logical statement is necessarily one and the same as sounds themselves.

གསུམ་པ་ནི། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The third part here will have two parts of its own: identifying the quality to be proven, and the definition of the quality to be proven.

བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་སྟེ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བྱོད་
སྐྱ་བྱོད་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཚོས་ཡིན་ན། ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་བོ།

If something lacks a self-nature, then it can always be the quality to be proven. This is because—if something lacks a self-nature—it can always be the quality to be proven in a logical statement where you are trying to prove that sounds are it. Therefore we can say that, if something is a quality to be proven, it need not be an existing thing.

སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of a quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things: "Anything which can be considered the quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things."

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགས་ཀྱི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་གཉིས།

Qualities to be proven can be divided into two separate types: qualities to be proven which are explicit, and qualities to be proven which are implicit.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་བཞིན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are their respective definitions. "Anything which can be considered the explicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "explicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཚོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

"Anything which can be considered the implicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "implicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་བཞིན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་པོ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་
པ་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Classical examples for these two, respectively, would be the following. An example of the first would be "a changing thing." An example of the second would be "the opposite of all that is not a changing thing."

ཡང་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་བྱས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་
ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་དང་། དེ་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་འགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་ནོ།།

You could also say that both "a changing thing" and "something that lasts only a moment" are, each of them, explicit qualities to be proven in a logical proof where being made is used as a reason to make the proof. The two

opposites—of all that each one of them is not—would then each be an example of implicit qualities to be proven.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་ཉག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚོ། སྒྲ་སྐྱོར་བ་དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་ཚོད་གཞི། མི་ཉག་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས། སྒྲ་མི་ཉག་པ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ། བྱས་
པ་ཉགས་ཡང་དག། ཉག་པ་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས། སྒྲ་ཉག་པ་སྐྱོར་བ་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་
བྱར་འཇོག། །དེས་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་རིགས་འགྲེ།

Let's consider now a case where we put forth the following logical statement:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are something which is made.

The basis of contention in this statement [—that is, the subject of the proof—] is "sounds." The quality to be proven is being a changing thing. The assertion, the idea to be proven, is that sounds are changing things. The reason is being something which is made. The quality being denied is being an unchanging thing. The idea being denied is that sounds are unchanging. You can apply this same pattern to every other logical statement.

སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ནི། མི་ཉག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་སྒྲ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་
བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་ཏེ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།།

Here are logical statements to prove what we've said:

Consider "being a changing thing."
It is the explicit quality to be proven in a proof that sounds are
changing things,
Because it fits the definition given above.

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

Consider "being a thing that only lasts a moment."
It is not an explicit quality to be proven in a [certain] proof that sounds
are changing things,
Because [in a certain proof] that sounds are unchanging things it
provides the reason in the proof.

*The forms of debate:
Posture, the use of a rosary,
and formulating the statement of a reason in three parts*

In our second lesson we will cover the classical posture for debating, how to use a rosary during a debate, and how to formulate a classical logical statement during a debate.

The person defending in a debate sits down and faces the challenger, who stands. The defender normally maintains a fairly mild appearance (until the debate gets hot), gesturing slightly with his hands, and answering quickly and concisely to points raised by the challenger.

The challenger, on the other hand, uses extensive body language to throw his opponent off. After the initial challenge, he stands sideways to his opponent, with his left foot forward. Each new assertion is accompanied by a stamp of the left foot, and a clap of the right hand on top of the left, where the rosary is strung around the arm. From time to time, the rosary is stretched back with the right hand as if aiming an arrow from a bow. This is an ancient debating custom, and in pictures of Master Dignaga or Master Dharmakirti we can still see the same gesture.

The rosary, as noted earlier, is also used in the selection of the initial challenger and defender. It is also an important tool for counting out lists of things, which are so popular in Buddhism: the two realities, the three Jewels, the four arya truths, the five paths, the six realms. . .and so on. During the course of a debate, the challenger and defender will often count out a list together on their rosaries, to make sure both are in synch on the point. Very occasionally a debater will swing a rosary to make a point, although it is rare and unaccepted to actually strike the other party—it would be more common to strike your own thigh or palm to get a nice "thwock"!

Positioning in front of the opponent says a lot. When an opponent makes a very serious mistake or uses circular reasoning, you might swirl around in a spin and come down with a clap. If an opponent takes too long to answer a

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Two

question or remember a quotation, you might turn your back and walk away a few strides, to feign disgust with his lack of preparation. Sometimes you might make rhetorical comments to the audience on both sides—"Where did he get that statement from? Sounds like a quotation from an autocommentary to a root text that was never written!"—and throw out your arms with your palms up, like "Who could ever debate with such a dummy!"

Sometimes you would get a bunch of your classmates up beside you to scream the same syllogism a few times in unison, with exactly the same claps and stamps: it looks like a chorus line or cheerleaders yelling Buddhist logic. Again, the whole point is that everyone learn to think quickly and clearly under pressure, which will help us all spread the teachings. The debates in Tibetan monasteries are refreshingly free of any of the American competitive attitude, and everybody is just excited about learning. In 15 years of debating in Tibetan monasteries, the American monk writing this account has never once been treated with any trace of disrespect or prejudice.

The classical presentation of a proposition in debate, after the initial challenge, has three parts, following the rules of formal logic established even as early as Lord Buddha himself. We first choose a subject, the thing we are going to debate about. One example would be "human beings." Then we choose a quality about them that we wish to prove to our opponent; for example, that they "have to die." Finally we choose a reason—which in Buddhist logic more often refers to the main thing mentioned in the reason as it is expressed—such as "being born." The entire proposition presented to the opponent then will look like this:

མི་ཚོས་ཅན།

Consider human beings.

ཉི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཏེ།

They do have to die,

སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Because they are born.

The defender listens to this proposition carefully, and then quickly prepares his answer in his mind. The very specific rules for answering will be covered in the reading for the next class.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Three: Quality and Characteristic

Selection from the collected topics:
Quality and Characteristic

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are those made by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༘ །དུག་པ་སྤྱི་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་སྤོང་གསུམ་
ལས། དང་པོ་ལ།

Here is the sixth section: a presentation of quality and characteristic. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྤྱི་ཡིན་ན་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Nothing which is a general category (in the sense of being a quality) can ever be a specific member of a category (in the sense of being characteristic of a quality).

དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། གྲེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ལྷབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider "working thing."
So is it never then characteristic of a quality?
Because it is a quality.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྩོད་ཀྱི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is a quality.]

Consider "working thing."
It is so a quality,
Because it has things which are characteristic of itself.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྩོད་ཀྱི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" has things which are characteristic of itself.]

Consider "working thing."
It does so have things which are characteristic of itself,
Because a water pitcher is one.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྩོད་དངོས་པོའི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྩོད་དངོས་
པོ་ཡིན། རྩོད་དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is characteristic of "working thing."]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is characteristic of "working thing"].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so characteristic of "working thing,"

Because (1) it is a working thing; (2) it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing; and (3) there exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a working thing.

རྟོགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་
དད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་ཁྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so true, that it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing,

Because (1) to be it is to automatically be a working thing; (2) it is something distinct from "working thing"; and (3) if there were no working things it could not never exist either.

རྟོགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་རང་བཞིན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of the last reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the first part of the last reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so, that to be a water pitcher is to automatically be a working thing,

Because to be a water pitcher is by nature to be a working thing.

རྟོགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
གཟུགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
It is so something distinct from "working thing,"
Because it is something physical.

རྟོགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་སྟོང་མེད་དགོས་
པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་གང་དྲན་དྲན་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of the reason we gave is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
It is so the case, that if there were no working things it could not never exist
either,
Because if there were no working things, then you could make up anything at
all.

གོང་གི་རྟོགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྟོང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངོས་པོ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཀ་བ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན།
ལྷག་པའི་ཀ་བ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your original reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
There do so exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a
working thing,
Because a pillar of sandalwood is one, and a pillar of juniper is also one.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱི་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱི་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: "working thing" is never
characteristic of a quality.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Consider "working thing."
It is so characteristic of a quality,
Because it is characteristic of "knowable things."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན།
བྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that it is not correct [to say that "working thing" is characteristic of "knowable things"].

Consider "working thing."
It is so characteristic of "knowable things,"
Because (1) a working thing is a knowable thing; (2) it shares a relationship with "knowable things" such that to be it is to automatically be a knowable thing; and (3) there exist multiple objects which are both not a working thing, but still knowable thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྣེ་ཡིན་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པའི་སྣེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ཐེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic, then it is always a quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic.

མཚོན་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པའི་སྣེ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྣེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ལས།

Consider "thing to be defined."
So is it then a quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic?
Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མཚོན་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་བྱོད་
ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which
"working thing" is characteristic.]

Consider "thing to be defined."
It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,
Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། མཚོན་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་མཚོན་བྱ་
ཡིན། བྱོད་མཚོན་བྱ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is characteristic of "thing to
be defined."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "working thing" is
characteristic of "thing to be defined"].
Consider "working thing."
It is so characteristic of "thing to be defined,"
Because (1) it is a thing to be defined; (2) it shares a relationship with "thing
to be defined" such that to be it is to automatically be a thing to be
defined; and (3) there do exist multiple other objects which are both not
it and yet are still things to be defined.

ཕྱ་བར་འདོད་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་མཚོན་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མཚོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚོན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "thing to be defined" is a
quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "thing to be
defined" is a quality of which "able to perform a function" is
characteristic].
It is not so, that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which "able to perform a
function" is characteristic,
Because it ["able to perform a function"] is the definition of a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་ན། མི་ཉལ་པའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic must also be a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic.

མི་ཉལ་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཉལ་པའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། སྐྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."
So is it then a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic?
Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་ཉལ་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's incorrect to say [that "distinct from 'changing thing'" is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic].
Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."
It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,
Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། མི་ཉལ་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཉལ་པའི་སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མི་ཉལ་པ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "distinct from 'changing thing' " is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that "distinct from 'changing thing'" is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

It's not so, that "distinct from 'changing thing' " is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic,
Because "changing thing" is not characteristic of it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་གྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of "distinct from 'changing thing'."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of "distinct from 'changing thing' "].
Consider "changing thing."
It is so [not correct to say that it is characteristic of the quality of "distinct from 'changing thing',"]
Because it is not distinct from "changing thing."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྟོན་རྟོན་དང་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོན་གང་
ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from "changing thing."]

Suppose you say it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from "changing thing"].
It is so true, that it is not distinct from itself,
Because it is an example of something where the person has no nature of its own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྤྱི་འདྲི་ཡང་ཡིན། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་
མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There exists no one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality.

དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཉག་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Isn't it though so, that there is such a thing?
Because "unchanging thing" is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཉག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་སྤྱིའི་སྤྱི་ཡང་ཡིན། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་སྤྱིའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality,

Because it is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic, and it is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."

ཉག་ས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཉག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་སྤྱིའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྤྱི་བྱོད་ཀྱི་
བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so a quality of which "quality" is characteristic,

Because "quality" is something which is characteristic of it.

ཉག་ས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཉག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
བྱོད་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན། བྱོད་བྱེ་བྲག་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་བྱེ་
བྲག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."]

Suppose you disagree to the second part of our reason, [saying that it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic"].

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so characteristic of the quality of "characteristic,"

Because (1) it is characteristic of a quality; (2) it has a relationship with "characteristic" such that to be it is to automatically be characteristic of a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not it, but still characteristic of a quality.

ཁ་ཅིག །རྟག་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་ན། །རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Nothing which is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic can ever be characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."

སྒྲི་ཚོས་ཅན། །དེར་ཐལ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "quality."

So is it then never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"?

Because it is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.

དེར་ཐལ། །རྟག་པ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "quality" is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.]

It is so a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic,

Because "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."

དེར་ཐལ། །རྟག་པ་སྒྲི་ཡིན། །རྟག་པ་སྒྲི་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། །རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་

ཞིང་སྒྲི་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་བྱུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

It is so characteristic of the quality "quality,"
Because (1) "unchanging thing" is a quality; (2) "unchanging thing" has a relationship with "quality" such that to be "unchanging thing" is to automatically be a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not an unchanging thing, but still a quality.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། སྤྱི་ཚོས་ཅན། ཉག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོད་ཉག་པ་ཡིན།
རྟོད་ཉག་པ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། རྟོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ཉག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"].

Consider "quality."

It is so characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing,"

Because (1) it is an unchanging thing; (2) it has a relationship with "unchanging thing" such that to be "quality" is to automatically be an unchanging thing; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not "quality," but still an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ །དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་མ་ཁྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It's not necessarily the case that anything which is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic can never be characteristic of the quality "changing thing."

མི་འཐུན་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་དང་དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,

Because there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing."

དེར་ཐལ། དེར་གྱུར་པའི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་མེད། དེར་གྱུར་བའི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and also characteristic of the quality "changing thing."]

It is so [correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because there exists neither an unchanging version nor a changing version [of something which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"].

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists no unchanging version.]

The first point in the reason is so [that is, it is correct to say that there exists no unchanging version of something which both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because something which is an unchanging thing can never be characteristic of the quality "working thing";

Which is to say, if something is unchanging, it can never be a working thing.

གོང་གི་རྟག་པ་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱིར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། གང་
བྲན་བྲན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say there exists no changing version.]

The second point in our reason is so [—that is, it is correct to say that there exists no changing version of something which both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because if there existed a changing thing that could be a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic, then you could make up anything at all.

རང་རིས་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་བྱས་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་
རེ། སྐྱི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་པོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim regarding our statement that, if something is a working thing, it can never be a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic:

Consider the fact that sound is a changing thing.
Is it then [not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic]?
Because it is a working thing.

Our definitive answer would be to say, "It's not correct [to say that this fact is a working thing]".

འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། སྐྱི་མི་རྟག་པ་དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། །དངོས་པོ་སྐྱི་མི་
རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with the original statement: the fact that sound is a changing thing is not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.]

But you cannot agree to the original statement,
Because the fact that sound is a changing thing is a quality of which "working things" is characteristic,
Because working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱི་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སྐྱི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

It is so [correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing],
Because (1) working things are "sound is a changing thing"; (2) working things are related to "sound is a changing thing" in such a way that to be a working thing is to automatically be "sound is a changing thing"; and (3) there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."

རྟོགས་སྤྱི་མ་དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The final part of your reason is not correct; that is, it is not correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."]

The final part of our reason is so true; [that is, it is correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],
Because "existing things" are one, and "unchanging things" are one as well.

དེར་ཐལ། བདག་མིད་ཡིན་ན། སྣ་མི་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's wrong to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing."]

It is so [correct, to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],
Because anything which has no self-nature is always "sound is a changing thing."

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྣོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is characteristic of the quality "mental object" is also always characteristic of the quality "working thing."

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་ཚད་མ་དང་བཅད་བཤེས་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ།

དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ལས།

Consider the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing.

So are they then [characteristic of the quality "working thing"]?

Because they are [characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱུང་སློ་ཡིན། བྱུང་སློ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ། བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། སློ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object."]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

They are so [characteristic of the quality "mental object"],

Because (1) the two of them are mental objects; (2) they share a relationship with "mental object" such that to be the two of them is to automatically be the mental object; and (3) there exist multiple things which are not the two of them but are still mental objects.

དང་པོ་དང་གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་
པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་མཐུན་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། ཚད་མ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། དེ་གཉིས་པར་ཚུན་
ཐ་དད་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first and second parts of our reason are easy to accept; suppose you say that the third is not correct; [which is to say, there do not exist multiple things which are both not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects].

It is so true, that there exist multiple things which are both [not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects],
Because omniscience is just such a thing, and valid perception is just such a thing—the two do exist as separate things.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་
བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two are characteristic of the quality "working thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider these same two.

They are not so—they are not characteristic of the quality "working thing," Because they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྒྲ།

[It's not correct to say that they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing].

Consider these same two.

It is so correct [to say that they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing], Because they are the cause of the working thing.

Our reason is easy to accept.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ལ། སྤྱིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་
འགོ་བའི་ཚོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is the part where we present our own position. There does exist a definition of "something general," because "any existing thing which subsumes its members" is the definition.

སྤྱི་ལ་སྒྲས་བཞེད་རིགས་ཀྱི་སློན་སྒྲུབ་དབྱེ་ན་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། རིགས་སྤྱི། དོན་སྤྱི།

ཚོགས་སྤྱི་དང་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Nominally speaking, things that are "general" may be divided into three different types: general things as far as types, general things as far as objects, and general things as far as collections of parts.

རིགས་སྤྱིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་འགོ་བའི་ཚོས་
དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality"), because "that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type" is the definition.

A classical example of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality") does exist, because "knowable things" is one.

བྱམ་པའི་དོན་སྤྱིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བྱམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་བཞིན་དུ་
བྱམ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་སྒྲུང་བའི་སྣོ་བཏགས་ཀྱི་ཆ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ།
བྱམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་བྱམ་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་
ལས་ལོག་པར་སྒྲུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") relating to a water pitcher, because it is the following: "That element which is imputed to be the water pitcher, but which is not: that thing which appears to be the water pitcher to the conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, but which is however not the water pitcher."

A classical example of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") does exist, because "the appearance, to the second instant of a conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, of the opposite of all that is not the water pitcher of the second instant" is just this kind of example.

ཚོགས་སྤྱིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་ཆ་ཤས་དུ་མ་འདུས་པའི་གཟུགས་རགས་པ་
དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བྱམ་པ་དང་ཀ་བ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts," because it is the following: "A gross physical object which is composed of its multiple parts."

Classical examples of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts" do exist, because a water pitcher or a pillar would each be one.

ཚོགས་སྡེ་དང་། རིགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both a "general as far as a collection of parts" and a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because the water pitcher would be one.

ཚོགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། རིགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as a collection of parts" and yet still a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because "knowable things" would be one.

རིགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། ཚོགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as types" (or "quality") and yet still a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of a pillar and a pitcher would be one.

རིགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། ཚོགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is neither a "general as far as types" ("quality") nor a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of "changing things" and "unchanging things" would be one.

བྱེ་བྲག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷན་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རང་གི་རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཅན་གྱིས་ཚོས་དེ། རང་ཉིད་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

There does exist a definition of a "member" (or "something characteristic of a particular quality"), because "an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it" is this very definition.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྒོར་བ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
ཚོགས་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་བྱལ། ཉགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྩལ་རྫས་བརྒྱད་འདུས་ཀྱི་གོང་
བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here finally is the third part, eliminating any rebuttal concerning our position.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
They are so something general,
Because they are generals in the sense of a collection of parts.

To this we answer, "It is not necessarily the case."

The reason though is correct, because they are units composed of molecules containing the eight substances, [which are: the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind; and the four objects of visual form, smells, tastes, and touches].

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་མིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your statement: I agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are something general.]

Suppose you agree to our statement, [and agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are something general].

It is not so, that they are something general, a general quality,
Because there is nothing which is characteristic of them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྤིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[It's not correct to say that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher].

Consider these same things.

It is so true, [that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher],

Because they are a knowable object which is not.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་སྟོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟོར་ན་མ་བྱུང།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality?
Because isn't it not a quality of which that thing which is
"knowable objects" is characteristic?

Our answer is: "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་བྱུང་ན། དེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟོ་མེད་པའི་
སྟོར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so true, that it is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic,

Because there exists no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.

མ་བྱུང་ན། དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་སྟོ་མེད་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཤེས་བྱ་དང་། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་
པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[It's not correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so [correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic],

Because (1) there exists no quality of which "knowable objects" is characteristic, and (2) "knowable objects" and "that thing which is knowable objects" are synonyms.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་གི་གསལ་བ་ལ་ཇིས་
སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to the statement above: "knowable objects" itself is not a quality.]

Suppose you agree to the statement above, [and say that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality].

Consider "knowable objects."

It is so a quality,

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes its members.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཇིས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་
ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes its members.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes its members.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes its members],

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཇིས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་
ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྟལ་དངོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཚུད་ཀྱི་རིགས་སུ་
གཏོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because all objects, whether they are unchanging things or working things, are of its type.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མ་ཡིན་པ་ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྲལ།

Suppose someone returns and makes the following claim:

Is it then so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic?

Because "not being" is characteristic of the quality "knowable things."

Our answer is: "It's not necessarily the case."

འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་ཡིན་ན་
གང་དྲན་དྲན་ཡིན་པས་བྲལ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[Then I agree to the statement: It is so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to the statement, [and say that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic].

It is not so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic,

Because if something were a quality of which something that was not a knowable thing were characteristic, then you could always make up anything at all.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། གྲེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱི་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་བྲལ།

Suppose again that someone makes the following claim:

It is so that there exists something which is characteristic of something which is not characteristic of something,

Because it is true that there exists something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is correct by the way to say that there does exist something which is a quality of something which is not a quality,

Because "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱི་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which is not a quality].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Consider "knowable things."

It is so a quality of something which is not a quality,

Because "something which is not a quality" is characteristic of it.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ལྷོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷོ་ཡིན་
པའི་ལྷོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྲུབ།

Suppose again that someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "knowable things."

It isn't so, that it is a quality of that which is not a quality,

Because it is a quality of that which is "quality."

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

རྟགས་བྱུང་སྟེ། ལྷོ་ཡིན་པ་ཁྲོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is true though to say that "knowable things" is a quality of that which is "quality," because "quality" is characteristic of it.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྟག་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་
པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes again and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "unchanging things" is not characteristic of
"sound is a changing thing"?

Because isn't it true, that "working things" is characteristic
of "sound is a changing thing"?

་་་མ་ཁྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་རང་གི་
གསལ་བ་རྟག་པ་ལ་ཇེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so true, that "unchanging things" is characteristic of "sound is a changing thing,"

Because "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."

དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རྟག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྲིར་ཏེ། དེའི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རྟག་དངོས་
གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་པའི་སྲིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."]

It is so true [that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things"],

Because it does have a member called "unchanging things."

And this is true because both "unchanging things" and "working things" are members that it has.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རང་གི་
རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིར། དེར་ཐལ། ལྷན་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཡོད་
པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྲིར་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "existing things."

So it must then be characteristic of something,

Because it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.

[It's incorrect to say that it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.]

It is so an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it,

Because there does exist an existence which subsumes it.

“མ་ཁྲུབ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཟུར་དུ་རང་གི་རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་སྟོས་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessary follow." And this is because there is a very important point served by saying the words "an example" in the definition of being characteristic of something.

*Formal logic subject:
Similar cases, dissimilar cases, and
"similar examples" in a logical statement*

གཉིས་པ་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ལྟོས་གཞི་མཐུན་སྟེགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་སྟེགས་གཉིས་བཤད་པ་ལ།
དངོས་བཤད་པ་དང་། ཞར་ལ་མཐུན་དཔེ་དང་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

This brings us to the second section of our explanation of the pivotal objects: an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases. We will proceed in two steps: the actual explanation, and an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། སྐྱབ་བཤད་འཇུག་གི་སྲ་བཞི་ཚི་བ། མཐུན་སྟེགས་
དང་མི་མཐུན་སྟེགས་གཉིས་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་བཞི།

The first of these comes in four parts of its own:

- 1) definitions;
- 2) divisions;
- 3) a calculation of the permutations based on whether the cases actually fit their name; and
- 4) an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not.

དང་པོ་ལ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་བསྐྱབ་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མི་རྟག་པས་མི་སྟོང་བ།

སྒྲི་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཁྲབ་མཉམ་ཡིན།

Here is the first. The following is the definition of the group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things:

All those things which are not void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which sounds are proven to be changing things in any particular logical statement.

"Changing things" and the group of similar cases in just such a proof are such that to be one is always to automatically be the other.

དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་ཚུལ་དང་མི་མཐུན་པར་མི་རྟག་པས་སྟོང་པ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་དེ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཁྲབ་མཉམ་ཡིན།

The following is the definition of the group of dissimilar cases:

All those things which are void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which this proof is made in the particular logical statement.

"All that is not a changing thing" and this same group are such that to be one is always to be the other.

གཉིས་པ་དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མིད་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས། གཞན་པ་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས། འགལ་བ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་གསུམ།

Here secondly are the divisions. The group of dissimilar cases can come in three different types:

- 1) The group of dissimilar cases that are not existing things;
- 2) The group of dissimilar cases that are something else; and
- 3) The group of dissimilar cases that are directly contradictory.

རི་བོང་རྩ་དང་པོ། །ཤེས་བྱ་གཉིས་པ། རྟག་པ་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

An example of the first would be the horns on a rabbit's head. An example of the second would be "knowable things." An example of the third would be "unchanging things."

གསུམ་པ་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་པའད
དུ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་བམ་ཞེ་ན།

Here is the third part. One may ask the following:

If something is part of a group of similar cases in any particular proof, is it then necessarily part of such a group in such a way that it fits the name of the group?

འདི་ལ་སྐྱབ་པས་སྐྱབ་སྟེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་
སྐྱབ་པའད་དུ་མེད་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་དང་
གསུམ།

Three of the permutations here hold. There do exist the following:

- 1) Something which is part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof, but which is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group;
- 2) Something which is both [part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof and which is also part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group]; and
- 3) Something which is neither [part of a group of similar cases nor part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group].

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་པའད་དུ་མེད་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན།

"That unproduced thing which is empty space" is an example of the first permutation: it is something which is part of a group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are unchanging things, but it is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྐབ་པ་ནི། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་དེ། དེ་དང་སྐྱབ་གཉིས་ཏྲག་
པར་ཚོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing [unproduced, empty space].

It is a part of the group of similar cases in the proof mentioned,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

It is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the
name of the group,
Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense
that they are both unchanging things.

གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐབ་ནི། བུམ་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་།
དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་སྐབ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Now for the second permutation: something which is both. A water pitcher
is both something which is part of the group of similar cases in a proof that
sound is changing, and also something which is part of this group in such a
way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྐབ་པ་ནི། བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་ཏྲག་པ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེའི་སྐྱབ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་དེ། བྱོད་དང་སྐྱབ་གཉིས་མི་ཏྲག་
པར་ཚོས་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན། སྐྱབ་ཡང་མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider a water pitcher.
It is so something which is part of the group of similar
cases of this same proof,
Because it is a changing thing.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Consider this same thing.

It is a part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group,

Because it is a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that they are both changing things: a water pitcher is a changing thing, and a sound is also a changing thing.

གཉེས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྐྱེ་ནི། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་
པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་པའི་
སྐྱ་གཉེས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Next is the permutation where something is neither. "The unproduced thing called 'empty space'" is something which is neither part of the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is a changing thing, nor a part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ། མི་རྟག་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེའི་སྐྱ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་དེ། བྱོད་དང་སྐྱ་གཉེས་མི་
རྟག་པར་ཚོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱོད་རྟག་པ་གང་ཞིག །སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of the group of similar cases in this same proof,

Because it is not a changing thing.

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of this same group in such a way that it fits the name of the group,

Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that they are both changing things: it is an unchanging thing, and sound is a changing thing.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྐྱོ་མི་མེད་དེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does not exist anything which would qualify as the final permutation; that is, something which was a part of the group of similar cases in such a way that it fit the name of the group, but which was not a part of the group of similar cases. This is because anything which is part of the group of similar cases in such a way that it fits the name of the group must also be part of the group of similar cases.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་ཡིན་ན་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་
པས་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། སྐྱོ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་
དང་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་ཅེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་མི་འདྲ་བར་འཇོག་
དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

When we speak of the "group" (*chok*) in the "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) we are not necessarily speaking only of the quality to be proven in the particular proof. This is because we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the "group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part* of the group of similar cases in the same proof. [This distinction has already been drawn for the reader in the translation above.]

མ་བྱུང་ན་སྟེ། མ་བྱུང་ན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱོ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་
རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་བྱ་འཕྲུལ་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་འཇུག་གཞི་དེ་ལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པ་ལས། དེ་སྐབ་
ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་ལ་བྱེད། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་དང་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པའི་འབྲེལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་
ཕྱོགས་དེ་གཉིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སམ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱོ་སྟེན་ལ་བྱེད་ཀྱང་།

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་ལ་མི་དྲག་པའི་སྤྱི་ཕྱོག་དང་གཞི་ཕྱོག་
ཐམས་ཅད་འཛོག་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's easy to see how you would prove someone wrong if they replied, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

Suppose though you say,

It's not correct [to say that we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the "group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part* of the group of similar cases in the same proof].

It is so correct to say this, because there are three different things that the word *chok* can make you think of—there are three different things that the word *chok* can refer to—when we speak of the "*chok*" in a proof that sounds are changing things. The *chok* in the word *chokchu* ("relationship between the subject and the reason") refers to the subject in the particular logical statement: the thing which the opponent doubts possesses the quality to be proven.

Then there are pair of further uses of this word: the *chok* we use when we are discussing whether or not something is part of the group of similar cases (*tunchok*), and the *chok* we use when we are discussing the object related to, within the necessary relationships in a logical statement (*kyappay drelyul gyi chok*). Both of these refer to the general type represented by the quality to be proven, or—in this case—the general type represented by "changing thing."

Finally there is the word *chok* as we use it in the expression "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) itself. Here the word must be understood as referring to everything: to both the general type and the specific instance represented by "changing thing."

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐོ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་
པས་སྐབ་བམ་ཞེ་ན།

One may ask the following question:

If something is part of the group of dissimilar cases for a particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group, is it then always something which is part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof?

འདི་ལ་སྤྱི་བུ་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་སྐྱོ་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་
ཡིན།

Three permutations hold here. The unproduced thing which is empty space is an example of the permutation where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are unchanging things in such a way that it fits the name of the group, but is not part of the group of dissimilar cases.

བུ་མ་པ་དེ་སྐྱོ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན།

A water pitcher would be an example of the permutation where something is neither, in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་སྐྱོ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་
དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན།

The unproduced thing which is empty space would be an example of the permutation where something is both part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are changing things in such a way that it fits the name of the group; and is also part of the group of dissimilar cases.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་
པའི་སྤྱི་ནི་མེད་དེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
ཀྱི་སྐྱོ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

One permutation here does not hold: where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof, but not part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group. This is because anything that is part of the group of dissimilar cases in a particular proof is always part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

གཞི་པ་མཐུན་སྟོབས་དང་མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་གཉིས་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་དབྱེད་པ་
ནི། མཐུན་སྟོབས་དེ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་དང་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། མི་མཐུན་
སྟོབས་མཐུན་སྟོབས་དང་དངོས་འགལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་མིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here lastly is the fourth point: an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not. The group of similar cases stands in direct contradiction to the group of dissimilar cases, but the group of dissimilar cases does not stand in direct contradiction to the group of similar cases. This is because the group of dissimilar cases does not exist.

གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། མཐུན་སྟོབས་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཉམས་ཡང་
དག་གི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱེས་བྱར་སྐྱབ་
པའི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because any object which can be established as existing is always part of a group of similar cases. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of a group of similar cases for some correct reason. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of the group of similar cases for a correct reason in the proof that sound in a knowable thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེས་ཉམས་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་
མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཚོས་མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་གྱི་སྐྱབ་དག་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་ཁྲུབ་བོ།

On this point, someone might come and make the following claim:

It is so true, that the group of dissimilar cases exists,
Because there does exist a group of dissimilar cases for the
proof that sounds are changing things; and also
because there does exist a "correct statement of
proof that relates to what is dissimilar."

Our answer would be: it doesn't necessary follow.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

[An actual example of a "correct statement of proof that relates to what is dissimilar" would be the following:

*Things that are unchanging are always things that are not made—
It's like the example of empty space, an unproduced thing;
And so, sounds are things that are made.]*

།གཉིས་པ་ཞར་ལ་མཐུན་དཔེ་དང་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་བཤད་པ་ལ།

Here is the second major topic—an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

མཐུན་དཔེར་བརྒྱུད་བ། མཐུན་དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བདག་མིད་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་
བྱབ་སྟེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

The definition of a similar example is: "Anything considered a similar example." Anything that lacks a self-nature is always a similar example, because anything which can be established as existing [that is, which does exist,] is always a similar example, and anything which cannot be established as existing [that is, which doesn't exist,] is also always a similar example.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། ལུས་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་
དེར་ཐལ། རི་བོང་གི་རྩ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the first part of our statement is correct,
Because "water pitcher" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

[The second part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the second part of our statement is correct,
Because "the horns on the head of a rabbit" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་
དཔེར་བརྒྱུང་བའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་སྤྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཁྲོད་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱོར་བ་ཡང་ཡོད། བྱས་ན། མི་ཏྟག་པས་བྱུང་། དཔེར་ན། ཁྲོད་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱབ་ངག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[The first part of your latest statement is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our last statement is not correct.
Consider the horns on the head of a rabbit.
They are too [a similar example],
Because they can be considered a similar example in a proof that sounds are
changing things.
And this is true because there could exist a logical statement where someone
said:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are things that are made;
It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's
head].

It is also true because there could exist a statement of proof where someone
said:

Anything that is made
Is always something that is changing;
It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's head].

རྒྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བརྒྱུང་བ། རྒྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་
དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་སྟེ། བཞིན་གྲུབ་ན་ཞེས་
སོགས་རིགས་འགྲོ། བྱས་པའི་ཏྟགས་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱར་བར་བྱའོ།།

Here is the definition of a similar example in a proof that sounds are changing
things:

Anything that can be considered a similar example in a proof that
sounds are changing things.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Anything that lacks a nature of its own is always just such an example, Because anything that can be established as existing...(and then you can just follow the same pattern as above). You can apply all this as well to a proof where "because it is something made" is used as the reason for the same assertion.

མི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བརྗེད་བ། མི་མཐུན་དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Anything which is considered a dissimilar example" is not, however, the definition of a dissimilar example. This is because no dissimilar example exists: anything that can be established as existing is always a correct similar example.

འོན་ཀྱང་སྐྱོ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱུབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་གོང་དུ་བསྐྱབས་
ཟེན།

There does however exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof that sounds are changing things; we've established all this already, earlier on.

The forms of debate:
The Two Responses to a Statement of a Reason

The great beauty of debate is that, assuming both parties stick to the rules of logic, *we must arrive at truth*. If the attacker in any particular exchange poses a series of questions in a correct, logical order, all the defender must do is give very simple answers reflecting his own beliefs—answers like "yes," or "no"—and sooner or later the truth will out. This is much like the way in which a computer program works, with switches at each logical decision point, turned "on" or "off" to indicate "yes" or "no"—and then continue on to this branch, and answer "yes" or "no," until the flowchart takes you where you must eventually go.

In an actual debate, the attacker will give his assertion in three parts: the statement of the subject, the quality to be proven about the subject, and the reason why this quality must be one that the subject possesses. He or she might say, for example,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are something hot to touch.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།
མི་རྟག་སྟེ།
ཚ་བའི་རིག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

Here "sounds" are the subject, "being a changing thing" is the quality we are trying to prove about them, and "because they are things that are something hot to touch" is the full statement of the reason we give to prove that this quality does apply to the subject in question.

This is the most common form of logical statement in a Buddhist debate, and in Tibetan ends with the word *chir*, which is the word for "because." (In Tibetan sentence order, the "because" comes at the end.) A defender who hears a statement ending in *chir* immediately begins to think of two possible answers.

The first answer is *tak ma drup* (*rtags ma grub*), which basically means, "the reason you gave doesn't apply to the subject." In our case above this is to say, "It's incorrect to say that sounds are something hot to touch."

Suppose that the attacker had instead made the following statement:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they exist.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།
མི་རྟག་སྟེ།
ཡོད་པའི་སྟེར།

Here it would be incorrect to answer *tak ma drup*, or "the reason you gave doesn't apply to the subject," because it is true that "existing" applies to "sounds"—that is, sounds do exist. Instead, the defender would answer *kyappa ma jung* (*khyab pa ma byung*), or "it doesn't necessarily follow." This is the same

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Three

as saying, "I admit it's true that sounds exist, but it doesn't necessarily follow then that they have to be changing things." After all, there are things—like emptiness or empty space—which exist but are not changing things.

Both of these answers are equivalent to saying "no," but for different reasons. They are the two classic answers because, if we assume a debate is about to take place, the attacker should begin with something to argue about—something the defender does not accept.

There are times in a debate though where an attacker is attempting to establish a certain context—trying to get the defender to accept one thing in order to go on to something else that he or she does not accept. An example would be the following:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are things that are made.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།
མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

This is a correct statement, and so the defender answers "yes" or "right." The way to give such an answer in the Tibetan language is to simply repeat the verb that the opponent has used in his or her statement. With this last statement, for example, the defender would simply say, *Yin!*—or "They are!" meaning, "Yes! They are things that are made!"

The last thing to know about these answers is: *Think carefully before you choose which one to say!* It's quite acceptable in a debate to mull over your opening response carefully, since this already decides which side of the truth you will end up at, when both you and your opponent reach the inevitable conclusion of the flowchart.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Four: Causes and Results

Selection from the collected topics:
Causes and Results

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༩ །ལྲོ་པ་རྒྱ་འབྲས་རྒྱུ་རྟེན་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་གྲོང་གསུམ་
ལས།

Here is the fifth section, which is the more elementary presentation on causes and results. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

དང་པོ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱེད་ཅེས་ན།

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Anything which can be established as existing is always either a cause, a result, or both.

ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "knowable things."

So is it then [always either a cause, a result, or both]?

Because it is [a thing which can be established as existing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that it is a thing which can be established as existing.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that "knowable things" is a thing which can be established as existing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be established as existing],

Because it can be established through valid perception as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷོ་འབྲས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "knowable things" is always either a cause, a result, or both.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, that "knowable things" is either a cause, a result, or both;

Because it is not a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say "knowable things" is not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is not a working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true [that it's not a working thing],

Because it is an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ལྷ་ཡིན་ན། འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause can never be a result.

དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.

So is it then true [that it can never be a result]?

Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you have already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause],

Because it has its own result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་

འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own result].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own result],

Because the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པར་

ཐལ། བྱིན་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing,

Because it is a produced thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱིན་གྱི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing can never be a result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement; [that is, suppose you say that a working thing can never be a result].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a result,

Because it has its own cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱིན་གྱི་སྣ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ། བྱིན་གྱི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own cause].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own cause],

Because the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱིན་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause],

Because it is a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ན། བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་མཁུ་ལྡན་ཅེས་ཀྱི་མཛད་པའི་ཐུགས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct cause can ever be an indirect cause.

དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing.

Is it then so, [that it can never be an indirect cause]?

Because it is [a direct cause].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a direct cause],

Because it is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a working thing is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Consider this same thing.

It is so a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it,
Because it's a working thing.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་
བྱང་བའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱང་བའི་བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working
thing can never be an indirect cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause,

Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment
after the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱང་བའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱང་བའི་
བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect cause of the
working thing as it will be the moment after the working thing
as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after the working
thing as it will be the moment after it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after
the working thing as it will be the moment after it,

Because it is a produced thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་ན། བརྒྱད་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct result can ever be an indirect
result.

དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing.
So can it never then be [an indirect result]?
Because it is [a direct result].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་
འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
result].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a direct result],
Because a working thing is a direct result of the working thing as it was the
moment before it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། ཁྱོད་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result of the
working thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
result of the working thing as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.
It is so a direct result of the working thing as it was the moment before it,
Because it's a thing which is made.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བརྒྱད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་བརྒྱད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working
thing can never be an indirect result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four


It is so an indirect result,
Because it is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment
before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་
བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of the
working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as
it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working
thing as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the
working thing as it was the moment before it],
Because it is a thing that was produced.



ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything that is a cause for a working thing is always a direct
cause for the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་
ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as
it was the moment before it.
So is it then [a direct cause for the working thing]?
Because it is [a cause for the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause for the working thing],

Because it is the working thing as it was the moment before it.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་
བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [which is to say, the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it is a direct cause of the working thing],

Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it is an indirect cause of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not [an indirect cause of the working thing.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an indirect cause of the working thing],

Because the working thing is its indirect result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་བརྒྱུད་
འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རང་གི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་

གྲུང་བའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་དང་རང་གི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བའི་དངོས་འབྲས་སུ་འཇོག་
ཅིང་། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རང་གི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་རང་གི་
བརྒྱུད་རྒྱ་དང་། རང་གི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་རང་གི་དངོས་རྒྱུར་འཇོག་དགོས་པའི་
ལྟར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it].

It is so true, that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it,

Because working things are established as being the indirect results of the working things as they were the moment before the working things as they were the moment before them; and as the direct results of the working things as they were the moment before them. And working things as they were the moment before the working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the indirect causes of working things, while working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the direct causes of those working things.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་
འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པས་བྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the direct result of a working thing must always be a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Consider the working thing as it will be the moment after it.
So is it then [a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the
working thing]?
Because it is [a direct result of the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་འབྲས་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment
after it is a direct result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be
the moment after it is a direct result of the working thing].
It is so true, that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is a direct
result of the working thing,
Because it is a changing thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་
སུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་དུས་
མཉམ་དུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing as it will be
the moment after it is a result corresponding to that which has
grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [and say that a working thing as
it will be the moment after it is a result corresponding to that which has
grown directly from the working thing.]

Consider a working thing as it will be the moment after it.
It is not a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the
working thing,
Because it is something which occurs at the same time as that which has
grown directly from the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་དུས་མཉམ་དུ་
སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it, is something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing],

Because it is something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་མ་
སྐྱེས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱང་མེད། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing.]

It is so [something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing],

Because (1) there is no point in time where the working thing as it will be the moment after it has already occurred, but where the direct result of the working thing has yet to grow; and (2) neither is there any point in time where the direct result of a working thing has already occurred, but where the working thing as it will be the moment after it has yet to grow.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བུས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། བུས་པའི་ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a material cause of the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་བའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཚོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་ཉེར་ལེན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འབྲེལ་བ་ཁས།

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
So is he then a material cause of the water pitcher?
Because he is a cause for the water pitcher.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a cause for the water pitcher],

Because he is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་རང་གི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་རང་གི་རྗེས་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a contributing factor for the water pitcher],

Because he is something which gives rise to a result of his where he is contributing to its creation, and he is making this contribution in a way where he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། ལུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལུམ་པའི་ཉེར་ལེན་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལུམ་པ་རང་གི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་དུ་གཏོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a material cause of the water pitcher.]

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
It isn't so the case, the he is a material cause for the pitcher,
Because he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་ཕྱི་མར་རྒྱུར་པའི་ལུམ་པ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material].
Consider this same person.
It is so true, [that he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material],
Because there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གང་ཟག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same material].

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same material].
Consider this same person.
It is so true, [to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same material],
Because he is a person.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། བུམ་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པས་འབྲུག་ཟེར་
ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a contributing factor for the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ་རྒྱར་པའི་འཇིམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། འབྲུག་པ་ཁས།

Consider the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
So is it then [a contributing factor for the water pitcher]?
Because it is [a cause of the water pitcher].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་འབྲེད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a cause of the water pitcher],
Because the water pitcher is its result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། འབྲེད་རང་གི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་འཇིམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། འབྲེད་ཀྱི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་འཇིམ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a result of the cause of a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a result of the clay which acts as a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider a water pitcher.
It is so a result of the clay which acts as its cause,
Because there does exist clay which acts as its cause.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལུས་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་གྱེད་རྒྱུན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལུས་
པའི་ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the clay which acts as a cause
for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the clay which acts
as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water
pitcher].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it acts as a contributing factor for the water pitcher],
Because it is the material cause for the water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པས་སྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause is always a material cause.

མར་མི་སྐད་ཅིག་ཐ་མ་ཚོས་ཅན། དར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། སྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.
So is it then [a material cause]?
Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant
of its existence is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at
the last instant of its existence is a cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause],
Because it is a working thing.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། མར་མེ་སྐྱད་ཅིག་ཐ་མ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཉེར་ལེན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
རང་གི་ཉེར་འབྲས་རང་གི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་སྤྱི་མར་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause].

Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.

It is so true, that it is not a material cause,

Because it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་སྤྱི་མ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.]

Because there is no later continuation of this same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་ཆད་ཁ་མའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no later continuation of this same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no later continuation of this same material].

It is so true, [that there is no later continuation of this same material],

Because this flame is a working thing at the point where the continuation of the same material is about to be cut off.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གྲུབ་བདེ་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན། གྲུབ་བདེ་རྗེས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If two things are the same in the sense of being co-occurring,
then they are always the same in the sense that to be one is to
automatically be the other.

ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དོག་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དྲི་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

སྐྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a
piece of sandalwood.

So are they then [the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the
other]?

Because they are [the same in the sense of being co-occurring].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྒྱུད་གཉིས་སྐྱབ་པ་དུས་མཉམ། གནས་པ་

དུས་མཉམ། འཇིག་པ་དུས་མཉམ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of piece of sandalwood
and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense
of being co-occurring.]

Consider these same things.

They are so [the same in the sense of being co-occurring],

Because they come about at the same time, they stay at the same time, and
they stop at the same time.

སྐྱབ་སྟེ་དེ་གྲུབ་བདེ་གཅིག་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because this is what it means to be "co-occurring."

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དྲི་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དོག་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། གྲུབ་

བདེ་རྗེས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྗེས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other].

It is not so, that they are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other,

Because they are not things that are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དོག་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། རྗེས་གཅིག་
མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རོ་བོ་སོ་སོ་བར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider the two of the smell of a piece of sandalwood and the color of a piece of sandalwood.

It is so true that they are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other,

Because they are existing things which come about in such a way that to be one is not to automatically be the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྗེས་རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན། རྗེས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Any things which are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other are also always such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

ཉེར་ལེན་ནས་དོག་གཅིག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ནས་འབྲུ་ཆེ་ཆུང་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། རྗས་
གཅིག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྗས་རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley.
So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?
Because they are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་ཉེར་ལེན་གཅིག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཐ་དང་
པའི་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other].

Consider these same things.

They are so [such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other],

Because they are produced things which are separate, and which have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

བྱབ་སྟེ། རྗས་རིགས་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་གི་དོན། རང་གི་ཉེར་ལེན་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་
ལ་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྗས་རིགས་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་གི་དོན་བཤད་ཚུལ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because the question of whether two things are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other is something you must decide by determining whether they have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། རྩས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཇོ་བོ་གཅིག་
པར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། ཇོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same two things.

It is not so, [that they are such that to be one is to automatically be the other],
Because they are not existing objects which come about in such a way that to be one is to be the other;

And this is true because they are such that to be one is not to be the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever things are of the same type, they are also always such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

ཕྱི་དཀར་ནག་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་གཅིག་
ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body.

So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?

Because they are of the same type.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ལྗོག་པ་རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are of the same type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are of the same type].

Consider these same things.

They are so [of the same type],

Because they are of the same general type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། གང་ཟག་གང་གིས་ཡིད་གཏད་པས་མཐོང་
ཅམ་ཉིད་ནས་འདི་དང་འདི་འདྲའོ་སྐྱམ་པའི་སྟོང་ང་གི་སྐྱིད་རྣམས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are of the same general type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are of the same general type].
They are so [of the same general type],

Because they are existing things that fit the following description: they give the immediate, natural impression of "This thing is similar to the other," to anyone who focusses upon them.

ཁྱབ་སྟེ། ལྗོག་པ་རིགས་གཅིག་གི་དོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there does exist something we mean when we say that a number of things are of the same general type.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཉེ། བན་རྒྱན་འབྲེལ་མེད་དོན་གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same things.

They are not so that to be one is to automatically be the other,
Because they are things such that to be one is not to automatically be the other;
And this is because they are completely separate objects, neither of which shares any relationship with the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་འབྲས་
ཡིན་པས་སྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a result of the material of a working thing is
always a material result of the working thing.

དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་
འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.

So is it then a material result of the working thing?

Because it is a result of the material of a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it did necessarily follow.

མ་སྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་གི་ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྲོད་གྱི་ཉེར་
ལེན་དེ། སྲོད་གྱི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so the result of the material of a working thing,
Because the material from which it came was its cause.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing is a material result of the working thing.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a working thing is a material result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, the material result of the working thing,
Because it is not a result of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is not a result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is not a result of the working thing].

It is so not its own result,

Because it is a thing which has no self-nature.

གཉིས་པ་རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྒྱུད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
རྒྱུ་འབྲས་བུ་དངོས་པོ་གསུམ་དོན་གཅིག་

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Here next is the second part, where we present our own position. There does exist a definition of a cause, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about something else.

"Cause," "result," and "working thing" all refer to the same thing.

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing.

And this is true because, whenever something is a working thing, the definition of its cause is always "the thing which brings it about."

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་དང་། དངོས་པོའི་
བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Causes for working things can be divided into two kinds: direct causes for working things and indirect causes for working things.

དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེད་ལོགས་རྒྱུ་བྱང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the direct cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before it.

དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱད་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱད་ནས་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྣ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྣ་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་དང་བརྒྱད་རྒྱུ་
ལ་རིགས་འགྲོ།

There does exist a definition for the indirect cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect causes of all kinds of working things.

ཡང་དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་དང་དངོས་པོའི་
ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Causes for working things can also be divided into another two types, which are (1) material causes for working things and (2) contributing factors for working things.

དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་རྣམས་རྒྱུ་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་
སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱས་
པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the material cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing primarily as a continuation of the same material.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: the thing which is made and which acts as a cause for a working thing, [meaning here the working thing as it was the moment before—such as clay for a pot].

དངོས་པོའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་རྫས་རྒྱུ་མ་
ཡིན་པར་རྫས་སུ་གཏོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ།
དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་གང་ཟག་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the contributing factor for a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing, but not primarily as a continuation of the same material.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: a person who acts as a cause for a particular working thing; [such as a potter for a pot].

འབྲས་བུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a result, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about.

དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་དངོས་
པོའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Results of working things can be divided into two different types: direct results of working things and indirect results of working things.

དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་སུ་བརྒྱུད་བྱ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the direct result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱུད་ནས་བརྒྱུད་བྱ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་དངོས་པོ་གཞན་གྱི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་བརྒྱུད་
འབྲས་ལ་རིགས་འབྲེ།

There does exist a definition for the indirect result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect results of all kinds of working things.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་སྤོང་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་ལེན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is the third major part in our presentation, which is where we eliminate our opponents' rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

So is it then the case that there exist no material causes for working things at all? Because it is the case that a working thing as it was the moment before it is no such cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉེར་ལེན་མ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དངོས་པོར་འགྱུར་ངེས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It is so true, that it is no material cause for the working thing,
Because there is no certainty that it will become the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོར་འགྱུར་ངེས་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོར་གྱུར་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྱབ།

[It's not correct to say that there is no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

It is so true, that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing,
Because it has already become the working thing.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེ་ལོགས་སུ་གྱུར་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོར་གྱུར་ཟིན་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it has already become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it has already become the working thing].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It has so already become the working thing,
Because it is a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀ་གུམ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉེར་ལེན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true, that they have their material causes,
Because they are working things.

Remember, you already agreed that it follows.

འདོད་ན། ཀ་གུམ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་དུ་འགྱུར་ངེས་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉེར་
ལེན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

[We agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Suppose you agree [that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes].

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is it then the case, that there is something which will with certainty become them?

Because they have their material causes.

Remember, you have agreed to our statement [that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes].

འདོད་ན། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དུ་འགྱུར་
ངེས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན། གོང་དུ་མ་བྱུང།

Suppose you agree [that it is the case that there are things which will with certainty become them.]

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is there then a thing which is them?

Because there are things which will with certainty become them.

To this we answer: "We respond 'It doesn't necessarily follow' to the last one."

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་རྒྱུའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང། བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རང་
གི་རྒྱུ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

We have stated that, if something is a working thing, then it is always a result of its cause. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim concerning this statement:

Consider "its cause."

So is it then a result of its cause?

Because it is a working thing.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རང་གི་རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཉེ། རང་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's not correct [to say that "its cause" is a working thing],

Because it has no cause;

And this is true because it's an unchanging thing.

ཁོ་ན་དེ། བྱམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a water pitcher.
So is it then the cause and the result?
Because it is both a cause and a result.

མ་འབྲས་སྟེ། བྱམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏེ། གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a water pitcher.
It is not so, that it is the cause and the result,
Because it is not separate things;
And this is true because it is one thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ །དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་
ཡིན་པས་འབྲས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is so true, that there exists a cause of what is not
unchanging,
Because anything which is a cause is always a cause for
what is not changing.

མི་འཐད་དེ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་འབྲས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,
Because nothing which is a cause is ever a cause for what is not changing.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because nothing which can be established as existing can ever be a cause for what is not unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a result.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a working thing.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་དང་། དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes once more, and makes the following claim:

Isn't it the case, that there does exist one thing which can be both (1) the cause of a working thing and (2) a result of the working thing? Because there does exist the result of a working thing that serves as the cause of a working thing.

མ་སྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོ་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so by the way true that there does exist the result of a working thing that serves as the cause of a working thing,
Because the working thing that acts as the cause for a working thing is a cause.
And this is so,
Because it is a working thing.

གཞན་ཡང་། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་དངོས་
པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is moreover true that there exists a result of a working thing which acts as
the cause of a working thing,
Because a working thing is a result of a working thing which acts as the cause
of a working thing;
And this is true because it is a working thing as it will be the moment after it
which acts as the cause of a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་
བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a working thing as it will
be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a working
thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a working
thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a
working thing.]

Consider a working thing.
It is so [a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as its
cause],
Because it is a produced thing.

བྱས་པ་ལ། ཁོ་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་
མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་དང་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུའི་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose that someone comes and makes the following claim with regard to
our last argument:

Consider a working thing.
Isn't it the case that there doesn't even exist a result of it which is its
cause?
Because isn't it true that there exists no object which is both its cause
and its result?

མ་ཁྱེད་ལྟོ། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱོད་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་དེ་རྟོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer here is: "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a working thing.
It is so true, that there exists a result of it which acts as its cause,
Because (1) there exists a version of it which acts as its cause, and (2) this
version is not something unchanging.

*Formal logic subject:
The definition of a correct logical statement,
and the three relations*

གཉིས་པ་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། ཚུལ་གསུམ་གང་ཞེ་ན། ཕྱོགས་ཚོས། ཇིས་བྱུང་། ལྷོག་བྱུང་གསུམ་
མོ། །དེ་རྣམས་སོ་སོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། ལྷོག་བྱུང་གི་རིགས་པ་དང་
གསུམ།

Here secondly we will explain the definition of a correct reason.

A correct reason is defined as:

A reason where the three relationships hold.

What are the three relationships? They are the following three: the relationship
between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason
and the quality to be proven; and the reverse necessity between the reason and
the quality to be proven. Here now we will give the definition, classical
examples, and supporting arguments for each.

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་རྒྱུབ་ཀྱི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་རྒྱོན་མེད་ཀྱི་སྤང་དུ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་
པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ། དེ་རྒྱུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Here is the first. The "relationship between the subject and the reason" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the subject of the proof—the object about which the opponent entertains his doubt—in the way asserted.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་
ངེས་པ་དེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases for the proof, in the way asserted.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་དོན་ཕྱོག་དང་འབྲེལ་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་དེ། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོག་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The "reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, in the way asserted, due to its relationship to the general type represented by the explicit form of the quality to be proven.

འོན་ཀྱང་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་དག་ནི་གོ་བ་གཙོ་བོར་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དེར་ངེས་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
སྐྱ་དེ་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་གསུམ་ཀ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་མཚན་བྱ་དེ་
ནམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

These definitions, however, are only meant to convey the principal sense of what each relationship is; something can, however, satisfy one of them and still not be a correct reason. Sound, for example, satisfies all three of these definitions in a proof that sound is a changing thing, but is none of the things defined by any of the three.

གཞི་ལ་སྐྱུར་ཏེ་རྒྱལ་པར་འགོད་ན། སྐྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱོ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་
པའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། སྐྱོད་སྐྱོ་དང་པན་ཚུན་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཚུལ་
ཀྱིས་སྐྱའི་སྟངས་དུ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ། སྐྱོད་
སྐྱོ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Suppose we now relate these in more detail, to specific applications. The holding of the "relationship between the subject and the reason in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) "Sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where the particular thing is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing; and
- (2) This particular thing is also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted—while it is also the case that it and sound are separate from each other.

སྐྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱོ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་
ཡང་དག་ཡོད། སྐྱོད་མི་རྟག་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ། སྐྱོད་སྐྱོ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཁོན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ། སྐྱོད་སྐྱོ་མི་
རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་སྐྱབ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The holding of the "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དྲགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་མི་
མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད། ཁྱོད་མི་དྲག་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The holding of the "negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "dissimilar example," involving both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

མཚན་གཉི་ནི། བྱས་པ་དེ་བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས།
རྗེས་བྱུང་། ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་གསུམ་ཀ་ཡིན།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Here is the classical example. "Something which is made" is an example where, in a proof where "something which is made" is being used as the reason to prove that sound is something changing, all three hold: the relationship between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven; and the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven.

སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ནི། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here next are the supporting arguments.

Consider "something which is made."
It is so a case where the relationship between the subject and the reason holds,
in a proof that sound is something changing,
Because it fits the definition given.

ཅ་ཉགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱས་པའི་ཉགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱིད་བྱས་པའི་ཉགས་ཀྱིས་
སྐྱ་མི་ཉགས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྩོད་གཞིར་བཟུང་བ་གང་ཞིག །བྱིད་བྱས་པར་ཚད་མས་
ངེས་ནས་བྱིད་མི་ཉག་པ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་ཤེས་འདོད་ཞུགས་པའི་གང་ཟུག་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct: it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our original statement is not correct, [which is to say, it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing].

Consider sound.
It does so provide the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Because (1) it is considered the basis of contention in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing; and (2) it is possible that there exists a person who, once they have ascertained through valid perception that sound is something made, still doubts whether or not sound is a changing thing.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་ཉག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་སྟོར་བ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct.]

The first part of our reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is made.

གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་བྱས་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་ནས་སྒྲ་མི་ཉག་པར་ཚད་མས་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

The second part of our reason is so correct,
Because there do exist people who, once they have ascertained through valid perception that sound is something made, still doubt whether or not sound is a changing thing.

ཅུ་ཉག་སྟེ་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱིད་སྒྲ་དང་ཕན་ཚུན་
ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག་བྱིད་སྒྲའི་སྟེང་དུ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་
ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original statement is not correct: it is not correct to say that "something which is made" is also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted; and that it is also the case that "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Suppose you say that the second part of our original statement is not correct. Consider "something which is made."

It is so [also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted; and it is so moreover the case that "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other],

Because (1) "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other, and (2) "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.

གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགོད་ཚུལ་ཡིན་འགོད་ཡིན། སྐྱ་
བྱོད་ཡིན། སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྣང་དུ་བྱོད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་རྣམས་སྐྱ།

[The second part of your last reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.]

The second part of our last reason is so true,

Because (1) the way in which the reason is set forth utilizes the verb "is"; (2) sound is something made, and (3) "something which is made" applies to the subject, "sound." All the parts of this reason are easy to accept.

བུམ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་སྐྱ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཇེས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་
ཉིད་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "something which is made."

It is so a case where the positive relationship between the reason and the quality to be proven holds, in a proof that sound is something changing,

Because it fits the definition given.

ཅུ་དྲགས་དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
དྲགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct—which is to say, there does not exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

The first part of our original statement on this point is so correct,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Because "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུ་མ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཚོས་
གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་བྱས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བརྒྱུང་བ་གང་ཞིག །སྐྱའི་སྣང་དུ་བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་པས་བྱབ་པ་ཚད་
མས་མ་ངེས་པའི་སྣ་རོལ་དུ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྣང་དུ་བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་པས་བྱབ་པ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་
པའི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a correct similar example, incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing,

Because (1) it can be considered a similar example in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing; and (2) there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to it [that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher].

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱོ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཉག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་
བཞེན་ཞེས་པའི་སྟོར་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your last reason is not correct.]

The first part of our last reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is made.
It's like, for example, a water pitcher.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱོ་མི་ཉག་པར་ཚད་མས་མ་
ངེས་པའི་སྐྱོ་རོལ་དུ་བུམ་པ་མི་ཉག་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་
དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྐྱོ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྐྱོ་
མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.
Consider all knowable things.

There does so [exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before
he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which
is made must always be something which is changing" applies to
sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that
"something which is made must always be something which is
changing" applies to it (that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher),.

Because there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof
who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that
"something which is made must always be something which is
changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid
perception, the fact that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

And this is true because there does exist a correct opponent for the proof that
sound is a changing thing.

And this is true because what it means to be a correct opponent for the proof
that sound is a changing thing is exactly what we just mentioned.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཕོ་ལ་ཡང་དག་དེས་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་ཚད་མས་མ་ངེས་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་
བུམ་པ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྟགས་གཉིས་ཚོས་
ཅན་གྱིས་སྐབ་

And this is true because a correct opponent for this particular proof is a person who (1) has not yet ascertained, with a valid perception, that sound is something changing; and who (2) has already ascertained, with a valid perception, that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

The two points of the reason are established by the very subject at hand.

ཅ་ཏྟགས་གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་མི་ཏྟག་པ་ལ་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason is not related to "changing thing."]

The second part of our original statement is so correct, Because the reason is related to "changing thing" in such a way that to be the reason is to automatically be a changing thing.

ཅ་ཏྟགས་གསུམ་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཏྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་འགོད་ཚུལ་ཡིན་འགོད་
གང་ཞིག །སྐབ་ཚུལ་ཡིན་སྐབ་ཡིན། བྱོད་མི་ཏྟག་པ་ཡིན། བྱོད་ཡིན་ན། མི་ཏྟག་
པ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason is not ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.]

The third part of our original statement is so correct, Because (1) the proof in which "something made" appears as a reason is one where "is" is used as the verb with the reason; and (2) the verb used with the quality to be proven is "is," (3) the reason given is a changing thing, and (4) anything which is something made is automatically a changing thing.

དང་པོ་སྒྲུབ། གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་ཚུལ་ཡིན་སྐྱབ་
དང་། ཡོད་གྲུབ་གང་རུང་གང་ཞིག་ །སྤྱི་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first point is easy.
The second is so true,
Because (1) it appears as a reason in a proof where the verb used with the
quality to be proven could have been either "is" or "exists," and (2) here
it is not the latter.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say that "it
is something made" appears as a reason in a proof where the
verb used with the quality to be proven could have been either
"is" or "exists."]

The first of the two points is so true,
Because it has been set forth as a reason in the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་
བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རྟགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་
འཇུག་པའི་རྟགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say that
here it is not the latter.]

Suppose you say that the second of the two points is not correct.
So is it then the case that "something which is made" is used here as a reason
which covers the entire group of similar cases in a proof where
"changing things exist" is being proven about sound?
Because there does exist a reason which covers the entire group of similar
cases in the particular proof.

འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your statement that "something which is made" is used here
as a reason which covers the entire group of similar cases in a
proof where "changing things exist" is being proven about
sound.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

Suppose you agree with our statement.
Consider all knowable things.
So are they then something which is made?
Because changing things exist with them.

རྟོགས་གསུམ་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your reason above is incorrect: the reason given is not a changing thing.]

The third part of our reason above is so correct,
Because the reason given is "something which is made."

རྟོགས་བཞི་པ་འབྲུད་དོ།

And we can throw out any objection to the fourth part of our reason, [which states that anything which is something made is automatically a changing thing].

བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྗོངས་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider [the reason] "something which is made."
It is so true, that the negative necessity holds with it in a proof that sound is a changing thing,
Because it fits the given definition.

ཅུ་རྟོགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་ཏེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it fits the first part of the original definition; that is, there does not exist a correct "dissimilar example," involving both the reason and the quality to be proven.]

It does fit the first part [of the original definition of whether the negative necessity holds],
Because "empty space, an unproduced thing" is just such an example.

ཅུ་རྟོགས་གཉིས་པ་སྐྱབ་ཟེན། ཅུ་རྟོགས་གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་
བྱས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

We have already established that it fits the second part [of the original definition; that is, the reason ("something made") does relate to "changing thing"].

It does fit the third part [of the original definition; that is, "something which is made" is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing],

Because nothing which is made ever applies to those things which are not changing.

*The forms of debate:
Formulating a statement of necessity*

One of the most powerful tools in logic, and in the debate ground, is called the "statement of necessity," which is *telngyur* in Tibetan (*thal-'gyur*) and *prasaṅgika* in Sanskrit. This form of logical statement is believed by the highest school of Buddhism, the upper half of the Madhyamika or Middle-Way Group of philosophers, to have the power to give an opponent a correct understanding of emptiness even before going on to a standard assertion—and because of this belief, the school is called the "Madhyamika Prasangika," or the "Necessity" School of the Middle-Way Group.

The word "necessity" here most often implies an absurdity which would be a necessary consequence if the opponent's incorrect statement were true. As such, the name of the highest school is sometimes rendered into English as the "Consequence" School of the Middle-Way Group.

In debate, a statement of necessity is most often used right after the opponent has objected to a standard assertion, such as in the following example. We have just given the statement,

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is a thing which is made.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན།

མི་རྟག་སྟེ།

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

The opponent then answered,

Your reason is incorrect. (Which is to say, "Sound is not a thing which is made.")

རྟོགས་མ་བྱུབ།

We then reply with a statement of necessity, in this case pointing out an absurd consequence of our opponent's position:

Let's consider sound again.
So is it then something which is unchanging?

སྐྱོམ་ཅན།

རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་པར་བྲལ།

Whenever we are using a statement of necessity in the sense of pointing out an absurd consequence of the opponent's position, our voice in the Tibetan descends at the end of the statement, on the word *tel*. In Tibetan this is the equivalent of a sarcastic statement like "Oh, so I suppose you're telling me then that sound is an unchanging thing?"

There are however also times when we use a statement of necessity to express something that we *do* believe is necessarily true. An example would be the following statement, which we might use in debate if the opponent has said "That's right" to our last statement above. (In other words, he has said, "It's right that sound is something which is unchanging.")

Let's consider sound again.
It is *not* the case that it is something which is unchanging,
Because it is a working thing.

སྐྱོམ་ཅན།

རྟོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བྲལ།

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Four

In this case, because we believe in the statement, our voice in Tibetan rises at the end of the statement, again on the word *tel*. This is the equivalent in Tibetan of something like "I told you so! Sound could never be something which is unchanging!"

A statement of necessity in debate, finally, often follows a statement of a general truth, such as the following. Suppose an opponent comes and says,

If something is the color of a flower, it must always be a white color.

མི་ཏོག་གི་ཁ་དོག་ཡིན་ན། ཁ་དོག་དཀར་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱུང།

We would then retaliate with,

Consider the color of a red rose.
So is it then a white color?
Because it is the color of a flower.

རྒྱལ་སྐལ་མི་ཏོག་དམར་པོའི་ཁ་དོག་ཚོས་ཅན།
ཁ་དོག་དཀར་པོ་ཡིན་པར་བྱུང།
མི་ཏོག་གི་ཁ་དོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Of course in this case our voice would drop on the *tel*, indicating that we ourselves would never believe this absurd consequence of our opponent's position. In the next lesson, we will learn about the traditional responses to a statement of necessity.

READING FIVE WAS NOT TRANSLATED.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Six: Negative and Positive

Selection from the collected topics:
Negative and Positive

The selection here is from a monastic textbook popularly known as The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trashī, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༘ །།དགག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་སྐྱབ་
པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Here next is a presentation on the concepts of negative and positive. We will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a working thing must always be something positive.

སྐྱབ་པ་ཉལ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་
ལས།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Consider the fact that sound is not unchanging.
So is it then something positive?
Because it is a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

འདོད་ན། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the fact that sound is not unchanging is something positive.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider the fact that sound is not unchanging.
It is not so, that it is something positive,
Because it is something negative.

དེར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་ཏྟགས་པའི་སྐྱོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་
ཏྟགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱས་རང་གི་
དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that sound is not unchanging is something negative.]

It is so,
Because (1) it is a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies; and (2) it is a thing which must be expressed through a process where the wording used to express it does so through a process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.

ཏྟགས་གཉིས་པ་བྱུབ་སྟེ། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱས་སྐྱ་ཏྟག་པ་ཡིན་པ་ཚོག་ཟེན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་འཇོན་
པའི་སྐོ་ལ་ཡང་རིགས་འདྲ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

[The second part of your last statement is not correct: the fact that sound is not unchanging is not a thing which must be expressed through a process where the actual wording used to express it does so through a process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.]

The second part of our last statement is so true,
Because the expression "sound is not unchanging" is one where the fact that sound is not unchanging is expressed through eliminating, directly, the idea that sound is something unchanging—by saying so explicitly.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་མེད་ཚོག་སྐྱར་བའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་ན། མེད་
དགག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever the actual name for something incorporates a word for the absence of something, then the thing is always a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེ་དཔག་མེད་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" (Amitayus).
So is he [a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something]?
Because he is [something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེ་དཔག་མེད་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེ་དཔག་
མེད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག དེའི་མཐར་མེད་
ཚོག་སྐྱར་བ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

[It's not correct to say that the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" is something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life."

He is so [something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something],

Because (1) the term "the Buddha known as 'Limitless Life'" is his actual name, and (2) the fact that his name incorporates a word for the absence of something is an example of the obvious level of reality.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན་སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེ་དཔག་མེད་ཚོས་ཅན། མེད་དགག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life."

It is not so, that he is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something,

Because he is a working thing.

མ་ཁྲུབ་ན་ཁྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ན་ཏྟག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

Suppose you say that it doesn't necessarily follow.

It does so necessarily follow,

Because anything which is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something is always an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་བའི་ཚོས་
ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a negative thing is always a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name.

ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་བའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ལས།

Consider space.

So is it then a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name?

Because it is a negative thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ། ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider space.

It is so a negative thing,

Because it is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ། ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཐོག་རིག་བཅད་ཅམ་
གྱི་མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider space.

It is so a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something,

Because, by being the simple elimination of all obstruction, it is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

དེར་ཐལ། འདུས་མ་གུས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space, by being the simple elimination of all obstruction, it is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
It is so,
Because it is that space which is an unproduced thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་
བའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་གི་ཟུར་དུ་དགག་ཚིག་མིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: space is a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider space.
It is not so a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name,
Because there is no term of negation that forms a part of its actual name.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་གི་ཟུར་དུ་དགག་ཚིག་མིད་
པར་ཐལ། ནམ་མཁའ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །ནམ་
དང་མཁའ་ཞེས་པ་གཉིས་གང་ཡང་དགག་ཚིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no term of negation that forms a part of the actual name of "space."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider space.
It is so true, that there is no term of negation that forms a part of its actual name,
Because (1) the expression "space" (*nam-ka*) is its actual name, and (2) neither of the two parts of this expression, *nam* or *ka*, is a term of negation.

གཞན་ཡང་། ཚོས་ཉིད་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་

བའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེད་པ་ལས།

We can also make this point another way.
Consider the nature of things.
So is this then a thing where its actual name incorporates a term of negation?
Because it is a negative thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

རྟོགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the nature of things is a negative thing.]

It is correct,
Because the nature of things is a negative thing in the sense of being the
absence of something.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་དགག་ཚིག་མ་སྤྱད་ཀྱང་།
རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྟོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་
པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree with your original statement: the nature of things is a thing
where its actual name incorporates a term of negation.]

But you can't agree with our original statement,
Because—even though it is a thing where its actual name incorporates no term
of negation—the nature of things is a thing which must be perceived by
the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of
eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.

བྱེད་སྟེ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྟོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་
རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་ན་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Because anything which a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies is always a negative thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཞུགས་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་
རྟོགས་པའི་སློབ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose that, on this point, someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider physical things.

Are they then negative things?

Because they are things which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཞུགས་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པས་
རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny].

Consider physical things.

They are so such things,

Because they are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཞུགས་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་འཇིག་པའི་རྟོག་པས་རང་མ་ཡིན་
པ་རྣམས་པར་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྱབ།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Consider physical things.

They are so such things,

Because they are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not.

To this last we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཟུགས་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱིན་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པས་བྱིན་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་
བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱིན་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you said that it wasn't correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not].

Consider physical things.

They are so things which must be perceived through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not,

Because they can be established as existing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ལུ་མ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a water pitcher.

It is not so true, that it is something positive,

Because it is something negative.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུ་མ་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་
རྟོག་པས་རང་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is something negative].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so something negative,

Because it is a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྟོན་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པས་རྟོན་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོན་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not,

Because it is something which can be established as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ལུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

And suppose you did agree to that original statement [that a water pitcher is something negative].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is not so true, that it is a negative thing,

Because it is a positive thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། ལྷོད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལུམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a positive thing.]

Consider a water pitcher.
It is so a positive thing,
Because it is one and the same as a water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་
བཀག་ལུལ་དུ་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕྲིན་པའི་
ཚོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a negative in the sense of not being something,
then it is always a thing where the term which expresses it
directly implies something else—either a negative in the same
sense or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

ལྷ་ས་སྤྱི་ཚོ་པོ་ཉི་ཤེས་པར་བྱས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་
ཁས།

Consider the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day.
So is it then [a thing where the term which expresses it directly implies
something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something,
or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies]?
Because it is [something negative in the sense of not being something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱི་ཚོ་པོ་ཉི་ཤེས་པར་བྱས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་གི་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་
ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕྲིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is something negative in the sense of not being something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day. It is so a negative in the sense of not being something, because it is a thing where the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་
མོ་ཟ་བ་ལྷགས་ལ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is a thing where the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.]

It is so,

Because (1) the term which expresses it directly denies that he eats during the day, and implies indirectly that he eats at night; and (2) the fact that he eats at night is something positive.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། ལྷས་སྐྱིན་ཚོན་པའི་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་
རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་མི་འཕེན་ཀྱང་ལྷགས་ལ་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: The fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is a thing where the term which expresses it directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

You can't agree to our original statement,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Because even though the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" does not directly imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies, it nonetheless does so indirectly.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷ་ས་སྦྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་
བྱ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་བྱ་བ་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྲིན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that, even though the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" does not directly imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies, it nonetheless does so indirectly.]

It is so,

Because the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" directly denies that he eats during the day, and indirectly implies that he eats at night.

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ལྷ་ས་སྦྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་རང་
གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་
གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྲིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕྱུང་བ་
ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་
ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྲིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

It is not so, that the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording,

Because it is not true that the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

རྟུགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་
ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་
ཤུགས་གང་རུང་དུ་མི་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And it is correct to say that it is correct [to say that the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording],
Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" neither indirectly nor directly implies something else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་འཕུང་བ་ཚིག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕེན་
པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so,
Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so,
Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" must be considered a negative thing in the sense of an absence of something.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་

ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་བཞུན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་
འཕྲིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a negative thing in the sense of not being something, then it is always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider an unchanging thing.

So is it then [always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording]?

Because it is [a negative thing in the sense of not being something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་གང་ཞིག་
ཤིང་དགག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an unchanging thing is a negative thing in the sense of not being something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider an unchanging thing.

It is so a negative thing in the sense of not being something, Because (1) it is a negative thing, and (2) it is not a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

རྟག་ས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that an unchanging thing is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.
Consider an unchanging thing.
It is so a negative thing,
Because it is unchanging.

མ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་ཁྱེད་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པར་གྱུར་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་རང་དབང་བ་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not necessarily the case that something is unchanging just because it is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not necessarily the case.
It is so necessarily the case,
Because there is no such thing as a discrete object which is a positive thing and still unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱབ་པ་རང་དབང་བ་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no such thing as a discrete object which is a positive thing and still unchanging.]

It is so,
Because anything that is a discrete object which is a positive thing must always be a working thing.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱས་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕྲིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་
པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree with the original statement above: an unchanging thing is always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

You can't agree with the original statement above,

Because even though an unchanging thing is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—it is not something that does so incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདི་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that, even though an unchanging thing is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—it is not something that does so incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so,
Because [in the Tibetan] the expression "unchanging" [*takpa*] does not incorporate a negative term.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་
རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཉིད་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—must always be a negative thing.

བྱས་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། རང་ཉིད་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་
ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a thing which is made.
So is it then a negative thing?
Because it is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་
དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་
བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུན་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is made is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive].

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider a thing which is made.
It is so such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive,
Because the term which expresses it implies that it had causes and conditions.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: a thing which is made is a negative thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider a thing which is made.
It is not so, that it is a negative thing,
Because it is a positive thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག དེ་
གཉིས་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is made is a positive thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
A thing which is made is so a positive thing,
Because working things are positive things, and the two are similar cases.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། ལྷོ་བ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a thing which is made.
It is not so, that it is a positive thing,
Because it's a negative thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷོ་བྱས་པ་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a thing which is made is a
negative thing].
A thing which is made is so a negative thing,
Because the fact that sound is something which is made is a negative
thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། ལྷོ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པའི་ལྷོ་འདིས་ལྷོ་བྱས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྲལ།

And suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the fact that sound
is something which is made is a negative thing].
It is so,
Because the expression "sound is something which is made" is a thing
which must be expressed in such a way that eliminates the
possibility that sound could not be something which is made.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow" [that, because the
expression "sound is something which is made" is a thing which must
be expressed in such a way that eliminates the possibility that sound
could not be something which is made, then the fact that sound is
something which is made must be a negative thing].

འོ་ན། བྱོད་རང་ལ་གཟུགས་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་
ལྷོ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Well then, according to you physical things must be negative things,
Because physical things are things such that the expression "physical things"
must be expressed in such a way that eliminates everything which is not
a physical thing.

འདོད་ན། སྐབ་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་སྐབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
[I agree physical things must be negative things.]

Suppose you agree.
So are there then no positive things at all?
Because physical things are not positive things.

འདོད་ན། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། སྐབ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
[I agree that there are no positive things at all.]

Suppose you agree.
So is it then the case that anything which can be established as existing is
always something negative?
Because there exist no positive things.

དྲགས་ཁས། འདོད་མི་རུས།

You already agreed to what we just stated as our reason.
And you cannot agree to our first statement, [that anything which can be
established as existing is always something negative].

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་དེ། གཟུགས་དེ་གཟུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་གཟུགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཚུལ་མིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It's not true of physical things that they are things such that the
expression "physical things" must be expressed in such a way
that eliminates everything which is not a physical thing.

དེ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞུགས་དེ་གཞུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་གཞུགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བསལ་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

They are so,
Because it is true of physical things that they are things such that the
expression "physical things" must be expressed in such a way that
excludes everything which is not a physical thing.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་གཞུགས་ལ་སེལ་འཇུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct that physical things are such that the expression
"physical things" must be expressed in such a way that excludes
everything which is not a physical thing.]

It is so,
Because the expression "physical things" applies to physical things in an
exclusive way.

བྱུང་སྟེ། སེལ་འཇུག་ཅས་པའི་སེལ་བའི་དོན་ནི་ཚེས་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་སེལ་བ་
ལ་ལྟོས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is necessarily so,
Because the words "in an exclusive way" in the expression "apply to something
in an exclusive way" mean that one must rely on excluding all that the
particular thing is not.

༥ །རང་གི་ལྷུགས་ལ། དགག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་
སྟོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཚེས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is the presentation of our own position. There does exist a
definition of a negative thing, because it is the following:

A thing which must be perceived by the state of mind which
perceives it directly through a process of eliminating, directly,
that which it denies.

དགག་པ་དང་། སེལ་བ་དང་། གཞན་སེལ་དང་། ལྷོག་པ་བཞི་དོན་གཅིག

The four terms "negative thing," "exclusion," "exclusion of all other," and "reversal" all refer to the same thing.

དགག་པ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་མིང་དགག་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Negative things may be divided into two different types: things that are negative in the sense of not being something, and things that are negative in the sense of the absence of something.

མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་
བཀག་ལྷུ་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕྲེན་པའི་དགག་པ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "negative thing in the sense of not being something," because it is the following:

A negative thing such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classic example of a negative thing in the sense of not being something, for it is "sounds are [always] changing things."

མིང་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་
ལྷུ་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕྲེན་པའི་དགག་པ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the following:

A negative thing such that the term which expresses it does not imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི་ཡོད་དེ། བང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classical example of a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the fact that no person has any nature of their own.

དགག་པ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་ལྟ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་བང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པ་དང་། ལྷགས་ལ་འཕེན་པ་དང་། དངོས་ལྷགས་གཉིས་ཀར་འཕེན་པ་དང་། སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་འཕེན་པ་དང་། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་བཀག་ནས་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་བང་རུང་མི་འཕེན་པ་དང་ལྟ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Negative things may be divided into five different types:

- 1) Those which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording;
- 2) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying indirectly;
- 3) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying both directly and indirectly;
- 4) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying by context;
- 5) Those which are such that the term which expresses them implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དང་པོ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་
ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་ཡོད་
དེ། བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the first type, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་
དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་
པའི་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་པ་གང་ཞིག་ ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་
དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that this is not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so true that it is the kind of negative thing which is such that the term which expresses it directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording,
Because (1) the term which expresses it denies what it denies directly in the actual wording; and (2) it also directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེ་
འདིས་བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of the reason you gave is incorrect: it is not correct to say that the term which expresses the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher denies what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because the expression "the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher" denies, in its actual wording, the possibility that any nature of their own that belonged to some person could ever be true of a water pitcher.

རྟོགས་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེ་
འདིས་བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག །བྱམ་
པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of the reason you gave is incorrect: it is not correct to say that the term which expresses the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher also directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.]

But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because the expression "the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher" (1) directly implies that the fact that no person has any nature of their own exists, and (2) the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher is a negative thing in the sense of not being something.

རྟོགས་དང་པོ་སྟེ། གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཚོས་ཅན།
ཁྱོད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first part of our reason is easy to accept.

Suppose you say that the second part is not correct.
Consider the fact that no person has any nature of their own.
The fact that it is true of a water pitcher is so a negative thing in the sense of not being something,
Because it can be established as existing.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚོག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་
ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་

བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the second type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདིས་རང་གི་
དགག་བྱ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་ལྷགས་ལ་འཕངས་
པ་གང་ཞིག་ མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is an example of this kind of negative.]

It is so,

Because (1) the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" indirectly implies that he eats at night, incidental to denying directly what it denies: that he eats during the day; and (2) his eating at night is a positive thing.

དེར་ཐལ། ཟས་ཟ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is so,

Because eating is a positive thing.

གསུམ་པ་རང་ཞེས་བཞེད་པའི་སྐྱས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་
ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་གཉིས་ཀར་འཕེན་
པའི་དགོས་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་ལྷགས་རིད་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the third type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them both directly and indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that there exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who is not thin.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱི་ཚོའི་ཉོན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་
ཞེས་པའི་སྐུ་འདིས་ཉོན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་ལྷགས་ལ་
འཕངས། ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚན་མོ་
ཟ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་དང་། ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that there exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who is not thin, is the kind of negative thing such that the term which expresses it both directly and indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so correct to say just this,
Because (1) the expression "There exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who has a body that is not a thin one," indirectly implies that he eats at night—and directly implies that there is a body which is not thin—incidental to denying directly that he eats during the day; and (2) the fact that there is a body which is not thin is a negative in the sense of not being something.

བཞི་པ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐུས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་
ཚོས་བཞུན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་
བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། གང་ཟག་གཅིག་རྒྱལ་རིགས་དང་བུམ་ཟེའི་རིགས་གང་རུང་དུ་
ངེས་ནས་བྱུང་པར་མ་ངེས་པའི་ཚོ་འདི་ནི་བུམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐུ་འདིས་བུམ་ཟེ་
ཡིན་པ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་རྒྱལ་རིགས་ཡིན་པ་སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་
འཕངས་པ་ངེས་ཤེས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the fourth type of negative, the kind which is such that the term which expresses it implies through the context something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

where you had determined that a particular person must be either of the royal caste or the Brahmin caste, but were unsure of which; and then someone says "They are not a Brahmin." The actual wording here directly denies, in its actual wording, that they are a Brahmin, and then implies—through the context—that they are of the royal caste; and this is the process you have to go through to determine which they are.

རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་
གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ།
བྱམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist finally that kind of negative where the term which expresses it implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that a certain Brahmin does not drink alcohol.

དེར་ཐལ། བྱམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་བྱམ་ཟེ་ཆང་འཕུང་བ་ཚིག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་
ཡང་མི་འཕེན་ཤུགས་ལ་ཡང་མི་འཕེན། སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་ཡང་མི་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that a certain Brahmin does not drink alcohol is a kind of negative where the term which expresses it implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so,
Because the expression "The Brahmin does not drink alcohol" implies neither directly, nor indirectly, nor by context, anything else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording: that is, that the Brahmin did drink alcohol.

དེ་དག་མ་ཡིན་དག་དང་མེད་དག་གཉིས་སུ་འདྲ་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དང་པོ་བཞི་པོ་མ་
ཡིན་དག་དང་། ལྷི་མ་མེད་དག་ཏུ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ལྟར།

These five can be grouped into two categories: negatives in the sense of not being something, and negatives in the sense of the absence of something. This is because the first four should be considered negatives in the sense of not being something, and the last should be considered a negative in the sense of the absence of something.

དག་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དག་གུ་ཚོག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པས་
མ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མ་ཡིན་དག་ལ་མ་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་ཞིག་མེད་དག་ལ་ཡང་མ་
སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྟར།

It is not necessarily the case that, just because something is a negative thing, the term which expresses it denies what it denies in the actual wording. This is because this is neither necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of not being something, nor the case with negatives in the sense of being an absence of something.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་དང་ཤེས་གུ་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་
ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དག་གུ་ཚོག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
ལྟར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that it is not necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of not being something that the term which expresses them denies what it denies in the actual wording.]

But the first part of our reason is correct, Because—even though the two of unchanging things and knowable things are negatives in the sense of not being something—they are not such that the terms which express them [in Tibetan] deny what they deny in the actual wording.

རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་མེད་དང་ཚོས་ཉིད་གཉིས་མེད་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རང་

ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟེང་།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that it is not necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of being an absence of something that the term which expresses them denies what it denies in the actual wording.]

But the second part of our reason is correct, Because—even though the two of space and the true nature of things are negatives in the sense of being an absence of something—they are not such that the terms which express them deny what they deny in the actual wording.

Formal logic subject:
Logical Statements that Use Natures

The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

།གཉིས་པ་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ།
མཚན་གཞི་དང་གསུམ།

Here secondly is our explanation of correct reasons of the type that use natures. We will proceed in three steps: the definition, the divisions, and the classical examples.

དང་པོ་ནི། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་
རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature.

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature, in any particular proof.

ཡང་ན་སྟོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག སྟོན་གྱི་རྟགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་
དངོས་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡིན་ན། སྟོན་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་
དགོས་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ་དེ། སྟོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof can also be defined as follows:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason in any particular proof, and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason [one that uses a nature] by virtue of the fact that anything considered the explicit quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason is necessarily such that to be it [the reason] is to be the quality.

གཉིས་པ་དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྟོན་པར་ལྟོས་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་
དག་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྟོན་པར་དག་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Here is the second step. Correct reasons that utilize a nature can be divided into two different types: correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such that they depend on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it]; and correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such they are free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག རང་
བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་འཕེན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of the first:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason for any particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it suggests the thing that made it.

དེ་གང་ཞིག རང་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་མི་འཕེན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ།
གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is as follows:

A reason which is (1) the same as the first part just given; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it does not suggest the thing that made it.

དང་པོ་ལ་ཡང་། རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་དང་། དེ་ལྷགས་ལ་འཕངས་
པ་གཉིས་ཡོད།

The first type may be further divided into two: those which suggest the thing that made them directly, and those which do so indirectly.

གསུམ་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། ཚོལ་བྱུང་དང་། རྐྱེས་པ། རྟེན་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
དང་པོ་དང་། བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་བྱེད་པར་དག་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གོ །

Here thirdly are the classical examples. "A thing which is produced by conscious effort" and "a thing which is brought about" are examples of the first type of reason, in a proof that the sound of a ritual horn is a changing thing. "A thing which is made" is an example of the second type of reason, in a proof that sound is a changing thing. "A working thing" is an example of a correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is such it is free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

ཡང་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་
དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་
རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

A correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is employed in the proof that sound is a changing thing can also be divided in a different way. This division would be into the two of (1) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which apply to the entire group of similar cases for the proof; and (2) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which both apply and fail to apply to the group of similar cases for the proof.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། བྱས་པ་དང་པོ་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Respective examples would be the reason "a thing which is made," and the reason "something characteristic of the quality of being made."

དེ་གཉིས་སྐྱབ་པ་ནི། །བྱས་པ་དེ་དང་པོ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is a demonstration for each of these.
"A thing which is made" is the first kind of reason,
Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it must always be it [that is, a thing which is made].

བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་
ཞིག་ མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Something characteristic of the quality of being made" is the second kind of reason,
Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it is not necessarily it [that is, something characteristic of the quality of being made].

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

The forms of debate:
Using Scriptural Authority

In Buddhist debate, we can prove a thing in two ways: we can prove it with logic, and we can prove it with scriptural authority; that is, by quoting a scripture which is accepted by the opponent. In Tibetan these two are known, respectively, as *rikpa* (*rigs-pa*) and *lung* (*lung*)—and the idea is so important that some monks (such as Khen Rinpoche's devoted attendant) are give the name "Lungrik." Quoting scripture must obviously be used with care when attempting to demonstrate something to a person who is not yet a Buddhist, since they may very well deny the authority you are quoting.

Favorite texts to quote in the monastery are the older scriptures from India: either the word of Lord Buddha himself, or the word of one of the great early Indian masters, as found in the Kangyur and Tengyur collections of the great classics of India translated into Tibetan. These are accepted by all schools of Tibetan Buddhism. In a debate between monasteries which are all of the Gelukpa tradition—such as the annual winter debates attended primarily by monks of the "Great Three" monasteries of Sera, Ganden, and Drepung—the favorite works to cite would be those of Je Tsongkapa or one of his major disciples: Gyaltsab Je, Kedrup Je, or His Holiness the First Dalai Lama.

In everyday debates at your own home monastery, you would normally quote from one of the monastic textbooks that are unique to the curriculum of each individual monastery; these are known as *yikcha* (*yig-cha*). These textbooks have developed over the last five hundred years much in the same way as the ACI course notebooks, and similar courses in the West.

The ammunition for using a quotation in the debate ground must of course be prepared in advance: no one can bring a scrap of paper into the area, and all quotations must be recited from memory. One way to get a good booring from the assembled crowd is to start a quotation and then flounder, unable to finish it from memory!

A scriptural citation is normally used to back up an assertion just given as a reason in a proof, and it is often introduced with a great flourish, emphasizing the indisputability and greatness of the source you have selected. You might see, for example, the following, where we start out with:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།

It is a changing thing,

མི་དག་སྟེ།

Because it is something which is made.

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The opponent replies with:

Your reason is wrong!

དྲགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Meaning, sound is not a thing which is made. We then reply with,

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།

It is so something which is made,

བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ།

Because it was spoken to be that way by the High and Holy One, the Good and Glorious Kedrup Tenpa Dargye, a Master (*Ke*) Who has Found All Attainments (*Drup*), and Whose Kindness to All of Us is Infinitely High; and because His words are something that you must accept!

བདག་ཅག་རྣམས་ལ་བཀའ་བྲིན་བྱུང་པར་དུ་འཕགས་པ་མཁས་ཤིང་གྲུབ་པ་

ཚྭ་པ་ཇི་བཅུན་མཁས་གྲུབ་བསྟན་པ་དར་རྒྱས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོས་དེ་

ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་གང་ཞིག ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Six

And he did so speak it be this way, because he did so in his *Overview of the Perfection of Wisdom*, with the following words: "When we use 'something which is made' as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing."

ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བརྩོམས་པའི་པར་ཕྱིན་སྐྱིད་ལས། བྱས་པའི་
རྟགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་རྟོགས་པ་ཞེས་སོགས་གསུངས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568) is the principal author of the textbook series of Sera Mey; he is therefore, for the monks of Sera Mey, an indisputable authority, and his words must be accepted.

A typical strategy once an opponent has resorted to scriptural authority is to respond that, despite the fact that such a statement *was* once made by that authority, it does not necessarily prove what the opponent claims that it does. In such a case, the other side in the debate just described might come back with:

"It doesn't necessarily follow!"

བྱས་པ་མ་བྱུང་།

Whenever someone contradicts scripture, it's time to pull out the unique response used by monks from Sera Mey. (Other monasteries have their own slightly different version.) Here you scream the following at the top of your lungs, and then go on to the formula above:

You contradict the scriptures! You contradict the holy scriptures!

དཔེ་ཆ་དང་འགལ། ཕྱག་དཔེ་དང་འགལ།

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Seven: Contradiction and Relationship

Selection from the collected topics:
Contradiction and Relationship

The following reading consists of the Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship ('Gal-'brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam 'bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

དང་པོ་འགལ་འབྲེལ་ལ་དགག་བཞག་སྒྲོང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ།
དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་
བྱུང་བ་རེ།

Here is the first section: an explanation of the concepts of contradiction and relationship. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing is always something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

རྟོག་པའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing.
So is being it then [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because being it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག །ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་དངོས་པོ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
It is so correct,
Because (1) it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] is something distinct from a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] and a working thing.

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something distinct from a working thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our statement is not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so distinct from being a working thing,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟོག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

[The second part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion all that is not an unchanging thing, and also a working thing.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our statement is not correct.
Consider an unchanging thing.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not it, and also a working thing,
Because it is unchanging.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། རྟག་པའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་
མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]

Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing.
It is not so true, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing,
Because being it is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

རྟག་པ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is because an unchanging thing is just such a thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་དེ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་སྐབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging, then it is always something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.

ཀ་བའི་ལྗོན་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.

So is it then [something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing]?

Because it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག
སྐྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་ཚཱ་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider a pillar.

It is so true that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,
Because anything which is the exclusion of all that is not it [a pillar] is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀ་བའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཚཱ་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.

It is not such, that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,
Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚཱ་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟག་སྐྱེ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so this way,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also a changing thing;

And this is true because a pillar itself is just such a thing.

This reason is easy to accept.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.

ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is it then [such that being it is not contradictory with being something that is not contradictory to being a working thing]?

Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་བྱུང་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also a changing thing;

And this is because the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན་སྒྲ། རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀ་བུ་མ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་དང་། མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

If you say it's not correct, the answer is easy.

Suppose though you agree to our original statement, [saying that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing].

Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

It is so not something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing,

Because it is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག
བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.


It is so,

Because (1) it is distinct from that which is such that being it is not contradictory with being a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་གྲུམ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་དང་གཅིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མིད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of
a pillar and a water pitcher is such that there exists no one thing
which is both it and also something such that being it is not
contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something
such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,
Because it is something which no one thing can be.



ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཅེས་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to
something which is not contradictory to being a working thing,
then it is always such that being it is not contradictory to being
a working thing.

དངོས་མིད་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a thing which does no work.
Is it then [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not
contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་

ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing;

And this is true because "knowable thing" is just such a thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་མེད་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Consider a thing which does no work.

It is not so a thing which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,

Because it is a thing such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། ཉམ་པ་དང་འགལ་
བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing, then it is always such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.

མ་གུས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Consider a thing which is not made.

Is it then [such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is
contradictory to being an existing thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཡོད་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being
it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to
being an existing thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, a thing which
is not made] and (2) such that being it is contradictory to being an
existing thing;

And this is true because the two of unchanging things and changing things is
just such a thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། མ་གྲུས་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་
དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which is not made
is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging
thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

It is not so, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging
thing,

Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། བྱོད་དང་རྟག་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པས་བྱོབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because anything which is an unchanging thing is such that it is one thing which is both itself and unchanging.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anytime something is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing, it must also always be such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.

དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider sharing a relationship with a working thing.

So is it then [such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing]?

Because it is [such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། བྱོད་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ། བྱོད་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། །བྱོད་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing is sharing a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider a working thing.

Sharing a relationship with it is so sharing a relationship with it such that to be it is to automatically be it,

Because sharing a relationship with it is (1) distinct from it, and (2) sharing a relationship with it exists.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.]

Consider sharing a relationship with "working thing."

It is not so, that it is what shares a relationship with it,

Because it is one example of the truth that the person has no nature of his own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱོད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything that shares a relationship with a working thing always shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing in the moment after it.
Does this then [share a relationship with the working thing such that to be it
is to automatically be the working thing]?
Because it does [share a relationship with the working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares
a relationship with the working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It does so,
Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from
it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares
a relationship with the working thing such that it came from it.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It does so,
Because it is a result of the working thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉམས་བསྐྱབས་ཟེན།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing in the moment
after it does share a relationship with the working thing such that
to be it is to automatically be the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider this same thing.
It is not so, that it shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be
it is to automatically be the working thing,
Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from
the working thing.
Our reason has already been proven.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཀ་
བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་
མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There exists no one thing which is both (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; and also (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་རྗེས་ཡོད་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But such a thing does so exist,
Because the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing"
is just such a thing.

[The "presence of all three of the material qualities" for any particular thing is, as we will see in Class Eight, the definition of its definition. The three material qualities are: (1) generally speaking, the thing is a definition; (2) it does apply to a typical example; and (3) it is the definition of no other thing than what it defines.]

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྟོའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དེ། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the first part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) it and (2) also something
such that being it is contradictory with being that which is one and the
same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher;
And this is true because "that which can be made an object of the mind,"
[which is the definition of "knowable thing",] is something which is such
that being it [the presence of all three of the material qualities for
"existing thing"] is not contradictory to being it [one and the same as the
two of a pillar and a water pitcher].

ཚ་རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེའི་རྗེས་ཡོད་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཀ་བུམ་
གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྩོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏེ། ལྷོའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that the second part of your reason applies to your
example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the
material qualities for "knowable thing" is the kind of thing such
that being it is not contradictory to being something which is
such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same
as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say that the second part of our reason
applies to our example.

Consider the presence of all three of the material qualities for this same thing.
It is so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
something which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water
pitcher,

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [the presence of all three
qualities for "knowable thing"] and (2) something which is such that
being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a
pillar and a water pitcher;

And this is true because "that which can be made an object of the mind" is just
such a thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་
ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There does exist one thing which is a combination of all of the following: (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing; (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; (3) something which shares a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a working thing; and (4) something which does not share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a working thing.

དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

So is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing then just such a combination?

Because (1) there does exist one thing which is all of those and (2) that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.

གཞིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་
དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་དངོས།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.
Consider that which does not share a relationship with a working thing.
Is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being
something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a
working thing?
Because it is just such a thing; [that is, one thing which is a combination of all
the above].

[It's not correct to say it is just such a combination.]

But the reason is what you've already said directly.

འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་ཚད་མ་དང་དཔྱད་ཤེས་
གཉིས་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: that which does not share
a relationship with a working thing is something which is such
that being it is contradictory to being something which is such
that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

But you can't agree to our original statement,
Because there does exist one thing which is both not related to it [to a working
thing] and which is also not such that being it is contradictory to being
the working thing;
And this is true because the two of a valid perception and a recollection which
act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག
འདི་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a
recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such
a combination.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider these two.
They are so,
Because they are something which is both (1) not related to a working thing,

and (2) also such that being them is contradictory to being a working thing.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དེའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are not related to the working thing.]

But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because they are its cause.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are such that being them is contradictory to being a working thing.]

But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because they are a knowable thing which cannot be.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There is no one thing which is all of the following: (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something such that being it is contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (2) such that being it is not contradictory with being something such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (3) related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging; and (4) not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.

དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But there does exist one thing which is all of the above,
Because that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་
བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་
དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging
thing is just such a thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.

It is so just such a thing, one that combines all four;
Because it is something which is (1) such that being it is contradictory to being
something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an
unchanging thing; and (2) it is such that being it is not contradictory to being
something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
this [unchanging thing]; it is related to what is related to this
[unchanging thing]; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to this
[unchanging thing].

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག །ཁྱོད་ཡིན་ན།
རྟག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཡིན་ན་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་མི་དད་
ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is incorrect to say that
that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that
being it is contradictory to being something that is such that
being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it is (1) distinct from this [thing that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing], and (2) if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it must be such that being it is not contradictory with being an unchanging thing;

And this is true because if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it cannot be distinct from an unchanging thing.

ཅུ་རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱིད་དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་
བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱིད་རྒྱང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྟག་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing; it is related to what is related to an unchanging thing; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our original reason is not correct.

Consider that which is not related to it [that is, to an unchanging thing].

It is so such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being it [an unchanging thing],

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, something which is not related to an unchanging thing], and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being it [an unchanging thing];

And this is true because an unchanging thing is just that.

ཅུ་རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། །དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་
མིན་ན། བྱིད་མིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

[The third part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct. Consider that which is not related to it [to an unchanging thing]. It is so something which is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging, Because it is (1) distinct from that which is related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], and (2) if there existed no things which were related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], then it could not exist either.

ཙ་རྟགས་བཞི་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The fourth part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say that the fourth part of our original reason is not correct. Consider that which is not related to an unchanging thing. It is so true, that it is not related to itself, Because it is an example of a thing which has no nature of its own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There does exist one thing which combines all the following: (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a knowable thing; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it

is not contradictory to being a knowable thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing; and (4) something which shares a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a knowable thing.

ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

So then is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing this kind of combination?

Because (1) there does exist just such a combination, and (2) something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is not such a combination.

དང་པོ་དངོས། གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

You have already agreed directly to the first part of our reason.
Suppose then you say that the second part is not correct.

Consider something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing.
So is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing?

Because it is just such a combination.

རྟགས་དངོས། འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྲིད་ཏེ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་
སྲིད་ཏེ། བུམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་སྲིད།

You have already agreed directly to the reason.
But you cannot agree to our original statement here,
Because it [something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this thing;

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

And this is true because there does exist something which is both (1) it [that is, something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being that [knowable thing];

And this is true because that which is one and the same as a water pitcher is just such a combination.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.]

Consider something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.

So is it then something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing?

Because it is just such a combination.

རྟགས་དངོས། འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། །དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན། །ཁྱོད་མེད་དགོས་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've already agreed directly to the reason.

You can't agree to our original position,

Because it [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing] is something which does share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing;

And this is because (1) it is distinct from something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing, and (2) if the thing with which it shares a relationship ceased to exist, then it would itself cease to exist.

རྟགས་སྒྲ། བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོངས་ཚུགས་དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ།
ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་

ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ན། འདིར་མ་ཟུབ། ཏྲགས་གྲུབ་
སྟེ། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

The reason we've given is easy to accept.
Suppose, relative to this same point, someone comes and says:

It is so, that there does exist a typical example which incorporates all the conditions stated.
Because there does exist one thing which is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this same thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this same thing; and (4) something which does share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with this same thing.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."
The reason, by the way, is itself true, for something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀ་
བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.
It is so just such a combination,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Because it is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; and (2) it is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being this thing [a pillar], (3) it is something which does not share a relationship with what does share a relationship with this thing [a pillar], and (4) it is something which shares a relationship with what does not share a relationship with this thing [the pillar].

རྟོགས་དང་པོ་དང་གཉིས་པ་སྒྲི། རྟོགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན། རྟོགས་མེད་མི་
དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བའི་དགག་གཞི་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first and second elements in our reason are easy to accept.
Suppose you say that the third is not correct.

Consider this same thing [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar].
It is so something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this thing [the pillar],
Because it is not necessarily the case that, if something which did have such a relationship ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist;
And this is true because a place where there is no pillar is an example of that.

རྟོགས་བཞི་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། །དེ་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན། རྟོགས་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟོགས་སྒྲི།

Suppose you say that the fourth element in our reason is not correct.
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.
It is so something which shares a relationship with something which shares no relationship with a pillar,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which shares no relationship with a pillar; and (2) if something which shares no relationship with a pillar ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། འགལ་བ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory, then it must always be something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.

འགལ་བའི་ལྗོན་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory.

So is it then [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory]?

Because it is [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། འགལ་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and also a thing which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.

And this is because being something which is contradictory is just such a thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

འགའ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། །ཁྱོད་དང་འགའ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏེ། འགའ་བ་འགའ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing [the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory].
It is not so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which is contradictory, and (2) there is no one thing which can be both it and something which is contradictory;
And this is because being contradictory is not something which is contradictory.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་བཞག་པ་ལ། འགའ་བ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

Here is the second part, where we present our own position. We proceed in two steps, covering the definition of what it is to be in contradiction, and then the different types of contradiction.

དང་པོ་ནི། །ཁྱོད་ཐ་དད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། །ཁྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་
དུ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། རང་ཉིད་འགའ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of what it is for two things to be in contradiction:

The two things must (1) be distinct from each other, and then they must be such that (2) it is impossible for any one thing to be both of them.

གཉིས་པ་འགའ་བ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། བན་ཚུན་སྤང་འགའ་དང་། ལྷན་ཅིག་མི་གནས་
འགའ་བ་གཉིས།

There are two different ways of being in contradiction: contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive; and contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed.

དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་བཅད་ཡོངས་གཅོད་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། ཕན་ཚུན་
སྤང་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་དང་འགལ་བ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག

The definition of the first of these, to be contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, is as follows:

Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that the presence of one automatically means the absence of the other.

The two terms "contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive" and "contradictory" refer to the same thing.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་འགལ་དང་། བརྒྱད་འགལ་གཉིས། ཕན་ཚུན་དངོས་སུ་མི་
མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། དངོས་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དངོས་སུ་གནོད་བྱ་གནོད་བྱེད་
མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། གཞི་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། བརྒྱད་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Things which are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive may be further divided into two types: those which contradict each other in this way directly; and those which contradict each other in this way indirectly.

The definition of things which contradict each other in this way directly is "Two things which conflict with each other directly." The definition of things which contradict each other in this way indirectly is "Two things which are such that no one thing can be both, but which are not such that one immediately obviates the other."

དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། དངོས་པོ་དང་དངོས་མེད་གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་
གཞི་ནི། ཚ་གུང་གཉིས་དང་། བདག་འཇོན་དང་བདག་མེད་ཉོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་
གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ།

A typical example of the first would be something like the two of "working thing" and "a thing which does no work." A typical example of the second

would be "heat" and "coldness," or else "the state of mind which holds that things have some nature of their own" and "the wisdom which realizes that nothing has a nature of its own."

གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྒྱན་བཅད་བྱ་གཅོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་སྐྱོན་སྐྱོན་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། ལྷན་ཅིག་
མི་གནས་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of the second kind of contradiction—of things which are contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed:

Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that each one acts to stop the continued existence of the other.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི། གཉིན་པོ་དང་སྤང་བྱ་གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ།

A typical example would be a spiritual antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate.

ཚོས་དེ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བྱོད་ཚོས་དེ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་
གཅིག་པའི་སྐྱོན་སྐྱོན་ཐ་དད། ཚོས་དེ་མེད་ན་བྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཚོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that to be the first is to automatically be the other is as follows:

Whenever two existing things are such that, to be the first is by nature to be the second, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if the second were to cease to exist—then the first would have to cease to exist as well.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུམ་པ་དང་བུམ་པའི་ལྲོག་པ་ལྟ་བུ།

An example would be the relation between a vase and the exclusion of all that is not the vase.

གཞི་ལ་སྐྱུར་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པའི་སྐྱོན་སྐྱོན་ཐ་དད། དངོས་པོ་མེད་

ན་སྐྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པ་དེ་དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུ།

Here is an actual application of the concept. The definition of what it is to share a relationship with "working things" in such a way that to be a particular thing is to automatically be a working thing is "something which is such that to be it is by nature to be a working thing, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if 'working things' were to cease to exist, then the particular thing would have to cease to exist as well." A typical example here would be a water pitcher.

དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཚོས་དེ་དང་རྗེས་ཐ་དད་པའི་སྐོན་ས་ཚོས་དེའི་འབྲས་བུའི་རིགས་སུ་གནས་པ། ཚོས་དེ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that the first has come from the second is as follows:

Whenever two things are such that to be the first is to be the kind of thing which is the result of the second, in such a way that to be the first is not to be, by its very essence, the second.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་རྣམས་དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

A typical example would be the relationship of one coming from the other between those things which are a working thing the moment after it, and the original working thing.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྐྱོང་བ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། ཐ་དད་ཅིང་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

རྟོགས་མ་གྲུབ་པོ།

Here is the final part: eliminating our opponent's rebuttal. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
So are these then two things which are discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both?
Because they are two things which are contradictory.

To this we answer, "The statement you gave as your reason is not correct."

འདོད་ན། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose you do agree [that the two of existence and non-existence were two things which are both discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both].

Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
Are they then something which exists?
Because they are discrete from one another.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཏུ་བ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མེ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་གྲུབ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider smoke.
It is so then a relationship where one thing has come from another,
Because it shares a relationship with fire such that it has come from the other.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

[Please note that this section continues,
but was not translated due to the quantity of material.]

Formal logic subject:
**Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something,
and the First Category of this Type of Statement**

The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso.

༘ གསུམ་པ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ།
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྣང་དུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ངེས་བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་བཤད་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Here thirdly is our discussion of correct reasons of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid perception where we confirm that the definition applies to a typical example.

དང་པོ་ནི། རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག །རྩོད་གྱི་རྟགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་
གྱི་དངོས་གྱི་སྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། དགག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་སྲིད་པ་དེ། རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof;
and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the
explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be
proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and
also (b) a negative thing.

གཉིས་པ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་
དྲགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent].

དང་པོ་ནི། མདོ་ལས། གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱ་སྟེ། ཉམས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ་རེ། ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་སྣང་བ་ཅམ་གྱིས་གཞན་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་དེ་སྟོབ་མེད་
ཅེས་འཆད་མི་རིགས་པའི་དོན་སྟོན་པ་ལ། རྣམ་འབྲེལ་ལས། ཚད་མ་རྣམས་ནི་མི་
འཇུག་པ། མེད་ལ་མི་འཇུག་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན། ཞེས་སོགས་གྱིས་བསྟན།

Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

དེ་སྟོབ་གྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གྲང་ཡིན། རང་ཉིད་གྱི་དྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་
སྟོབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བདྲགས་པའི་དོན་དེ་སྟོབ་ཡོད་གྲང་། རང་ཉིད་དེ་སྟོབ་གྱི་
སྟོབ་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚད་མ་ལ་མི་སྣང་བ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྟོབ་གྱི་མི་
སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྣང་བའི་འབྲེལ་ལྷན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག
།དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྣང་བའི་འགལ་ལྷན་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

This kind of reason can be further divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཀྱང་ཡིན། མེད་དགག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as:

Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the sense of being the absence of something.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The second is defined as:

Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is

imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

དང་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། མི་སྣང་བའི་རྒྱ། བྱབ་བྱེད། རང་བཞིན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་གསུམ།

The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct reasons used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a cause for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a nature of something involving a thing which is imperceptible.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཚོས་ཅན། འཇ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་
བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་འཇ་དེས་པའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་དེ། འཇ་བསྐྱལ་
དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་འཇ་དམིགས་བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚོ། འཇ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་འཇ་དམིགས་
བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་འཇ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་
ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་འཇ་དེས་པའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དང་པོ་ཡིན།

Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following logical statement:

Consider the place in front of us.
There cannot exist here, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits [another word for a *preta*, or tormented spirit] are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit;
Because there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit.

Think of this fact: that there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater

spirit. This represents the first type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.

འཇམ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་འཇམ་ཡོད་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་
དམིགས་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་འཇམ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་འཇམ་
ཡོད་ཅེས་དམ་བཅའ་མི་རིགས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Think now of the fact that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects has not yet perceived, with a valid perception, the fact that flesheater spirits exist. This represents the second type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects to swear that flesheater spirits do exist.

འཇམ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་འཇམ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔུང་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་དེ་འདྲའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་
ལ་འཇམ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན།

Think finally of the fact that—in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects—there cannot be perceived, with any valid perception, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This represents the third type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not exist, in the mental continuum of just such a person, any recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.

དགོས་པ་ནི། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ལྟའི་བར་སྲིད་དང་། འཇམ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་
བའི་སྐོ་ནས་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་གཞི་འདིར་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་ཅེས་
སམ་མེད་ཅེས་ཐག་གཅོད་དུ་མི་རུང་བ་དཔེར་མཛད་ནས། དོན་ལ་གང་ཟག་གང་དང་

གང་གི་སྐྱོན་ཡོན་རང་གི་ཚད་མས་མ་ངེས་བཞིན་དུ་སྒོ་བཀུར་བྱས་མི་རུང་བར་ཤེས་
པའི་ཆེད་དུ་འོ།།

There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a person still doubted whether flesheater spirits existed (and if they were thus still objects which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own minds about whether these spirits existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular person we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in reality possess a particular positive or negative personal quality.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་
ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་
རྒྱུ་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་དང་དེའི་དགག་བྱའི་
ཚོས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཤ་ཟ་དང་དེ་ངེས་པའི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་
ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་དེའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in a particular logical statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This is both what we consider the main element in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not exist any such recollection whose object corresponds to reality. The two of (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits, are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, but not all that we deny in the particular logical statement.

དང་པོ་སྒྲིག་མཁུ་གྲུབ་ན། འཇམ་དང་དེ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་གཉིས་རེ་
རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྤྱི་གོལ་
ཡང་དག་དེས་མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་འཇམ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟེ་བའི་སྤྱིར་དང་། དེས་དེ་
འདྲ་བའི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟེ་བའི་སྤྱིར།

The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect.

Consider then (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits.

These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement,

Because a correct opponent for this particular proof doubts whether or not flesheater spirits exist in the place in front of us, and also doubts whether or not there exists any such kind of recollection whose object corresponds to reality.

དེ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྤྱིར་འཇམ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་
དང་། ཏུ་བ་དེ་མཚན་མེད་ཀྱི་མཚོར་ཏུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་སྤྱིར།

Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular logical statement, because generally speaking there do exist flesheater spirits; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there exists no smoke upon the nighttime ocean.

ཡོད་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་འཇམ་བསྐལ་དོན་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་འཇམ་
ཟེ་ངེས་བྱེད་གྱི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་སྐྱེང་བའི་འགལ་རྒྱ་
དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Consider the fact that [the person described here] exists. This is an example of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects still has no recollection which ascertains the existence of such spirits, and whose object corresponds to reality.

སྤྱིར་སློལ་སྤྱོད་པའི་བསྐྱེད་ལོན་ལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། ཡུལ་དང་དུས་དང་ངོ་བོའི་
བསྐྱེད་ལོན་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། དང་པོ་ནི། རང་དང་ཕྱོགས་ཐག་ཤིན་ཏུ་རིང་བ་ན་
ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱོད་བཅུད་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པར་ལྟ་བུ། གཉིས་པ་ནི། བསྐྱེད་པ་འདས་ཟེན་པ་དང་
འབྱུང་བའི་དུས་ན་རྗེ་འབྱུང་བ་དང་འབྱུང་བའི་བྱུང་པར་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། དེ་རྣམས་ནི་སྤྱིར་
བསྐྱེད་ལོན་མིན་ཡང་རང་གི་སློལ་སྤྱོད་པའི་བསྐྱེད་ལོན་ལོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། རང་
དང་ཉེ་བ་ན་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ངོ་བོ་སྤྱོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་བསྐྱེད་ལོན་དུ་སོང་བ་མདུན་གྱི་ལ་ཟ་ལྟ་
བུ་དང་། ལྟ་མིའི་བར་སྤྱིར་པ་རྣམས་དང་དེའི་ཕུང་པོ་ལྟ་བུའོ།

Generally speaking, there are three different ways in which an object can be abstruse, relative to your state of mind. These are objects which are abstruse by virtue of the place, time, and nature. The first would be something like the details of particular beings or realms which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the past or future. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only relative to a given state of mind. The third would be something which is abstruse by virtue of being very subtle in nature, even though it may exist in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater spirit, or a being between death and rebirth who is headed towards birth as a human or pleasure being, and their various heaps.

The forms of debate:
Some Debating Tactics

The exquisite boxing style of Muhammed Ali showed the value of distracting and harassing your opponnet before even throwing a punch, and we use some of the same tactics in a Buddhist debate. Again remember though, that the goal is not to defeat your opponent, but to help him and yourself and the audience listening; to sharpen his ability to concentrate under pressure, and to raise challenging questions that will clarify everyone's understanding of the life-saving Dharma.

Almost every normal debate begins with the attacker taking a mistaken position, and this is perhaps the most important tactic of all. The greatest geshes and debaters in the monastery have overcome any kind of pride, and are fearless in taking a position which is mistaken—a position where they will eventually have to "lose"—if this means that the defender and the audience will learn some important point. The goal here is to take a position which is *almost* correct, and very subtly mistaken: this will make for a fun debate, and clear up this point for everyone.

Feigning is another common tactic in boxing and debate. Hutzpah is essential: even if you're not sure your answer is correct, act like it is. Let the other person prove you wrong logically, and you'll both learn something valuable. Even if you can't hear the opponent's position clearly (which is a common occurrence in the incredibly noisy debate grounds!), or you don't have much clue of what he's talking about, take a shot! It starts a lively debate, which sooner or later clarifies every detail of the issue. The point is: always work from what you honestly think, answer to the best of your current understanding, and don't be afraid to go on a journey with your opponent, even through some dark or fuzzy places in your understanding, to reach to the higher ground of knowledge.

Don't be afraid to use the audience to help you distract or disrupt your opponent. Many an unbeatable position is overthrown in the monastery simply by the (mistaken) boos of the audience, egged on by the attacker. Here there are a whole repertoire of distracting taunts, which are fair game in the rules of debate. We will list a few of them following—please note though that the exact meaning of the words used has often been obscured over the centuries; the meanings given here are sometimes "best guesses" offered to us in an informal interview by the most qualified master in the world, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin.

One common taunt is *Whoa!* The attacker either feels or feigns great surprise at a position taken by the defender, and begins a loud *whoa* sound. This is

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

picked up by the monks in the immediate vicinity who are following the argument, and quickly spreads to the "deadheads" in the back (who are often engaged in some conversation of their own and not listening) and even to monks in other debate groups in the compound—all of whom have no idea what the defender even said that he deserves a *whoa!* This *whoa!* generally means "Uh-oh! Now you're in trouble!"

In the winter debates, the *whoa* can be followed by a loud *chir!* This is most often used when an argument has been presented to a defender and he finds himself unable to formulate an answer; it has the meaning of "Come on! We want an answer!" A common corrolary in smaller groups is for the attacker himself to say to a speechless defender, *labda!*—"Come on! Say something!" Some people say that the *chir!* is *che!*—meaning "Your argument has stalled now!" The spellings of these three in Tibetan are:

ཕྱིར། ལའ་ད། ཆད།

A screamed *ha!* has the same meaning as in English, "Wow! What a joke! Are you kidding?" It is often accompanied by throwing your hands up in the air.

Tsa! is one of the most common taunts; it comes from the word *ngo-tsa*, meaning "You should be ashamed to have said such a stupid thing!" and is typically used when someone is forced to retract a position they have taken themselves earlier. This is most often accompanied with a slap of the back of one hand in the palm of another, with everything repeated a few times for emphasis: *Tsa! Ooooh tsa! Tsa chik!* ("You should be ashamed! Ashamed, man! What a disgrace!"). At this point a debater might scowl at his opponent and jam his finger in his own cheek, meaning: "Time for you to blush, man!" Some people say the *tsa* is the *tsar* in *ngo-tsar*, meaning, "Man! That was a weird thing to say!" These words in Tibetan are:

ཚ། རོ་ཚ། རོ་མཚར།

Two more taunts are more based in formal logic than in tactics. The first is *kyappa long*, which literally means, "Give me your statement of necessity then!" This is used in a context like the following, with the indented portion from the opponent:

Consider sound.
It must so be a changing thing,
Because it's a thing which is made.
And that's true because anything which is made is always a changing thing.

སྒྲ་ཚོས་ཅན།
མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད།
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
བྱས་ན་མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's incorrect to say that.

དྲགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Give me your statement of necessity then!

བྱབ་པ་ལོངས།

At this point, the opponent would be forced to give the following absurd statement of necessity:

Just because something is a thing which is made doesn't prove that it's a changing thing.

བྱས་ན་མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱབ།

A final rejoinder is *korsum!* or *kordhi korsum!* This means "You have just made a circular argument," or "Now you have contradicted yourself completely!" A typical case would be where the opponent accepts that sound is a made thing, and accepts that if something is made it must be a changing thing, but stubbornly asserts still that sound is an unchanging thing. In the second version of this statement, the root syllable for the mantra of Gentle Voice (Manjushri, or Jampel Yang) is interjected. The Tibetan spellings for these are:

འཁོར་གསུམ། འཁོར་རྗེེ་འཁོར་གསུམ།

Defenders have a few tactics of their own, one of the most useful being *ah?* or *la?*—meaning "Whaddya say? I couldn't catch what you said." Then you put your cupped palm up to your ear as if you're having a problem hearing the attacker in all the mayhem of the debate ground. This is a great way to buy a few extra moments while you formulate your answer!

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Eight: Definitions and the Things They Define

Selection from the collected topics:
Definitions and the Things They Define

The following reading consists of the Presentation of Definitions and the Things They Define (mTsan-mtson gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam chung-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ལ། མཚན་བྱེད་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བཏགས་ཡོད་ཚེས་
གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is our own position. There is a definition of something defined, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the nominal qualities are present.

བཏགས་ཡོད་ཚེས་གསུམ་འདྲེན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྲིར་མཚན་བྱེད་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྟེང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ། རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་གཅིག་པོ་དེ་ལས་
གཞན་པ་གང་གི་ཡང་མཚན་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གསུམ་འདྲེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three "nominal qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be something to be defined;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be something defined only for whatever its definition is, and not for any other.

མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཇུས་ཡོད་ཚེས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definition of a definition, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the material qualities are present.

ཇུས་ཡོད་ཀྱི་ཚེས་གསུམ་འདྲེན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྤྱིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྤྲོད་དུ་གྲུབ་པ། རང་གི་མཚན་གྲུ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་གང་གི་
ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three "material qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be a definition;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be a definition for nothing other than the thing it defines.

དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་གྲུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་
ཚེས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of what "that which performs a function" defines, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the nominal qualities pertaining to "that which performs a function" are present.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་ཡོད་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་
བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the definition of a working thing, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the material qualities pertaining to "working thing" are present.

དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བའི་མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་
དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བའི་དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a definitive example where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present, because it is the following:

That case of "that which performs a function" where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present.

དེའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definitive example of such a thing, because a working thing would be one.

ཡང་ན་མཚོན་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྣམ་པར་བཞག་བྱ་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is an alternate definition for something to be defined, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for being establishing as something are present.

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་བྱའི་ཚོས་གསུམ་འདྲེན་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་དེ། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་

མཚན་ཉིད་ལས་གཞན་པའི་མཚན་གྲུ་མ་ཡིན་པ། མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་སྲིད་
བ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for being established as something, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be something to be defined;
- 2) It should not be something defined for any other definition than its definition; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example.

མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྣམ་པར་འཇོག་བྱེད་ཚེས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definition, for it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something are present.

རྣམ་པར་འཇོག་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚེས་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ།
རང་གི་མཚན་གྲུ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ། མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་
ལ་སྲིད་བ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for establishing something, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be a definition;
- 2) It should not be a definition for any object to be defined other than the one it defines; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example.

མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་བབ་པའི་མཚན་གྱ་མཚན་
པའི་གཞིར་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definitive example, because it is the following:

An example which typifies the object to be defined for the particular definition in question.

དེ་ཡང་གཞི་གཅིག་ལ་མཚན་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་གྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ།
དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་གྱའི་ཚོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

We can illustrate these with a specific case. There is a definition for the object defined by "that which performs a function," because it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something through "that which performs a function" are present.

དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་གྱའི་ཚོས་གསུམ་འདྲན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་
རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་གྱ་ཡིན་པ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་ཚོས་གང་གི་ཡང་
མཚན་གྱ་མ་ཡིན་པ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པའི་མཚན་གྱའི་མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་
སྲིད་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for being established as something by "that which performs a function," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be something to be defined by "that which performs a function";
- 2) It should not be something defined for any other definition than "that which performs a function"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example of the thing to be defined by "that which performs a function."

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་འཇོག་གྱེད་ཚོས་
གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definition for the definition of a working thing, for it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something as a working thing are present.

དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་འཇོག་གྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚོས་གསུམ་འབྲེན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་
མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། དངོས་པོ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་ཚོས་གང་གི་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་
པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་སྲིད་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་
འབྲེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for establishing something as a working thing, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be a definition for "working thing";
- 2) It should not be a definition for any object to be defined other than "working thing"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example for the definition of a working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་གྱེད་རྣམ་པར་དངོས་པོ་མཚོན་པའི་
གཞིར་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definitive example of a working thing, because it is the following:

An example which typifies the working thing defined by "that which performs a function."

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definitive example, since a water pitcher would be one.

སྒྲིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། རིགས་མི་མཐུན་དང་། འོག་ཏོག་སེལ་
བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Generally speaking, definitions may be divided into two types: (1) definitions which disallow dissimilar types; and (2) definitions which disallow wrong ideas.

དེ་གཉིས་ཀའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། གསར་དུ་མི་སྒྲུབ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཏོག་
བྲལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

An example of both of these would be something like:

A state of mind which is (1) a fresh, unerring perception, and (2)
which is free of conceptualization and also unmistaken.

དེ་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། འོག་ཏོག་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །འོག་
ཏོག་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

This is a definition which is both kinds: one which disallows dissimilar types, and one which disallows wrong ideas. And this is because it is (1) a definition which disallows dissimilar types, and (2) a definition which disallows wrong ideas.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མའི་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་ལ་ཚད་མིན་དང་ཇེས་དཔག་
ཚད་མ་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས་ལ། ཚད་མིན་ནི་དེའི་ཟུར་གྱི་གསར་དུ་མི་བསྒྲུབ་བ་ཞེས་པས་
སེལ་རྒྱས་ཤིང་། ཇེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་ནི་དེའི་ཟུར་གྱི་ཏོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གང་
རུང་རེ་ངེས་སེལ་རྒྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

The first element mentioned is correct, because those states of mind which are dissimilar to direct valid perception are limited to precisely two: perceptions which are not valid, and deductive valid perceptions; while perceptions which are not valid are disallowed by the part of the definition that says, "fresh, unerring perception," and deductive perceptions are disallowed both by the reference in the definition to "free of conceptualization" and also by the reference to "unmistaken."

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གང་རུང་རི་རིས་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་
སེལ་གྲང་། རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་སྣོས་པ་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་དབང་
དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་ལྷ་གཅིག་ལྷ་གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་ཤེས་ལྟ་བུའང་རྟོག་
བྲལ་ཡིན་པས་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ནམ་སྣམ་པའི་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་
མ་འབྲུལ་བ་སྣོས་ཤིང་། རིགས་པ་ཅན་པ་སོགས་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པར་འདོད་པ་
རྣམས་ཀྱི་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དུ་རྟོག་བྲལ་སྣོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second element mentioned is correct, because—although the references to "free of conceptualization" and to "unmistaken" each by themselves disallow dissimilar types—they each address a different wrong idea, and so both "free of conceptualization" and "unmistaken" are mentioned, to disallow these wrong ideas. Something like the sense perception where one moon appears to be two is also a state of mind free of conceptualization, and so someone might wonder whether it's a direct valid perception; and so the part about "unmistaken" is added to disallow this wrong idea. The [non-Buddhist] Logician School (the Nyayika) believe that direct perception is a kind of conceptualization; the part about "free of conceptualization" is added to disallow their wrong idea.

Formal logic subject:
***Reasons for the Absence of Something
Which Involve Something Perceptible***

The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the great tutor, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso.

།སྐྱང་རླང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

There are two parts to our explanation of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible [to the opponent]: the definition, and the divisions.

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ལ་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བརྟགས་པའི་
དོན་བསྐལ་དོན་མིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible is the following:

That thing which is both (1) a correct reason for the absence of something in a particular proof; and (2) such that the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof is not an abstruse object to the person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། སྐྱང་རླང་གི་འབྲེལ་ལྗོངས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྐྱང་
རླང་གི་འགལ་ལྗོངས་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

This type of reason may be divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་བཞིན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱང་རླང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་
ཡིན། མེད་དགག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are the respective definitions of these two different types. The definition of the first is:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is:

That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) either a negative thing in the sense of not being something, or a positive thing.

དང་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། སྣང་རུང་གི་རྒྱ། བྱ་བྱེད། རང་བཞིན། དངོས་འབྲས་མ་
དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་བཞི།

The first may be divided into four different types: those reasons for the absence of something where the reason involves a cause, a comprehensive set, a nature, or an immediate result.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། སྣང་རུང་གི་རྒྱ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དང་
པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེས་འོག་མ་རྣམས་ལ་རིགས་འགྲ།

Respective definitions of these four are as follows. The first is defined as "A reason for the absence of something perceptible where the three relationships hold, and where this reason represents a cause." This same pattern holds for the other three.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། མེ་མེད་པ་དེ་མཚན་མེའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
དང་པོ་དང་།

Respective typical examples of the four are as follows. The first would be "there is no fire there," used as a reason to prove that there is no smoke on the surface of a [totally dark] nighttime ocean.

ཤིང་མེད་པ་དེ། ཤིང་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་བྲག་ཚོང་དུ་ཤ་པ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

An example of the second would be "there are no trees there," used as a reason to prove that there are no juniper trees on the surface of a barren rock crag where no trees can be perceived by a valid perception.

བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་
བུམ་པ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

An example of the third would be "no water pitchers can be perceived there by a valid perception," used as a reason to prove that there are no water pitchers in a particular place where no water pitchers can be perceived with a valid perception.

དངོས་འབྲས་དུ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ། དུ་བས་དབེན་པའི་རྩིག་སྐྱོར་དུ་དུ་བའི་དངོས་རྒྱ་མེད་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་བཞི་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།།

An example of the fourth would be "there is no smoke, its immediate result, there"—used as a reason to prove that there the immediate cause of some smoke does not exist atop a particular wall which is totally devoid of any smoke.

The forms of debate:
Different Types of Ceremonial Debates

The setting for debate in Tibetan Buddhism ranges from the intimate to highly ceremonial debates before thousands of assembled monks. Walking around Sera Mey Monastery at any given time of the day or night, you can hear the sound of heated arguments and the slap of hands floating out of any window, or from atop any of the flat roofs of most of the buildings, as friends or classmates challenge each other in spontaneous debates that go wherever their fancy takes them. Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin has often said that the reason he attained the highest standing among the highest ranks of geshe in the year he graduated was because of the constant exchange between him and his roommate, the great geshe Jampel Sengge, who went on in later years

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

to become the teacher of Guiseppe Tucci, one of the greatest Tibetologists of history.

Debate is often used in a private scripture class. Student monks in a Tibetan monastery may visit the classes of different teachers throughout their career, and choose the one who most fits their own needs. At any given time for the sophomore class, for example, there may be three or four great teachers instructing different groups of its members. Classes normally take place early in the day—the teacher reads through a few pages of scripture with the students, constantly throwing in pieces of debate about difficult questions. It is very common for the teacher to take the role of the attacker, and then all the students to yell back in unison, as a defender. Then by evening the students are prepared to debate the topic of the day, having reviewed it themselves in their own rooms during the afternoon.

As mentioned before, the first debate of the evening for any particular monk in the geshe program is a "one-on-one" with another young monk, chosen by wandering around the monastery debate park until you catch the eye of someone you think might be good. (It feels much like a high-school dance!) If the other monk is from a lower class, you get to review what you learned before; if he's from a higher class, you get to explore something you will be studying within a year or two.

Later on in the evening the monks bunch up into class groups, clustered around a single attacker and one to three defenders. The subject here will follow the readings of your class for the week, whether it be the perfection of wisdom (*prajnya paramita*), middle-way philosophy (*madhyamika*), vowed ethics (*vinaya*), logic (*pramana*), or higher knowledge (*abhidharma*).

Once a week, two entire classes challenge each other on a rotating basis, in a debate called *damcha* (*dam-bca'*), a word which literally means "a position taken." One class selects two of their best members to defend; and they come first and seat themselves on a special platform at the head of the debate park. These two will be the only defenders for the whole night, although their classmates are allowed to shout out helpful answers, and jibes at the attackers from the other class.

The attack begins with one of the senior members of the other class, who rises and raises the first question. He continues to a certain point, often decided by the debate master, when the next member of the class by seniority rises to pose a different question. If the debate is particularly hot, other members of the class leap up to throw in their own points, and before long there is a wonderful scene of a whole row of students screaming great questions, often in perfect unison. (It looks a little like a chorus line!)

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

This again is a great opportunity for the older class to review their knowledge, while members of the younger class get to hear arguments inevitably referring to the more advanced subject which the older class is on at the time. *Damcha* debates can continue into the wee hours of the night, until the debate master pulls the debaters off each other. Most of the monks wander home, while a group of diehards might go on in a cluster in some corner of the debate park, sometimes until dawn.

Two or three times a year, all monks in the geshe program are required to attend a *gyuktru* (*rgyugs-sprod*) or "examination" debate. This is to test their progress in their studies before a board made up of the abbot, the debate master, and a number of senior geshe. Each monk will have an opportunity both to defend on one question, and to attack on another. These debates are very brief and heated, since each side knows they only have a few minutes to demonstrate their ability before the debate master calls a truce and the next pair begins (there are hundreds of students to get through in only a few days). The question of who will qualify for the geshe and other degree examinations is primarily based on the scores from these regular exams.

The degree examinations are the most critical and ritualized debates, and all of them are also called *damcha*. The first major degree exam in a monk's career is the *rikchung* examination; appearing for such an examination is known as *rikchung tsoklang*. The meaning of the word *rikchung* (*rigs-chung*) is somewhat uncertain, but Khen Rinpoche states that it probably refers to the level of a student's ability in the science of reasoning (*rigs-pa*), which at this point (after twelve or thirteen years of debating) is considered "lesser" (*chung*).

The expression *tsoklang* (*tsogs-lang*) most likely refers to the fact that the student must stand up (*lang*) in the entire assembly of monks (*tsok*) from his own monastery to defend his understanding. It also may ultimately be a corruption of the expression *tsulen* (*tsod-len*), meaning to "judge the ability or capacity" of the candidate's knowledge of the art of reasoning (*rigs-pa'i tsod len*).

A *rikchung* debate is rigorous, requiring many months of training by one's teacher. Each candidate must prepare, with his teacher's help, a formalized debate on a topic assigned by seniority—the "best" topics, such as compassion, being awarded in advance to the best debaters. The opponent will be another member of the class, and there are also large chunks of scripture to be memorized for the required chanting section.

Practically the entire debate, down to *whoa's* and *tsa's*, must be memorized in advance. Flowcharts are prepared showing all the possible appropriate responses to every possible answer. The flowchart splits, and half becomes totally useless, when the opponent during the actual debate answers, for

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

example, "wrong!" (*tak ma drup*) or "not necessarily!" (*kyappa ma jung*). After the rough flowchart has been prepared by the candidate and his teacher, it is handed over to a calligrapher, who prepares a huge banner with all possible exchanges (even though the actual debate will ultimately only go down one branch).

This banner is pasted to door of the candidate's room, where he can review it frequently. He will also spend many months out in the cornfields, practicing by himself, out of earshot of the opponent or his buddies (who are always trying to find out in advance what issues he plans to raise).

Here he will also practice, over and over, every move of the entire debate: how to bow to the abbot at the beginning; when to put on or remove the high, peaked ritual hat; when to stand, when to sit; when to wave what arm; how to wear the (incredibly heavy and hot) ritual robes and other accoutrements.

The *rikchung* debate is a very serious moment in a student monk's life; if he fails to be among the small number of qualifying candidates (perhaps only 12 of the entire class), he will not be eligible for the *geshe* examinations much later. After a successful *rikchung* debate there is usually a big party: mom and dad, sister and brother, are usually down from other refugee camps in India to see the big event; and the opponent, your teacher, and all your classmates show up with gifts and silk scarves to help you celebrate.

The *rikchen* (*chen* meaning "greater" ability to reason) debate is the next big step, and immediately precedes the *geshe* exams for higher ranks of *geshes*. It is basically the same as the *rikchung* exam, except that it takes place in the *tsokchen* (the great hall shared by the two monasteries involved, such as Sera Mey and Sera Jey Monasteries), and the opponent comes from the sister monastery. The audience now is not only all the monks of your monastery (over a thousand now at Sera Mey, for example), but also all the monks of the opponent's (Sera Jey, for example).

Both the *rikchung* and *rikchen* debates also call for a night of defending your ability at your own college, or *kangtsen* (*khang-tsan*). Sera Mey, for example, is divided into some twelve surviving colleges; and the one which ACI students are affiliated with is that of our root lama, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. This is Gyalrong College, home also to the illustrious Pabongka Rinpoche. The *kangtsen* defense is mostly a dry-run among friends, to get the student ready for the pressure of the other, larger debates to come.

The debates for a *geshe* candidate are, of course, the most rigorous. There are many levels of *geshe*, and different kinds of *geshes* even among different monasteries of the same tradition. A candidate for the *lingse* (*gling-bsres*) or

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

lower rank of geshe need only defend himself in the midst (*se*) of the assembled monks of his own monastery (*ling*). Debates for this rank of geshe are held about twice per year, and the number of candidates in each case is typically restricted to two.

The *lingse* candidate first defends himself in open debate against each member of his college, one-on-one, before the assembled college. The next step is a defense before each member of every one of the classes in the geshe program, which means every monk attending the debate park, each evening for about a week. Finally comes a grand defense before the assembled monks of the entire monastery, including all geshe and other monks who have graduated from the debate park already. The other details of the *lingse* debate are similar to the *rikchung* and *rikchen* debates, with a large amount of scripture to be memorized and recited also.

The debates for the *hlarampa* or highest rank of geshe are much more difficult, in the old days requiring an open defense before the assembled monks of every one of the six major Gelukpa monasteries. The opponent here is another highly qualified candidate selected by one of these other monasteries; normally, only one or two candidates are "fielded" by each monastery per year.

The final debates between *hlarampa* (*hla rams-pa*) geshe occur during the great prayer festival at the Tibetan new year; this was held in Lhasa (*Hla-sa*), and the candidates had to have mastered a veritable myriad (*rab-'byams*, shortened to *rams*) of scriptures. (This etymology comes from the *Great Dictionary of the Tibetan Language*.) The most successful of the *hlarampa* debaters were awarded "honors" (called *anggi* or "number") by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the Potala Palace—and our root lama, Khen Rinpoche, was awarded highest honors in the year he completed his geshe.

In recent years, an extended series of intensive debate examinations before a special board of abbots and their assistants, as well as written examinations, have been added to the process, lengthening the entire wait of a candidate who has already completed his class work, in some cases, up to eight or more years.

A final special form of debate is the Winter Debates, called *Jang Gunchu*, a sort of annual Olympics between the great Gelukpa monasteries. *Jang* ('*Jang*) is the name of a small monastery where these debates were held in Tibet, and *gunchu* (*dgun-chos*) means "Dharma event held in the winter." In India, the debates are sometimes mistakenly referred to as the *Jamyang Gunchu* ("Winter Debates of Manjushri").

Traditionally, a small group of hand-picked students in the geshe program—perhaps 50 from a monastery of thousands—was sent to Jang

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Eight

Monastery to participate. The monks would prepare a backpack and sleeping roll, and walk to the town of Jang, a good distance to the southwest of Lhasa. The sponsoring monastery of the debate was Rato, known for its tradition of masters of debate and logic. Here the monks would debate the very subjects of this course series—logic and Buddhist perceptual theory—from the great *Commentary on Valid Perception* of Master Dharmakirti. Special attention was given to its most famous Tibetan commentary, an extraordinary masterpiece by Gyaltsab Je, one of the principal disciples of Je Tsongkapa.

The Winter Debates would continue for an entire month, with nearly non-stop debating on a personal, class, and inter-monastery level for the entire day and—during special debates called *tseppe damcha*—the entire night as well. (According to Khen Rinpoche, the word *tseppe* is a corruption of the word *tsebu* (*mtsan-bud*), meaning "all night long.")

The invasion of Tibet marked the end of the Winter Debates. After a long hiatus, they were re-instituted in India, with the help of Khen Rinpoche and his students. They are now back to their original glory, attended by hundreds of the best young debaters and rotating each year between the "Big Three" monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden. They provide an excellent opportunity for the cream of the monasteries to get to know one another and "cross-fertilize" their thinking, making the entire tradition stronger.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Supplement to Reading Eight

རིགས་པའི་འགོ་སླངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part One

བུམ་པ་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bumpa tokpa yinpay chir.

...Because a water pitcher is an unchanging thing.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Tak madrup!

Wrong!

བུམ་པ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ།

Bumpa takpa mayinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is *not* an unchanging thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

Right!

མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།

Mayinte!

And why not?

བུམ་པ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpay chir.

Because a water pitcher is a changing thing.

བུམ་པ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པར་གྲུབ།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

Right!

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Nine: The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

Selection from the collected topics:
The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

The selection here is from a monastic textbook popularly known as The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trashi, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

། །གཞན་སེལ་གྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། །འཕྲིན་ལེན་རེ། །སྤོང་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
གསུམ་པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་ན། །སྤོང་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་སྤྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Here next is a presentation on the concept of exclusion. On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

If any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion exists for something, then the exclusion for that thing always exists.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། །སྤོང་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་བྲལ། །སྤོང་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གསུམ་
པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །སྤྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Consider the horns of a rabbit.
Does an exclusion then exist for them?
Because any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion exist for them.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རུ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གསུམ་པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exist any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion for the horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.
Any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion does so exist for them,
Because there does exist the mental kind of exclusion for them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རུ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་
འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པར་སྣང་བ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the mental kind of exclusion exists for the horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.
The mental kind of exclusion does so exist for them,
Because the mental kind of exclusion for them is the image of the reverse of
all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps
to them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རུ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་
པར་སྣང་བ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

[It's not correct to say that the mental kind of exclusion for the horns of a rabbit is the image of the reverse of all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps to them.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.

The mental kind of exclusion for them is so the image of the reverse of all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps to them,

Because they are something that has no nature of its own.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་
དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: an exclusion does exist for the horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.

It is not so, that an exclusion exists for them,

Because there exists for them no exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance;

And this is so true, because they are not a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་
ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a working thing, then it is always an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

བྱུ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance?

Because it is a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

འདོད་ན། བྱུ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a water pitcher is an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then an exclusion?

Because it is an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

འདོད་ན། བྱུ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that a water pitcher is an exclusion.]

Suppose you do agree.

So is a water pitcher then a negative thing?

Because it is an exclusion.

མ་བྱུ་ན་བྱུ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། གཞན་སེལ་དང་དགག་པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "exclusion" and "negative thing" are terms that refer to the same thing.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a water pitcher is a negative thing.]

But you can't agree to our original statement,
Because a water pitcher is a positive thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

The reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.
It is not so true that it is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which
is the objectification of a specific instance,
Because it is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a
specific instance.

མ་སྐྱབ་ན། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་
ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

[It's not correct to say that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.

It is so true that it is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a specific instance,

Because it is not an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

[It's not correct to say that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is not an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.

So is it then a working thing?

Because it is an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.

You already agreed to this reason.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཚོས་དང་དངོས་པོ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow that, just because something is an existing object which represents objectification of a specific instance, it must always be a working thing.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because the terms "existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance" and "working thing" both refer to the same thing.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། ལྷུ་མ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷུ་མ་
པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་གཉིས་ལ་སྲུང་པར་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

It is not so, that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is a working thing,
Because (1) all that is not all that is not a water pitcher is not a working thing,
and (2) there's no difference between this and the other.



ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྲོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་ན། སྲོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་
ལོག་པ་ཡོད་པས་སྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If there exists for something an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance of the particular object, then there must always exist the reverse of all that it is not.

ཀྱ་ལྷུ་མ་གཉིས་ཚོས་ཅན། སྲོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྲོད་ཀྱི་དོན་
རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
So does there exist the reverse of all that they are not?
Because there does exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agree that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་
པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist for the two .]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
There does so exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance,
Because it would be the existing objects which are the objectification of a
specific instance of them.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པ་མེད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: there does exist the reverse of
all that a pillar and a water pitcher is not.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is not so true, that there does exist the reverse of all that a pillar and a water
pitcher is not,
Because they are a knowable thing which nothing can be.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་
པར་ཐལ། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པ་གཅིག་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་རྟགས་ཕྱི་མ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པའི་ཀླ་
བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Consider the two of a pillar and a pitcher.

There does not so exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance,

Because (1) the two of a pillar and a pitcher is no such thing, and (2) there exists no single such thing which would be distinct from them.

Our answer to this would be, "The latter part of your statement is not correct." And this is true because an example of such a thing would be the two of a pillar and a pitcher which is devoid of being both an unchanging and a changing thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་འཇོག་པའི་ཚེ་ན། ཏྲག་
དངོས་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever you establish something as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance, then you must establish a water pitcher which is devoid of being both an unchanging and a changing thing.

དེ་མི་འབྲད་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་
མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ལ་བཞག་ཚེ་ག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it's not so that this is the case,
Because it is allowable to establish the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
བྱམ་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it is allowable to establish the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification
of a specific instance,

Because it is, for the pitcher, an exclusion.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པའི་མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་འཇོག་པའི་ཚེ་ན། བྱམ་པ་གང་
ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་དེ་འཇོག་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever we establish something as being, for a water pitcher,
an exclusion of the kind which is a negative that involves the
absence of something, then we always establish, for a water
pitcher, the lack of any self-nature to the person.

དེ་མི་འཐད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་ལ་བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མིང་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་མིང་
དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ལ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this cannot be the case,

Because we must always establish the exclusion of the kind which is a negative
that involves the absence of something, with regard to a water pitcher,
as the condition that a water pitcher has nothing about it which is part
of all that is not a water pitcher.

དེར་ཐལ། བ་ལང་ལ་བ་ལང་མ་ཡིན་པ་མིང་པ་བ་ལང་གི་མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་
ལ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case,

Because we must establish the exclusion of the kind which is a negative that
involves the absence of something, with regard to a cow, as the
condition that a cow has nothing about it which is a part of all that is
not a cow.

དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་ཆེན་ལས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case,
Because this is how the *Great Book on Valid Perception* explains it.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་དེ་སློའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་བུམ་པ་དེ་བུམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་
གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་གཉིས་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It must be the case that the state of mind which is the reverse of
all that is not the state of mind is, for the state of mind, an
exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a
specific instance,

Because (1) that water pitcher which is the reverse of all that is not the
water pitcher is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind
which is a specific instance of the water pitcher, and (2) the two
are similar cases.

འདོད་ན། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་ཚེས་ཅན། སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། སློའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་འདྲུབ།

Suppose you agree to our statement.
Consider that state of mind which is the reverse of all that is not the state of
mind.

It must then be the mental kind of exclusion,
Because it is, for the state of mind, an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

ཁོ་ན་རེ། ལྷོ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྒྱུད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་རྒྱུད། རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུད་ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་འདོད་ལན་
ཐེབས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱི་བའི་ཚེ་ན། ལྷོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་ལྷོ་དེ་ལྷོ་དའི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཅེས་ཕྱི་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a state of mind.
That state of mind which is the reverse of all that it is not is so, for it,
an exclusion;
Because it is an existing thing which can be.

Our answer to this is, "We agree." And this is because, when you are determining how to read this point, it is correct to read it in such a way that you would answer "we agree" to the fact that the state of mind which is the reverse of all that a state of mind is not would be an exclusion *for that mind*, [and not a "mental kind of exclusion"].

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ལྷོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་ལྷོ་ལྷོ་དའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
ལྷོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་ལྷོ་དེ་ལྷོ་དའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་འབྲལ།
འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། ལྷོ་དའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་ན་ཏེག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར།

On this particular point, someone might come and make the following claim:

That state of mind which is the reverse of all that is not
the state of mind is so a mental kind of exclusion,
Because that state of mind which is the reverse of all that
is not the state of mind is an exclusion for that state
of mind.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."
One could though never agree to the statement,
Because anything which is an exclusion for a state of mind is always an
unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་ཏྲག་པ་དེ་ཏྲག་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུབ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is so true that that unchanging thing which is the reverse of all
that is not the unchanging thing is the exclusion for that
unchanging thing,
Because that water pitcher which is the reverse of all that
is not the water pitcher is exclusion for a water
pitcher.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཏྲག་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པའི་དོན་རང་
མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་ཡིན། ཏྲག་པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན།
ཏྲག་པའི་སློབ་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you agree to that statement.

Consider that unchanging thing which is the reverse of all that is not the
unchanging thing.
It is not so true, that it is the exclusion for that unchanging thing,
Because it is neither the type of exclusion which is a specific instance of the
unchanging thing; nor the type of exclusion for the unchanging thing
which is a negative that involves the absence of something; nor the
mental type of exclusion.

ཏྲགས་དང་པོ་མ་བྱུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཏྲག་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that an
unchanging thing which is the reverse of all that is not an
unchanging thing is not the type of exclusion which is a specific
instance of the unchanging thing.]

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so true, that it is the type of exclusion which is a specific instance of
the unchanging thing,

Because it is one example of the lack of any self-nature of the person.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འདྲུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ན་མ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། མིང་དགག་གི་དོན་རང་མཚན་
གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱིར་བཏོན་ན་མ་

བྱས།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider unproduced, empty space.

It is so true, that it is the type of exclusion which is a specific instance
of a negative thing which involves the absence of something,

Because it is a type of exclusion which is a negative that involves the
absence of something.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

*[Please note that this text uses the above unusual spelling for "unproduced" several
times, so we have left it as is.]*

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མིང་དགག་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་ན་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་
རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་
སྤྱིར་བཏོན་ན་

Suppose someone else, in response to this exchange, comes and makes the
following claim:

Consider a negative thing which involves an absence.

It is so true, that anything which is an exclusion for it is that type of
exclusion which is a specific instance for it,

Because there does exist an exclusion for it.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བརྗེ་བའི་ཚེ་ན་མིང་དགག་དེའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་
རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་ཅེས་རྗེ་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It's not correct to say that." And this is because, when you read this statement, you would have to read it as "there does exist an exclusion for this particular negative involving an absence," and would therefore have to answer, "It's not correct to say that."



ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འདུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་མིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Unproduced, empty space is not an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something.

འདུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཚོས་ཅན། མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།


Consider unproduced, empty space.
It is so an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something,

Because it is a negative thing which involves the absence of something.

མ་བྱུང་ན་བྱུང་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་དང་མིང་དགག་གཉིས་
དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something" and "a negative thing which involves the absence of something" both refer to the same thing.



རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། གཞན་སེལ་དང་དགག་པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་མཚན་
ཉིད་འཇོག་མི་དགོས།

Here secondly is our own position. Because the terms "exclusion" and "negative thing" refer to the same thing, there is no need to posit a definition for exclusion.

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་སྲོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། དངོས་
པོར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་པ་དང་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་

If something is a working thing, then there always exists an exclusion for it which is the objectification of a specific instance. The terms "negative thing which is a working thing" and "an exclusion which is the objectification of a specific instance" both refer to the same thing.

བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན་སྲོད་ཀྱི་སློབ་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། སློབ་གཞན་སེལ་དང་
ཚོག་པའི་སྣང་ཡུལ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་

There is always a mental kind of exclusion for anything which is such that it possesses no nature of its own. The terms "mental kind of exclusion" and "object which appears to a conceptualization" refer to the same thing.

གཞི་བྱུང་ན་སྲོད་ཀྱི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། མེད་དགག་གི་
གཞན་སེལ་དང་མེད་དགག་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་ནོ།།

If a thing can be established as existing, then there is always an exclusion of it which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something. And the terms "exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something" and "negative thing which involves the absence of something" refer to the same thing.

Formal logic subject:
**Identifying Elements of a Logical Statement,
and Some Different Classifications of Correct Logical Statements**

The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), composed by the great tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama named Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

རྟོགས་ཚེས་དོན་གསུམ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་ལ། དམ་བཅའ་བཞག་པ་དང་། སྐྱབ་བྱེད་
འགོད་པ་གཉིས་དང་པོ་ནི།

This brings us to the section where we identify the reason, the quality to be proven, and the subject. We proceed in two steps: presenting our position, and then putting forth proofs to support our position. Here is the first.

མི་མེད་པ་དེ། མི་མེད་པའི་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་མཚན་མེད་ཀྱི་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན། མི་མེད་དེ་དེའི་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིག་མ་ཡིན།

The expression "because there is no fire" is a logical reason for proving that there is no smoke on the surface of an ocean in the middle of the night in a proof where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason in the proof. "Because *there's* no fire" is not a logical reason for the same proof where that same term serves as the reason in the proof.

དུ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ། མི་མེད་པའི་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཚེས་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་
དངོས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བུ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན། དུ་མེད་དེ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན།
དེས་ཤིང་མེད་སོགས་ལ་རིགས་འདྲེའོ།

The expression "there is no smoke" is both (1) the quality to be proven in that same proof, where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven for the same proof. The expression "it's smokeless" is neither of the two. This same pattern applies for the expressions such as "there are no trees" and so on.

བྱུང་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། བྱུང་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་
བྱུང་པ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན། བྱུང་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། བྱུང་པ་ཚད་མས་
མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་
དངོས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན། དེས་གཞན་རྣམས་ལ་རིགས་
འགྲོའོ།།

The expression "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is a logical reason for proving that there exists no water pitcher in a particular location where no water pitcher is perceived by any valid perception to be present. The expression "there exists no water pitcher there" is both (1) the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof, where "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is acting as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof. This pattern follows for other cases as well.

ཤ་ཟ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་
ངེས་པའི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་
དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན།

A "flesheater spirit" [a *preta*, or tormented spirit] is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that, in the location before us, there can exist no recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects. This same term though is not the "quality which is denied" itself.

ཤ་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་པའི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་
བཏགས་པའི་དོན་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

The existence, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects, of a recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, is both (1) the quality which is denied in this particular proof, and (2) a main element in the quality which is denied in the same proof.

དུ་བ་དེ་མཚན་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་
པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན།

The term "smoke" is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, but it is not the quality denied in the same proof.

དེར་དུ་བ་ཡོད་པ་དེ། མཚན་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་
སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

The "existence of smoke in that particular place" is both (1) a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, and (2) the quality which is denied in the same proof.

རྟག་པ་དེ། སྐྱ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་
ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

"An unchanging thing" is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that sound is not an unchanging thing, but it is not the quality which is denied in the same proof.

༘ གཉིས་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་ཀྱི་སྐོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན། སྐྱབ་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་། དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Here next is the second major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified according to the quality to be proven. Here there are two types: correct positive reasons, and correct negative reasons.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག བྱོད་ཀྱི་

རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། སྐྱབ་པ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are their respective definitions. First comes the definition of a correct positive reason for any particular proof:

Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a positive thing.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། འབྲས་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་
ཡོད། དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན། སྐྱབ་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང།

These kinds of reasons may be divided into two types of their own: correct reasons that involve a result, and correct reasons that involve a nature. Anything which is one of these two types of reasons is always a positive reason.

བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་
ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་དགག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ།
བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct negative reason for any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a negative thing.

དགག་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག

The terms "correct negative reason" and "correct reason for proving the absence of something" both refer to the same thing.

དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དགག་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་དང་། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་འགལ་
ཡང་། དགག་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྐབས་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་མི་འགལ་ཏེ། བྱས་པ་
དེ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཉག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབས་པའི་དགག་ཉག་
ཡང་དག་དང་། སྐབས་ཉག་པར་སྐབས་པའི་སྐབས་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

It is contradictory for one thing to be both a correct negative reason for a particular proof and also a correct positive reason for the same proof. It is not contradictory though for one thing to be both a correct negative reason and a correct positive reason. And this is because the expression "a thing which is made" can be both: it is both a correct negative reason for proving that sound is not an unchanging thing, and it is a correct positive reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.

གསུམ་པ་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག་ལ་སྐབས་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྐོན་སྤྱོད་དབྱེ་ན། དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་
དག། ཐ་སྐད་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག། དོན་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག།
ཐ་སྐད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ལ་ཡང་དག། དོན་དང་ཐ་སྐད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་
ལ་ཡང་དག་དང་ལྷ་ལས། དེ་རྣམས་སོ་སོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། སྐབས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་
རིགས་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Next is the third major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified by according to how the proof is made. Here there are five different types:

- 1) Correct reasons for proving the meaning;
- 2) Correct reasons for proving the term;
- 3) Correct reasons for proving the meaning alone;
- 4) Correct reasons for proving the term alone; and
- 5) Correct reasons for proving both the meaning and the term.

We will discuss these reasons in three parts: their definition, typical example, and supporting logic.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བབྱང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་
པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དོན་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here first is the definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning in any particular proof:

Something which is both (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) a definition.

དེ་གང་ཞིག། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བབྱང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྲོད་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the term in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is defined.

དེ་གང་ཞིག། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བབྱང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དོན་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning alone in any particular proof is as follows:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a thing defined—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a definition.

དེ་གང་ཞིག་ ། བྱོན་གྱི་དྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་གྱི་བསྐབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན།
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོན་དེ་སྐབ་གྱི་ཐ་སྐད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐབ་གྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the term alone in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a thing defined.

དེ་གང་ཞིག་ ། བྱོན་གྱི་དྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་གྱི་དངོས་གྱི་བསྐབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོན་དེ་སྐབ་གྱི་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྐད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐབ་གྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་
དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven

for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—and there can also exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a thing defined.

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་དེ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་ཀྱང་། བྱས་པའི་ཉག་ས་ཀྱི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་འདྲའི་
ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ན། བྱས་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Something which only lasts a moment" is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing; but it is not a correct reason in the same proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason. This is because, if something is a correct reason for this specific proof, it must be one and the same as "something which is made."

བྱས་པ་དེ་སྐྱ་སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཚད་མས་བྱབ་ཟེན་གྱི་ཚོལ་བ་ཡང་དག་གྱི་དོར་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། སྐྱིར་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་
དོན་དང་ཐ་སྐྱད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྐྱ་སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཚད་
མས་མ་ངེས་པའི་ཚོལ་བའི་དོར་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྐྱད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Something which is made" is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing, when this proof is presented to a correct opponent who has already established, through a valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment. Generally speaking though it is a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term. This is because it is—when presented to an opponent who has not yet ascertained, through any valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment—a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term.

བཞི་པ་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་སློན་ས་དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་སློབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་
དག་ །ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ །བྲགས་པའི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་དང་གསུམ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

This brings us to the fourth major point, which is classifying correct reasons by the assertion to be proven. Here there are three different types: correct reasons involving deduction; correct reasons involving reasoned belief; and correct reasons involving convention.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞེས། །དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ལ་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་
དཔག་ཚད་མ་བློད་བྱེད་དེ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first is as follows:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a deductive type of valid perception towards the assertion of the particular reason.

དེ་གང་ཞེས། །དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་བློད་བྱེད་དེ།
གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which involves reasoned belief, towards the assertion of the particular reason.

དེ་གང་ཞེས། ། །དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་བློད་བྱེད་
དེ། གསུམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the third is:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which involves convention, towards the assertion of the particular reason.

དང་པོ་ལ། འབྲས་རང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གསུམ་ལས། མཚན་གཞི་
རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ཏུ་བ་ཏུ་ལྟན་ལ་ལ་མེ་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་དྲགས་

ཡང་དག །བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་
 ཡང་དག །མི་མེད་པ་དེ་མཚན་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་
 སྟོབས་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན།

The first of these may be divided further into three types: correct reasons which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Respective typical examples would be the following.

- 1) "Because there is smoke," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the result type, for proving that fire exists in a smoky mountain pass;
- 2) "Because it is a thing which is made," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the nature type, for proving that sound is a changing thing; and
- 3) "Because there is no fire there," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the type relating to the absence of something, for proving that there is no smoke upon the surface of the nighttime ocean.

གཉིས་པ་ལ་ཡང་འབྲས་རང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གསུམ་ལས། དཔྱད་
 གསུམ་གྱིས་དག་པའི་ལྷང་དེ། སྐྱེན་པས་ལོངས་སྟོན་བྲིམས་གྱིས་བདེ། ཞེས་པའི་
 ལྷང་རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚད་མ་སྲ་མ་སྟོན་དུ་སོང་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་
 ཆེས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག །དེ་དེ་འབྲའི་ལྷང་རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་ལ་མི་
 བསྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག །དེ་དེ་འབྲའི་ལྷང་
 རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་ལ་བསྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་
 རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།།

There are also these same three types for the second kind here: those which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Examples here would be:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

- 1) "Because it is scriptural authority which has withstood the three tests," a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the result type, for proving that the citation "Giving leads to possessions, and morality to happiness" is scriptural authority which is such that the person who spoke it possessed, before he spoke, a valid perception in which he or she realized the truth of what the citation expresses;
- 2) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to a nature, for proving that the same citation is unerring about what it expresses; and
- 3) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to the absence of something, for proving that the same citation is not erring about what it expresses.

[The "three tests," by the way, are:

- 1) We have confirmed, with our own direct valid perceptions, those parts of the statement which correspond to "evident" reality;
- 2) We have confirmed, with our own logical, deductive form of valid perception, those parts of the statement which correspond to "hidden" reality; and
- 3) We have established that those parts of the statement which correspond to "deeply hidden" reality are free of any internal contradiction or similar faults.]

གསུམ་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ལས། ཉོག་ཡུལ་ན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། རི་བོང་ཅན་ལ་སྐྱབ་ཞེས་པའི་
སྐྱུ་བརྗོད་རུང་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་གྲགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག། ཉོག་
ཡུལ་ན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། རི་བོང་ཅན་ལ་དངོས་དབང་གིས་སྐྱབ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱུ་བརྗོད་རུང་
མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གྲགས་པའི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཞོ།

There are, finally, two types for the third kind here. "Because that's how people think," is an example of a correct reason which involves convention and which relates to a nature, to prove that it is nominally appropriate to speak of the moon as the "house of the rabbit." The same expression, "Because that's how people think," is also an example of a correct reason which involves

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

convention and which relates to the absence of something, to prove that it is not literally appropriate to speak of the moon as the "house of the rabbit."

ལྷ་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་འཇུག་ཚུལ་གྱི་སློན་སྐྱོད་ན། མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱུང་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། དེ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་
པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ལས།

The fifth point is the classification of correct reasons according to how they relate to the group of similar cases. Here there are two types: correct reasons where the set of similar cases and the reason subsume each other; and correct reasons where they relate to each other in two dissimilar ways, [subsuming in one direction, but not in the other].

སྐྱེ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱུང་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ།
དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first in a proof that sound is a changing thing is:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof subsume each other.

དེ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The definition of the second in the same proof is:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof relate to each other in two dissimilar ways.

བྱས་པ་དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡིན།

A definitive example of the first type would be "a made thing," while a definitive example of the second would be any particular kind of made thing.

༥ ལྷོག་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་ཚོལ་བའི་སློན་ས་དབྱེ་ན། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་། གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

The sixth and final division here is that critical one where the classification is made by correct opponent. Here there are two types: correct reasons to use in the context of oneself, and correct reasons to use in the context of others.

ཁྱོད་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་ཡང་དག་མེད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first is as follows:

Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is no correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.

སྐྱ་ཚོལ་རང་གིས་རང་ཉིད་ལ་བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་དེ་
སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚོ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན།

Whenever the proponent seeks to establish something to his own mind, setting forth "because it's a made thing" to himself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing, then "because it's a made thing" is serving as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་
ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second type above is as follows:

Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is a correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.

བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་ཉམས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།

"Because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་ཉམས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་
དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

"Because it's a made thing" is both a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, and a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེ་མི་ཉམས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་ཡང་དག་
མེད་པར་བཟུམ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "because it's a made thing."
So is it then the case that there is no correct opponent to whom it can be used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?
Because it is a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེ་ཡོད་པར་བཟུམ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་
ཉམས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Now suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider this same thing.
There is so such a correct opponent,
Because this is a correct reason to use in the context of others.

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ །རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉམས་ཡང་དག་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Once again someone may come, to make the following claim:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

There is no such thing as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

མི་འབྲུག་དེ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་
སོང་པའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་པའི་སྟེན།

But this is incorrect,
Because in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing, then "because it's a made thing" is then a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

གཞན་ཡང་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་
པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་སྟེན།

We can moreover say that there do exist correct reasons to use in the context of oneself, because there does exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ན།
དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པར་ཐལ། མ་གྲུབ་པ་
དེའི་སྟེན།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider knowable things.
So is it then the case that, whenever anything is a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing, it can never be a correct reason, to use in the context of oneself, in order to prove that sound is a changing thing?

Because you said it was not correct.

འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་
སོང་བའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འཁོར་གསུམ།

Suppose you agree that it can never be.

Consider "because it's a made thing," in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

So is it then not a correct reason to use in the context of oneself for this same proof?

Because it is a correct reason for this same proof.

Now all you can do is contradict yourself.

གཞན་ཡང་། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
སྐྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཉག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པའི་སྟོར་བ་དེ། གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་
ཀྱི་ཉག་ས་ཡང་དག་གི་སྟོར་བ་རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Moreover, isn't it so that "because it's a made thing" cannot be a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing?

Because isn't it a correct reason to use, in the context of others, to prove the same thing?

And isn't this the case, because the logical statement given immediately below is a correct logical statement involving a correct reason to use in the context of others?

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it's a made thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། བྱས་པའི་ཉག་ས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོག་ཡང་དག་མེད་

པའི་ཚོ། བྱས་པའི་ཉགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་
བའི་ཚོ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཉགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་གྲུབ་བོ།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

So is it then true that—in a case where there is no correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there *is* in fact a correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?

Because—in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing—"because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use, in the context of others, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

To this we answer, "Your reason is not correct."

འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཚོ། བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པའི་ཉགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་
ཉག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་མེད་པའི་ཚོ། བྱས་པའི་ཉགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་ཉག་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོལ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉགས་ཁས།

And suppose one did agree to your original statement.

So is it then the case that, where there is not something made, there is something made?

Because it is the case that—where there is no correct opponent for a proof in which "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there *is* in fact a correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing.

And you've already agreed that this reason is correct.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་ཀྱང་། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is true that there does not exist any correct reason to use in the context of oneself. Nonetheless, "because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing—in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

མི་འགྲད་དེ། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,
Because there must then exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself;
Because there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for
proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་ཚེ།
བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞེས། །དེའི་ཚེ་བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་
ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

And this is true because—in an instance where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing—it is the case that (1) a made thing actually does exist, and (2) there does exist in this instance a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, where "because it's a made thing" is employed to prove that sound is a changing thing.

You've already agreed that the reason is correct.

གཞན་ཡང་། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་

ཐལ། བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is moreover true that there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing;
Because there is an instance where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཏུ་བ་ཏུ་ལྡན་ལ་ལ་མི་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because there is a person for whom "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for this particular proof;
And this is true because there is a person for whom "because there is smoke there" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that there is fire in a smoky mountain pass.

ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ་ཕྱི་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཏྲགས་སྟོར་ནི། སོ་སྐྱེ་འཆི་ཁ་མའི་སེམས་སྐྱད་
ཅིག་ཐ་མ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉིར་འབྲས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་རིག་པ་ཕྱི་མ་ཡོད་དེ། བྱོད་
ཆགས་བཅས་རྒྱན་ལྡན་གྱི་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན། ད་ལྟའི་སློབ་བཞིན།

There is also the logical proof that we use to establish the existence of past and future lives:

Consider the mind of a common person [one who has not yet seen emptiness directly] who is just about to die.
There does exist, as its material result, a later state of mind;
Because it is a state of mind present in the being of a person who still possesses ignorant desire.
It is, for example, similar to the present state of mind.

བྱིས་པ་བཙས་མ་ཐག་པའི་སློབ་ཚུལ་ཅན། རང་གི་རིགས་འདྲ་བའི་སློབ་ཚུལ་སློབ་དུ་སོང་
སྟེ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དབེར་ན། སྐད་པའི་སློབ་ཞེན་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ།

And consider the mind of an infant who has just been
born.
A mind which is of exactly the same type as it has
preceded it,
Because it is a state of mind.
It is, for example, like the mind of a very old person.

The forms of debate:
The Traditional Debating Classes and Subjects

Over the centuries, each major Gelukpa monastery in Tibet has developed its own unique curriculum, all based on the study of the five great books of ancient Indian Buddhism. The structure of the different classes in the debate park is designed around the progressive study of a student in the geshe program through these five great classics, and this is where the core subjects and even the name of the Asian Classics Institute come from.

There are fourteen different debate classes going on simultaneously at Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery, and typically 20 to 22 years is required to pass through the fourteen. Each of the classes has its own special name—something like "freshman" or "sophomore" in the West. At any given night in the debate park, the classes will be huddled in different spots spread around the park. The best spots (under a couple of especially shady trees in the summer, or up against a protecting wall in windy, cold weather) are given to the higher classes. If a beginning class is very large, the debate master may choose to break it up for the night into two or even three separate groups. Each group starts out with a single attacker and, normally, two defenders; by the end of the night, this may have dissolved into melee of eight or ten attackers bearing down on the original two defenders, with a group of supporters huddled behind them shouting out answers too.

Typical classes at present in Sera Mey might start out with sixty or seventy young men, of whom only a handful—four or five—will actually make it to the end of the geshe program. There is a custom at an advanced point in the

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

curriculum, around ten years into the program, to combine two of the classes from that point on, so that there are enough monks left to make the debates interesting.

The following is a list of the names, durations, and traditional subjects for each of the debate classes at Sera Mey. It was compiled with the help of Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. It should be noted that this is the ideal curriculum, and in the refugee monasteries of southern India events like an unusually long monsoon season, an attack of tuberculosis, sudden changes of plan by monastic officials, extra monastic ceremonies to be attended, a public teaching by a great visiting Lama, or any number of other happenings can conspire to lengthen or shorten the time needed to complete one's geshe studies.

Year One

Class One: Beginning Class, Collected Topics

This class is Tibetan is known as *duchung* (*bsdus-chung*), since it is a beginning (*chung*) class on the collected topics (*bsdus-grva*) of Buddhist logic and perceptual theory, mostly according to the "Sutrist" (*Sautrantika* or *mDo-sde-pa*) School, which is considered the second of the four schools of ancient India. It is also the higher of the two schools of the Lower Way (Hinayana).

The original root text for this class is the *Commentary on Valid Perception* (*Pramana Varttika, Tsad-ma rnam-'grel*), written by Master Dharmakirti (*sLob-dpon Chos-kyi grags-pa*) around 650 AD. The principal monastic textbook is the *Collected Topics* (*Yongs-'dzin bsdus-grva*) of the Master Tutor, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

The duration of the class is one year, and begins with a special ceremony of initiation into the debate park. The students are typically around 14 or 15 years old; they have completed some elementary study of the collected topics with their house teacher, and are already familiar with the format of debate (called *rikpay grotang* [*rigs-pa'i 'gro-stangs*]). These students have also already learned to read and write (in both the regular and cursive alphabets), and have memorized many of the shorter prayers and texts.

In a pattern which will continue throughout their careers as students in the geshe program, the class moves through a standard series of topics, each with its own name—such as *chokchu* (*phyogs-chos*): the study of the subject element in a logical statement, and its relationship to the reason. The class might remain on a particular topic for say one to six weeks, and then move on to the next, according to an undefined, organic schedule dependent on a constant

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

assessment of their progress by the great lamas who are instructing different members of the class.

In the curriculum of the Asian Classics Institute, the topics of this and the next class are represented in the following courses:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Extension Course 3: Mind and Mental Functions

Year Two

Class Two: Advanced Class, Collected Topics

This class is a continuation of the previous, and lasts for a year. Its name is *duchen* (*bsdus-chen*), meaning the advanced (*chen-po*) class on the collected topics (*bsdus-grva*).

Year Three

Class Three: Beginning Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

The name of this class in Tibetan is *shungsar* (*gzhung-gsar*), indicating that these students are beginners (*gsar-pa*) in the first of the great classics (*gzhung*). The foundation root text here is the *Ornament of Realizations* (*Abhisamaya Alamkara*), dictated to the realized being Asanga (*'Phags-pa Thogs-med*) by the future Buddha, Maitreya (*rJe-btzun Byams-pa*) around 350 AD. The principal monastic textbook for this class is the *Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom* (*Phar-phyin mtha'-dpyod*) by Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (*mKhas-grub bsTan-pa dar-rgyas*), a master from Sera Mey who lived 1493-1568.

These texts present the beliefs of the lower Middle-Way school (the lower half of the fourth or highest school of the four, which itself corresponds to the higher of the two schools of the Mahayana, or Greater Way). This school is known as the *Madhyamika Svatantrika* (*dBu-ma rang-rgyud pa*), or "Independent" branch of the Middle-Way, so named because of their belief that we must take an independent object and discuss it in common terms to bring another person to understand correct view. The entire study of this school is called, in the monastery, the "Perfection of Wisdom," or *parchin* (*phar-phyin*) in Tibetan—an abbreviation of the full term, *sherab kyi parul tu chinpa* (*shes-rab kyi pha-rol tu phyin-pa*, or *prajnya paramita*).

This class also lasts for a year, and is devoted to covering only the first third of the first chapter of the root text. (The first chapter is by far the most extensive.) The topics covered in this and the following five classes are

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

represented in the following ACI courses:

Course II: Buddhist Refuge
Course XV: What the Buddha Really Meant

Year Four

Class Four: Intermediate Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

This class is a continuation of the preceding. It lasts for a year and is devoted to the second third of the first chapter of Lord Maitreya's root text. The name of the class in Tibetan is *shung-nying* (*gzhung-rnying*), meaning a study of this great classic (*gzhung*) by students who are now more advanced (*rnying-pa*).

Year Five

Class Five: Advanced Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

This class is again a continuation of the preceding. It too lasts for a year, and is devoted to the final third of the first chapter. Its name in Tibetan is *shung-nying gongma* (*gzhung-rnying gong-ma*), meaning an "even more" (*gong-ma*) advanced class of more experienced (*rnying-pa*) students of the great classic (*gzhung*).

Year Six

Class Six: Class on the Second and Third Chapters of the "Ornament"

This class is a continuation of the previous, and covers the second and third chapters of Lord Maitreya's text. It lasts for one year, and is named *kab nyipa* (*skabs gnyis-pa*), since it is devoted to the second (*gnyis-pa*) and third chapters (*skabs*) of the root text.

Years Seven and Eight

Class Seven: Class on the Fourth and Higher Chapters of the "Ornament"

The study of the *Ornament* continues in this class, dedicated to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of the root text. The eighth chapter is considered especially important because it is dedicated to a thorough description of an enlightened being. The name of this class is *kab shipa* (*skabs bzhi-pa*), meaning the students have reached the fourth (*bzhi-pa*) and higher chapters (*skabs*) of the root text. Each of the courses from this point on to the end of the geshe program last for two years each.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Years Nine and Ten
Class Eight: Class for Supplementary Topics
on the Perfection of Wisdom

The next class is named after and devoted to the study of supplementary topics on the perfection of wisdom known as *surkul* (*zur-bkol*), so called because they are extensive treatments of particular subjects which are "extracted" (*zur-du bkol-pa*) and expanded from much briefer references in the *Ornament*.

The four classic topics here are dependent origination (*rten-'brel*); the permutations of the flowchart that leads to enlightenment, known as the "community of the twenty" (*dge-'dun nyi-shu*); the levels of the form and formless realms, along with their corresponding meditational states (*bsam-gzugs*); and the very important study of the art of interpreting statements of the Buddha (*drang-nges*).

In conjunction with the last, the members of this class will also engage in a separate study of the "foundation consciousness" (*kun-gzhi*, or *alaya vijnyana*) concept accepted by the Mind-Only (*Citta Matra* or *Sems-tzam-pa*) School, the lower of the two Mahayana schools of ancient India, and third in the overall scheme of four schools. This will in fact be the most time ever spent on the beliefs of this particular school, although it is also touched upon later in the "Middle-Way" courses.

In Sera Mey, the principal monastic textbooks used for the supplementary topics are those on each particular subject composed by the masters Kedrup Tenpa Dargye and Panglung Lobsang Tukje (*sPang-lung Blo-bzang thugs-rje*, fl. 18th century).

Years Eleven and Twelve
Class Nine: Beginning Class on the Middle Way

Entrance to the ninth class, where a student debater begins his study of the higher half of the Middle-Way School, marks a major change in status. At Sera Mey, it is at this point that the monk earns the right to vote upon questions affecting the monastery at large during the regular assemblies. He has also normally just finished his *rikchung* examinations, which in effect qualify him to become, in time, a *geshe*.

In Tibet it was a custom at this juncture for the entire surviving class to approach sponsors and raise the funds to make an important gift to the monastery in appreciation of her kindness. The gift might be a set of rare and important books, new paintings or images for the temple altars, or even a

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

building. Members of the class would also go into deep retreats, intended to accumulate the good karma necessary to grasp the very subtle points of higher Middle-Way philosophy, the next subject in the curriculum. It is considered auspicious if the student encounters difficulty during this retreat (as the sign of an effective attempt to eliminate previous bad karma), and our Root Lama, Khen Rinpoche, has said that he became dangerously ill during his retreat in Tibet at this time.

The name of this class is *uma sarpa* (*dbu-ma gsar-pa*), meaning "beginning" (*gsar-pa*) class on the beliefs of the higher part of the Middle-Way (*dbu-ma*) School. The root text is *Entering the Middle Way* (*Madhyamika Avatara, dBu-ma la 'jug-pa*), composed by Master Chandrakirti (*Slob-dpon Zla-ba grags-pa*) around 650 AD. The principal monastic textbooks used are the *Illumination of the True Thought of the Middle Way* (*dBu-ma dgongs-pa rab-gsal*) of Je Tsongkapa, along with its commentary by Kedrup Tenpa Dargye entitled *Overview of the Middle Way* (*dBu-ma spyi-don*).

The higher half of the Middle-Way School is known as the "Consequence" (*Prasangika*, or *Thal-'gyur-ba*) group, due to their belief that a logical statement utilizing a ridiculous but necessary consequence of an opponent's erroneous beliefs is especially effective in helping the opponent develop a correct view of emptiness. The entire study of this particular group is called "Middle Way" (*Uma*, or *dBu-ma*) in the monastery, although technically the beliefs of the Independent group, already studied, also qualify as "Middle Way."

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in the following ACI courses:

- Course VI: The Diamond-Cutter Sutra
- Course VII: The Vows of the Bodhisattva
- Courses X, XI, and XII: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life—Parts One, Two, and Three
- Extension Course 4: The Marriage of Emptiness and Karma

Years Thirteen and Fourteen
Class Ten: Advanced Class on the Middle Way

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and in Tibetan is known as *uma nyingpa* (*dbu-ma rnying-pa*), meaning "advanced" (*nying-pa*) class on the beliefs of the higher part of the Middle-Way (*dbu-ma*) School.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Years Fifteen and Sixteen
Class Eleven: Beginning Class on Vowed Ethics

The class then graduates to the study of vowed ethics (*vinaya*, or '*dul-ba*'); here the curriculum of Sera Mey is unique, since the other major Gelukpa monasteries continue on to higher knowledge (*abhidharma*, or *chos mngon-pa*) at this point. This course will cover, extensively, the beliefs of certain groups within the first of the four schools—the Detailist—on the eight different types of vowed morality.

It is only here that a monk learns, in detail, the finer points of monastic rule. The debates of this class are a sharp contrast to the high theoretical dialectic of the Middle Way: here we are more likely to be quoting lists of monastic guidelines, and memorization of the versed summary on the subject is a "must." This is the *Versed Summary on Vowed Morality* by Kongpo Ngawang Tsultrim (*Shar-chen Kong-po Ngag-dbang tsul-khrims*), an eminent lama from the Kongpo College of Sera Mey.

The great commentary of the omniscient Tsonawa (*Kun-mkhyen mTso-sna-ba Shes-rab bzang-po*), a Kagyupa master from the latter part of the 14th century, will also be studied carefully. Both are based, as is the study of vowed morality throughout Tibet, upon the *Summary of Vowed Morality (Vinaya Sutra, or 'Dul-ba mdo rtza-ba)*, by the Indian master Guna Prabha (*Slob-dpon Yon-tan 'od*), from about 500 AD.

The name of this particular class in Tibetan is *senkyang dangpo* (*gzan rkyang dang-po*), since in the old days in Tibet it was only (*rkyang*) by reaching this class that a student was first (*dang-po*) considered senior enough to wear a heavy sort of monastic shawl (*gzan*) or cloak called a *dagam*, on the (very cold) nights of winter in the Lhasa valley.

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in ACI Course IX: The Ethical Life

Years Seventeen and Eighteen
Class Twelve: Advanced Class on Vowed Ethics

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and is given the name *dzindra sumpa* ('*dzin-grva gsum-pa*), meaning third (*gsum-pa*) class ('*dzin-grva*) from the top.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

Years Nineteen and Twenty
Class Thirteen: Beginning Class on Higher Knowledge

Year nineteen marks the beginning of the final subject, higher knowledge (*abhidharma*, known simply as *dzu* [*mdzod*] in the monastery). The original root text here is the *Treasure House of Higher Knowledge* (*Abhidharma Kosha*, or *Chos mngon-pa mdzod*), written by Master Vasubandhu (*Slob-dpon dbyig-gnyen*) in about 350 AD. This work primarily presents the beliefs of the Kashmiri section of the Detailist (*Vaibhashika*, or *Bye-brag smra-ba*) School, the first of the four Indian schools, and lower of the two Hinayana schools.

Three monastic textbooks for this subject are featured in the curriculum of Sera Mey:

The commentary of His Holiness the First Dalai Lama, Gendun Drup (*rGyal-ba dGe-'dun grub*, 1391-1474) entitled *Light on the Path to Freedom, an Exposition of Higher Knowledge* (*Mdzod-tik thar-lam gsal-byed*);

A resolution of difficult points on higher knowledge popularly known as *The Book on Higher Knowledge by Gyalwang*, composed by Gyalwang Trinley Namgyal (*rGyal-dbang 'Phrin-las rnam-rgyal*, fl. 1850); and

An exquisite, highly detailed commentary from the Sakya tradition entitled *The Chim Book on Higher Knowledge*, written by Jampeyang of Chim (*mChims 'Jam-pa'i dbyangs*, c. 1280).

The name for this class in Tibetan is *dzindra nyipa* (*'dzin-grva gnyis-pa*), so called because it is the second (*gnyis-pa*) class (*'dzin-grva*) from the top.

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in the following ACI courses:

Course V: How Karma Works

Course VIII: Death and the Realms of Existence

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

*Years Twenty-One and Twenty-Two
Class Fourteen: Advanced Class on Higher Knowledge*

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and in Tibetan is called *dzindra dangpo* ('*dzin-grva dang-po*), meaning it is the first (*dang-po*) class ('*dzin-grva*), or the highest class of all. The minimum stay for a person in this class would be two years, but this could stretch out into three, four, or even more years, since a student is required to remain until he can complete his examinations for any of the ranks of a geshe.

*Annually for the Entire Geshe Program
Special Winter Classes on Buddhist Logic and Perceptual Theory*

Throughout the entire length of a monk's career in the geshe program, several months in the winter are reserved for special classes on Buddhist logic and perceptual theory, based upon the *Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, Tsad-ma rnam-'grel)* of Master Dharmakirti (*Slob-dpon Chos-kyi grags-pa*), who lived about 650 AD.

The principal monastic commentary here is *Light on the Path to Freedom, an Explanation of the "Commentary on Valid Perception,"* by one of the principal disciples of Je Tsongkapa, Gyaltsab Je Darma Rinchen (*rGyal-tsab rje Dar-ma rin-chen, 1364-1432*). At Sera Mey, a new commentary by Geshe Yeshe Wangchuk (*dGe-bshes Ye-shes dbang-phyug, 1928-1997*) is also very popular. Normally each class simply takes its name from whichever major topic it may be debating at the time.

One reason the text by Gyaltsab Je is so widely used is that it is studied in all of the major Gelukpa monasteries, and can thus be used as common scriptural authority during the annual Jang Gunchu, or Winter Debates—a kind of annual Olympic intensive where the best student monks from each of the major colleges can come together to study and debate, almost day and night, for an entire month.

Here all the students from each monastery who are debating the same subject join into a single class, which acts as an excellent preparation for the debates they will have with each other during the geshe examinations down the road. Back home, those from each monastery who did not qualify for the Winter Debates continue on these same general subject; this provides a good opportunity for students of medium or lesser ability to take center stage at the debate park and improve themselves.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

The topics for the Winter Debates are represented in the following ACI Courses:

Course IV: The Proof of Future Lives
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Special Teachings by Eminent Lamas

Throughout the geshe program, a student will also attend special teachings given by eminent Lamas, both inside and outside their home monasteries. Actual recent examples at Sera Mey, for example, would be a one month teaching on the steps of the path to Buddhahood (*lam-rim*) presented by Geshe Yeshe Wangchuk, or a teaching by His Holiness the Dalai Lama on emptiness. The most frequent subjects of these teachings are either *lam-rim* or *lojong*: developing the good heart. The content of these special teachings often comes up later in the debate park, in conjunction with almost every other subject. For this reason, the teachings on *lam-rim* and *lojong* have been organized into a sixth subject in the ACI curriculum, and are represented in the following courses:

Course I: The Principal Teachings of Buddhism
Course III: Applied Meditation
Course XIV: Lojong, Developing the Good Heart
Extension Course 1: Offering of the Mandala
Extension Course 2: Contemplations on the Practice of Giving and Taking (Tong-Len)
Extension Course 5: Lord Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment*
Extension Course 6: The Garden—Discussions with the Great Masters of Buddhism

The invasion of Tibet led to a great deal of disruption in the debate classes. For twelve years after the fall of Tibet in 1959, the surviving monks from all of the major Gelukpa monasteries were thrown together in the Buxall refugee camp in northeastern India. Only several hundred of over 10,000 student monks from Lhasa lived through the invasion and subsequent horrors of the Buxall camp, to reach their new home in south India.

In the early 1970's, land was found in the Karnataka area of south India for the re-establishment of these major monasteries. (Khen Rinpoche's older brother, a Tibetan government official, was instrumental in locating and securing the

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

land.) The debating classes and geshe examinations continued throughout this time in a very tenuous way, and by the mid 1970's it looked as though there would not be enough support for them to be carried on at Sera Mey.

This is when Khen Rinpoche began the food fund for students in the geshe program, which proved to be a deciding factor in their survival. Khen Rinpoche and his students also provided a great deal of the support needed to revive the Winter Debates in India. The debate classes throughout the great Gelukpa monasteries of south India now thrive, and the level of study is said to rival that of Old Tibet.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Supplement to Reading Nine

རིགས་པའི་འགོ་སླངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part Two

(Continued from the previous reading:)

བུམ་བ་མི་རྟག་བ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

That's right!

མ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ།

Mayinpar tel,

No it's not,

བུམ་བ་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bumpa chu yinpay chir.

Because a water pitcher is a dharma—an existing thing.

ལྷན་པ་མ་བྱུང་།

Kyappa ma jung.
It doesn't necessarily follow.

ཚོས་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་མ་ལྷན་པར་ཐལ།

Chu yinna, mitakpa mayinpe makyappar tel!
Are you telling me that, just because something is an existing thing, it doesn't have to be a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!
That's right!

ག་རེ་བཞག།

Gare shak?
Then show me something like that!

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཚོས་ཅན།

Tongpa nyi chu chen.
Consider emptiness.

མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་སྟེ།

Mitakpa mayin te,
It's not a changing thing,

རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Takpa yinpay chir.
Because it's an unchanging thing.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Ten: The Concept of Time

Selection from the collected topics:
The Concept of Time

The following selections on the concept of time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), are excerpted from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdus-groa), by Master Chokhla U-ser, a great master of Rato Monastery who lived about 1500 AD. This particular book is considered the "grandfather" of what came to be a separate genre of literature in Tibet: the dura (bsdus-groa), or "selected topics from the Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, or Tsad-ma rnam-'grel) of Master Dharmakirti (circa 650 AD).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༘ ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རླུང་ལ་འགགས་པ། འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། རླུང་ལ་མ་
འགགས་པ། ད་ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད། རླུང་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་རླུང་པའི་ཆ། མ་
འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Suppose someone comes again, and makes the following claim:

The definition of the past is: "That which has begun and stopped." The definition of the present is: "That which has begun and not yet stopped." The definition of the future is: "That condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present."

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ན་ནིང་གི་ལོ་ཉོག་། །དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི། ད་ལོའི་ལོ་ཉོག་།
།གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་གཞི། དོ་ཞག་གི་ལོ་ཉོག་། །གསུམ་པའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཟེར་ན།

Respective examples would be the following. For the first, the example would be last year's crops. For the second, it would be this year's crops; and, for the third, crops soon to grow.

དང་པོ་ལ། འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་མཚན་གཞི་དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། འདས་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ད་ལྟར་
བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Concerning the first of these, we answer as follows.

Aren't your definition and example for the past though incorrect?
Because there is no definition for the past,
And this is because the past doesn't even exist,
And this is because anything which can be established as existing is always
something of the present.

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པའི་དུས་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ།
འདས་པའི་དུས་དང་། མ་འོངས་པའི་དུས་དང་། ད་ལྟར་བའི་དུས་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་
སྤྱིར་ཏེ། དུས་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ན། མ་བྱུང་།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

But there must be things that are past,
Because past time exists;
And this is because all three—past time, and future time, and present
time—exist.
And this is because the three times exist.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འོ་ན། ཁོ་རང་ལ། འདས་པ་འདས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

རྟགས་ཁས།

And we also ask this person,

So is the past the past?
Because the past exists.

You already agreed to the reason here.

འདོད་ན། འདས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། འདས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འགགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཞིག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the past is the past.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the past.
It is not so the past,
Because it is not something which has stopped;
And this is true because it is not something which has been destroyed.

བྱུང་སྟེ། འདས་པ་འགགས་པ་ཞིག་པ་གསུམ་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་
གསུམ་ཀ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "the past," "that which has stopped," and "that which has been
destroyed" all refer to the same thing.
And this is true because all three of them exist;
And this is true because the past exists.

You already agreed that the reason is true.

མ་བྱུང་འཚམས་ལ་མ་བྱུང་ན། འདས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཞིག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Suppose that, instead of "it doesn't necessarily follow," the opponent says "it's incorrect."

Consider the past.

It is not so something which has been destroyed,
Because it is a working thing.

བྱུང་སྟེ། ཞིག་པ་དང་དངོས་པོའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་
གྱི་འཕྲེང་བ་ལས། རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འཇོན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ། ཞིག་
པ་དངོས་པོར་ནི་མི་བཞེད་ལ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) something that has been
destroyed but which is still (2) a working thing.

And this is true because the *Golden Necklace of Good Explanation* says,

None of the schools that belong to the side that believe that
things exist through some nature of their own accept the idea
that something which has been destroyed could be a working
thing.

[The *Golden Necklace* is a famed commentary by Je Tsongkapa upon the
Ornament of Realizations, spoken to the realized being Asanga by Lord
Maitreya.]

སྟེ་མ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། འདས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I disagree to your earlier statement.]

Suppose you say that the earlier one is not correct.

Consider the past.

It is so a working thing,
Because it is something made.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ། རྩོམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the past is something made.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because it's something that started.

བྱུང་སྟེ། རྩོམ་པ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "something that started" is the definition of "something made."

སྒྲུ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་ན། འདས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྩོམ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྩོམ་ལ་འགགས་
པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The earlier point is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the earlier point is not correct.

Consider the past.
It is so something that started,
Because it is something that started and then stopped.
And this is true because it's the past.

རྟགས་གསལ་ཁས་སྤངས། བྱུང་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་དངོས། གཞན་ཡང་།
ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so, and
the necessity is something that does apply to the definition.

It must moreover be true that that which has been destroyed is a working
thing,
Because the past is a working thing.

རྟོགས་བསྐྱབས་ཟིན། འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་ཞིག་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

We've already established that the reason is true.
Suppose you do agree.
Is it then the case that a working thing which has been destroyed is still a
working thing?
Because (1) there does exist a working thing which has been destroyed, and (2)
that which has been destroyed is a working thing.

རྟོགས་སྟེ་མ་ཁས། དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྟེར།

You've already agreed to the latter part of the reason.
Suppose now you say that the first part is not correct.
The first is too correct,
Because there does exist a working thing which is past.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྟོན་འདས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྟོན་འདུས་བྱས་
ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist a working thing which is
past.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider a working thing.
There does too exist it past,
Because it is something that has been produced.

རྩ་བའི་ཐལ་འགྲུར་གཉིས་པ་ལ་འདོད་ན། ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཤིང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར། རྟོགས་ཁས།

[Then I agree to your second original statement: it is the case that a
working thing which has been destroyed is still a working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our second original statement.
So is a tree that was already destroyed still a tree?

Because a working thing which has been destroyed is still a working thing.

You've already accepted the reason.

འདོད་ན། ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་གི་འོག་རོལ་དུ་ཤིང་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཤིང་གང་
ཞིག ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་པའི་འོག་རོལ་དུ་ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཤིང་མེས་
ཚིག་པའི་ཚེ་ཤིང་ཞིག་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a tree that was already destroyed is still a tree.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

So is it then true that when a tree has been burned up by fire there is still a tree?

Because (1) a tree that was already destroyed is a tree; and (2) there exists a destroyed tree subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire.

And this is so because—when a tree has been burned up by fire—there is a tree destroyed.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་པའི་འོག་རོལ་དུ་ཤིང་མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་མཐོང་བར་
ཐལ། དེའི་འོག་རོལ་དུ་ཤིང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྲགས་ཁས།

[I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Is it then the case that—subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire—you can still see a tree by using your visual consciousness?

Because there does exist a tree subsequent to that point.

You already agreed to the reason.

བྱུང་པ་བྱུང་ཅིང་། འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲུལ་ལས། རྐྱེ་ཕྱིར་འཇིག་པ་འཇིག་
ཅན་འགྱུར། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་འང་ཤིང་མཐོང་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་དེ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་
པོར་འདོད་པ་ལ་ཏེ་ཅང་ཐལ་བའི་རྐྱེན་འཕྲིན་པའི་གཞུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

If the one is the case, then the other is necessarily so. [That is, if there does exist a tree subsequent to that point, then you must be able to see it by using your visual consciousness.]

And you cannot agree to this last statement;
Because the following quotation from the *Commentary on Valid Perception* was meant to point out—to those who asserted that something which was destroyed could ever be a working thing—what very absurd consequences their position entailed:

Because it has started, then the destruction
Must be destroyed; and then the tree
Would have to be seen once more.

ཅུ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། ད་ལྟར་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱ་བ་པ་ཁས།

Concerning the second of the original definitions, [that the definition of the present is "that which has begun and not yet stopped,"] we pose the following:

Consider "knowable things."
So is it something which has begun and not yet stopped?
Because it is something of the present.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agree that it does necessarily follow.

རྟོགས་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། གཞི་བྱ་བ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something of the present.]

It is so correct,
Because it can be established as existing.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། རྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
རྟོགས་ཁས།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

[Then I agree to your statement above: "knowable things" is something that has begun and not yet stopped.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Consider "knowable things."
So is it something which ever began?
Because it has begun and not yet stopped.

You already agreed to the reason.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན།
དངོས།

[Then I agree to your statement.]

Suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider this same thing..
It is not so, that it is something which ever began,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

If you agreed [that an unchanging thing could begin], then what we would answer to you is obvious.

རྩ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་པ་ལ། མ་འོངས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྩུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་དེ། མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

Concerning the third of the original definitions, [that the definition of the future is: "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present,"] we pose the following:

So is it true then that the future exists?
Because it is something which has a definition;
Because "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present" is the definition of the future.

You already agreed that the reason was true.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་ཁོ་ཁོ་རང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your point above.]

Suppose you agree to the above.
So is it then the case that the future is itself?
Because it does exist.

འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མ་འོངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས། བྱབ་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྤང་དུ་
དངོས།

[I agree to your statement: the future is itself.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the future.
So is it then a condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for
beginning are present?
Because it is the future.

You already agreed to the reason,
And it is obvious that the necessity must apply to the definition.

འདོད་ན། ཕྱི་དང་བྱས་པས། ཁ་ཅིག །མ་འོངས་པ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག །ཕྱོད་གཞི་ཆ་དེ་ནས་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་
སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པ་འདོད་ཟེར།

[Then I agree.]

Suppose you agree.
Depending on how they read this definition [in the Tibetan], some people
claim, "I agree that the future is the condition of having not yet begun,
although the causes for beginning are present (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)." Others
claim, "I agree that the object of our argument [the future] is the condition of
having not yet begun, even though it has cause to begin from this same
condition (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)."

འོན། ཅི་ལྷགས་སྐྱ་མ་ལ། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་
ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉམས་ཁས།

Well suppose then that you read it the first way.

So does there exist a cause that makes the future begin?
Because the future is the condition of having not yet begun, even though the
causes for beginning are present.

You've already accepted the reason.

འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that there does exist a cause that makes the future begin.]

Suppose you agree.
So is this cause that makes the future begin a working thing?
Because it does exist.

འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that it is.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider this cause that makes the future begin.
Is it something made?
Because it is a working thing.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉམས་
ཁས།

[I agree that it is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider this same thing.
Is it then something which has begun?
Because it is something made.

You already agreed to the reason.

འདོད་མི་ལུས་ཏེ། མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྲགས་གསལ་ཁས་སྤངས།

But you cannot agree,
Because it is something which has not yet begun;
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun;
Because it is a condition where, even though [its cause] exists, it has not yet begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

ཅུ་བའི་ཕྱི་ལྷགས་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་སྐྱོན་འདི་ལྟར། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the following problem applies to the latter way of reading the phrase.

Is it then the case that this cause that will make it begin is a working thing?
Because the cause that will make the future begin exists.

མ་བྱུབ་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྲགས་གསལ་ཁས།

[It's not correct to say that the cause that will make the future begin exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that will make the future begin.
It does so exist,
Because [the future] is a condition where, even though [its cause exists], it has not yet begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

མ་བྱུབ་ན། རྣམ་བཞག་མ་ཆགས་སོ།།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

If you say it doesn't necessarily follow, then your whole presentation collapses.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.
Consider the cause that makes [the future] begin.
It must then be something which has begun,
Because it is a working thing.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that the cause that makes the future begin is something which has begun.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider then this same thing.
It is not the case that it has already begun,
Because it is a thing which has yet to begin,
Because it is a condition of not having yet begun.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the cause which makes the future begin is a condition of not having yet begun.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that makes the future begin.
It is so the condition of not having yet begun,
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun, even though it exists.

རྟགས་གསལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལས།

You've already both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

༥ ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། རྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Does there exist a cause for something to begin or not?

རང་རེས་ཡོད་བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྐྱེས་ཟེན་
པས་བྱུང་བ་གང་ཞིག །རྐྱེས་ཟེན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྐར་ཡང་བཏབ་སྟེ་རྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

We answer that there does, and then someone comes and makes the following claim:

But isn't it the case that no cause for something to begin exists?
Because isn't it the case that nothing beginning exists?
Because isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it can never be beginning?
Because (1) isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it must be something that began already; and (2) isn't it the case that, if a working thing has begun already, it cannot start all over again?

འདིར་མ་བྱུང།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

༥ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྐྱེ་འགྱུར་དང་། རྐྱེ་དགོས་དང་། རྐྱེ་ཁ་མ་
དང་། རྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་རྣམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན།

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

So is it then the case that there are no beginnings at all?
Because none of the following exist: "something that's going to begin,"
"something that needs to begin," "something that's about to
begin," and "something that's in the act of beginning."

མ་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ལན་བཏབ་ནས། འདི་ལྟར། རྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱ་སྐྱི་ཡོད་པའི་
སྤྱིར་ཏེ། རྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱ་སྐྱི་དུ་མར་ཚོགས་གཉིས་གོམས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། རྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱ་སྐྱི་དུ་
མར་ཚོགས་གཉིས་གོམས་པ་ལས་ཚད་མའི་རྐྱེས་བུར་འབྲུངས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ།

To this we say, "It doesn't necessarily follow," and then we say:

It's like this. The beginning or the birth of something does too
exist,
Because past and future births exist.
And this is true because there exists the practice of amassing the two
collections over a great many births, past and future.
And this is true because there does exist the creation of an Infallible
Being, who comes from the practice of amassing the two
collections over a great many births, past and future.

སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ལ་ལྟོས་ཚད་ཡིན་རིགས། ཞེས་པ་དང་། སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཐུགས་ཇི་གོམས་ལས་
ཏེ། ཞེས་པ་ནམས་ཀྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར།

And this itself is true, because there is a point to the following
two quotations:

By relying on the various proofs
It's right to say "infallible."

And—

The proof is that it comes from the practice
Of the attitude of compassion.

[Both quotations are from the Commentary on Valid Perception, and are used to
establish that an Enlightened Being is produced from many eons spent amassing the
two collections.]

གཞན་ཡང་། རིགས་པའི་དབང་ཕྱོག་ཡབ་སྐུ་གི་ལུགས་དོར་ནས། ལྷ་སྒྲིགས་
རྒྱུ་པའི་གྲི་རྒྱུ་སྐྱེས་སུ་འབྲང་རིགས་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་མ་རྒྱོག་གྱུར་དོན་ཤེས་ཡིན། །དེ་
སྐྱེས་བྱེད་ཀྱང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །ནམ་ཉན་བྱེད་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་ནི་ཁ་ཅིག་རབ་ཏུ་
བརྗོད། །ཞེས་པ་དང་། ལྷ་སྐྱེས་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། །གོམས་པས་གྲུབ་པ་མེད་ཅེ་
ན། །ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་མ་རང་ལུགས་སུ་ཁས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Are you saying, moreover, that it is proper to throw away the whole system of those Lords of Reasoning, the Father and his spiritual Sons, and go following the system of that non-Buddhist school, the Rejectionists (Lokayata)?

Because you would have to accept the other side as our side in the following verses:

"An Infallible One would have to know
Even things that are hidden, and there's
No proof that shows he can;
Neither is there a way to try."
Thus do a number of them
Make their presentation.

And—

Because the mind is something
That depends upon the body,
There is nothing you can achieve
Through practice [over many lifetimes].

སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ་བྱི་དུ་མར་ཚོགས་གཉིས་གོམས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་འཕགས་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་
ཁས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ་བྱི་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

རྟགས་ཁས།

And this is true because it would then be right for you to accept the position that it's impossible for there to exist an enlightened realized being who has practiced assembling the two collections over a great many births, past and future.

༘ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རློལ་མའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་རློལ་མའི་
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

There must too exist a working thing which is about to begin,
Because there exists a working thing which is about to
take birth from their mother's womb.

རློབ་ཞེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་རློབ་ཞེན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར། ལྷུ་པ་འགྲིག།

So does there exist then a working thing which is in the act of beginning?
Because there exists a working which is about to take birth from their mother's
womb.

The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷ་བས། རློབ་ཞེན་པ་ནི་རློལ་ཕྱོགས་པས་ཡོད་མིན་
ཞིང་། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But you cannot agree, because the glorious Chandrakirti has stated, "Since
something in the act of beginning is only approaching beginning, it is not
something which exists."

གཞན་ཡང་། མ་རློལ་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་མ་རློལ་པའི་
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And are you, furthermore, saying that there exists a working thing which
hasn't begun?
Because there exists a working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's
womb.

ཁ་ཅིག །དྲགས་མ་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and says, "It's incorrect [to say that there exists a working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's womb].

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མའི་མངལ་དུ་གནས་བཞིན་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །རྟགས་
སྐྱེས་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it is correct, because (1) there does exist a person who is in the act of staying in their mother's womb, and (2) there also exists a working thing which is born complete.

ཡང་། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྐྱར་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་
ཅན། སྐྱར་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྐྱར་ཡང་འཁོར་
བར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འཁོར་བར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྐྱར་ཡང་འཁོར་
བར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མིར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྐྱར་ཡང་མིར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་
པ་གང་ཞིག །འདོད་པར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྐྱར་ཡང་འདོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Are you saying, moreover, that a working thing which has already begun begins again?

Because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again.

And this is true because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again in the circle of suffering life.

And this is true because (1) there exists a living being who has already taken birth as a human, and who has to take birth again as a human; and (2) there exists a living being who has already taken birth into the desire realm, and who has to take birth into the desire realm again.

རྟགས་རེ་རེ་ནས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མི་ནས་མིར་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་། འདོད་པ་ནས་འདོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྟོན།

Each of the reasons given is correct, because there do exist those who come from a birth as a human and are born as a human; and there do exist those

who come from a birth in the desire realm and are born into the desire realm.
It's easy to accept these reasons.

གཞན་ཡང་། འབྱུང་བ་ཡིད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པས་
སྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱུང་ཟིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར། སྲུབ་པ་འགྲིགས།

And is it, moreover, the case that there exists nothing which is occurring?
Because nothing which is a working thing could ever be something which is
occurring.

And this is because anything which is a working thing is something which has
already occurred.

The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རང་རྒྱུ་ལས་བྱུང་ཟིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་
ཡིན་ན། རང་རྒྱུ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པས་སྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར།

The reason we've stated is correct, because anything which is a working thing
is something which has already occurred from its own causes.

And this is true because anything which is a working thing is something
which has already begun from its own causes.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། འབྱུང་བ་ཡིད་པར་ཐལ། འབྱུང་བ་བཞི་ཡིད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། འབྱུང་
བ་ཆེན་པོ་བཞི་ཡིད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། ས་རྒྱ་མི་རླུང་བཞི་ཡིད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: it is the case that there exists
nothing which is occurring.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

There does too exist something which is occurring,

Because there exist the four great elements.

And this is because there do exist the four of earth, water, fire, and wind.

[Translator's note: This argument depends upon the fact that the Tibetan words for
"occurring" and for "element" have the same spelling ("byung ba).]

སྲུབ་སྟེ། དེ་བཞི་ལ། འབྱུང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་བཞིར་མཁས་མཚོག་དབྱིག་གཉེན་གྱིས་

གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མཛོད་ལས། འབྲུང་བ་དག་ནི་ས་ཁམས་དང་། །ཀླ་དང་མི་
དང་རླུང་ཁམས་རྣམས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow, because that highest master, Vasubandhu, has stated that the great elements are four. And this is true because the *Treasure House* says,

The elements are the following:
The divisions of elements we call
Earth and water and fire and wind.

༘ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྐྱེ་དགོས་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་འགྲུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose yet another person comes and claims:

There must too exist a working thing which still has to start,
Because there does exist a working thing which is going to start.
And this is because there does exist a working thing which is going to occur.

མ་ཟུབ། ཏྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། སྣོ་སེར་དཀར་དམར་བཞི་སོགས་འབྲུང་འགྲུར་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་དང་། འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གྱི་རིག་བྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རིག་བྱ་ལ་འབྲུང་བ་དང་
འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

The reason in itself though does apply to the subject,
Because the four of blue, yellow, white, and red and the like are all derivatives of the elements, and there also exist tangible objects which are derivatives of the elements.
And this is true because all tangible objects can be divided into two types: those that are elements, and those that are derivatives of the elements.

[Translator's note: This argument depends on the fact that the Tibetan for "going to occur" and for "derivative of the elements" is the same ('byung-'gyur).]

མཛོད་ལས། རིག་བྱ་ནམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because *The Treasure House of Wisdom* says,

Tangible objects are of two types...

རྩ་བར་འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྐྱེས་ཟིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You can't though agree to the original statement, [that there must exist a working thing which still has to start],
Because anything which is a working thing is something which must have already started.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། འབྱུང་འགྱུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱུང་
ཟིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་ཁ་ཅིག་ཟེར་བ་ནི།

On this point some may make the following claim:

It must so be the case that there exists no working thing which is going to occur,
Because anything which is a working thing must have already occurred.

ལེགས་པར་མ་བརྟགས་པས་ནོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྐྱེ་འགྱུར་དང་རྐྱེ་དགོས་ཞེས་པ་སྐར་
རྐྱེ་འགྱུར་དང་། སྐར་རྐྱེ་དགོས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བྱེད་པར་མཚུངས་གྲང་།

This position though reflects a gross error of failing to examine things thoroughly. The expressions "going to start" and "still needs to start" are equivalent in meaning, exclusively, "going to start from the beginning" and "still needs to start from the beginning."

འབྱུང་དགོས་ཞེས་པ་སྐར་འབྱུང་དགོས་པ་ཁོ་ན་དང་། འབྱུང་འགྱུར་ཞེས་པ་ད་ལྟར་
བྱུང་ཟིན་སྟོན་པོ་དང་། ཚ་བ་དང་། བྱང་བའི་རིག་བྱ་སོགས་ལའང་འཇུག་པའི་བརྟ་
འཆད་མཛོད་པ་མ་ཐོས་པས་ནོངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But whereas "still needs to occur" means, exclusively, "still needs to occur from the beginning," the [Tibetan phrase for] "going to occur" also applies to things which have already occurred, such as the color blue, or the tangible objects of heat or cold, and so on. And the mistake by the opponent here is that they have never heard the terms explained this way.

༘ ཁ་ཅིག །བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་
འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་
ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

The definition of something "past" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and also stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "future" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which is such that—although the causes for it to start are already present—it has yet to start, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "present" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and not yet stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

དང་པོ་ལ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཉི། ཚོས་ཅན་དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Let us address the first of these definitions.

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.
Is this cause then something which has started and also stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present?
Because it is something which is past relative to the time of the water pitcher.
And this is because it is the example we've chosen here.

སྒྲོན་མར་འདོད་ན། བྱམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།
འགགས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you agree to the previous statement. [That is, suppose you agree that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has started and also stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider again the cause of a water pitcher.
Is it then one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree that the cause of a water pitcher is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree then.
Consider this same thing.
Is it then something which has started in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed above.

འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And yet you can't agree, because it is something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.

And this is because it is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.

མ་བྱས་ན། བྱས་སྟེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་

ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག། །མ་སྐྱེས་པ་མ་བྱས་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེས་པ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not necessarily the case that, because the cause of a pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher, it must be something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not necessarily the case.
It is though necessarily the case,
Because the very definition of something's not having been made in a certain time is "something's not having started" in that same time.
And this is true because (1) there is at that time something which hasn't been made, and (2) the definition of "something that hasn't been made" is "something that hasn't started."
And this is true because "something that has started" is the definition of "something that has been made."

མ་བྲུབ་འཚམས་ལ་མ་བྱུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པར་བཟུལ། དེའི་
དུས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་
སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས།

Now suppose that you were to answer "it's not correct to say that" above, where you answered "it doesn't necessarily follow." [That is, suppose you say that it's not correct to say that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider this same thing.
It is so true that it has not been made in that particular time,
Because it doesn't even exist in that particular time.
And this is because it has stopped in that particular time.
And this is because, in that particular time, it has started and also stopped.
And you've already agreed to what we stated as our reason.

གཞན་ཡང་། བུ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བུ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།
འགགས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཟུལ། འགགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་

ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider, moreover, the cause of a water pitcher, once again.
It is not so, that it is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the
water pitcher, and (2) stopped in this same time,
Because it is not something which has stopped.
And this is true because it hasn't stopped.
And this is true because it is a produced thing.

༘ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། མ་བྱུབ།

Suppose yet another person comes, and makes this claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.
It is too something which has started in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it has finished starting in the time of the water pitcher.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

དེས་ན། བྱམ་པའི་རྒྱ་དེ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་
ཟེར་དགོས་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་སོགས་ཀྱིས། ལས་འབྲས་བུ་ལང་དེ་
བུ་ལེན་པ་མ་ཡིན། ཞེས་བཞེད་པ་དང་ཁས་ལེན་འཛིན་ཕྱོགས་མཚུངས་སོ།།

Therefore we have to express the situation as follows: Although the cause of
the water pitcher, in the time of the water pitcher, has already begun, it is not
something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher. This is for
example like the case where the followers of the Independent group of the
Middle-Way School and such say that "Cause and effect is true [Tib: *bden-pa*],
but not real [Tib: *bden-pa*]." You have to be able to make the same kind of
distinction here.

༥ ལ་ཅིག །རྣམ་མཁུན་གྱིས་བུམ་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་ཀྱང་། མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་
གྱི་རྣམས་སྤྱི་བའི་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མ་རྟོགས་ཟེར། དེ་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་འཐད་མོད།

Suppose someone comes along and claims,

Even though omniscience perceives a water pitcher directly, it does not do so in the sense that the word "directly" has when we divide perception into the two of "direct" and "deductive."

To this we answer, "You are absolutely correct."

འོན་ཀྱང་། མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ན། མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་གྱི་རྣམས་སྤྱི་བའི་མངོན་གསུམ་
ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། ཚུད་པའི་ཆོ་རིགས་པ་གྲུབ་དགོས་སོ།།

If however someone were to come along in a debate and say that "Every state of direct perception is 'direct' in the sense that this word has when we divide perception into the two of 'direct' and 'deductive'," some logic would be required to prove the point just made.

མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་པ་ལ། བུམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། མ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

As for the second definition, [the definition of "the future" given above,] consider the result of a water pitcher.

Is it then something that has not begun?

Because it is the condition of not having begun.

And this is because it is the condition of not having begun, even though the causes for its beginning exist in the time of the water pitcher.

༥ ལ་ཅིག །མ་ཁྲུབ་ཟེར་ཡང་བསྐྱེས་གྲ་མ་ཆགས་པའི་རྟོགས་སོ།།

Now some may come along and claim, in response, that "it doesn't necessarily follow." This however would indicate that they had yet to grasp the meaning of the collected topics on logic and perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྒྲ། འབྲེལ་པ་ཁས།

Suppose someone else came and said, instead, that "Your reason is not correct."

Consider then this same thing: [the result of a water pitcher].
Are you saying that it is the condition of not having begun, even though, in
the time of the pitcher, the causes for its beginning are present?
Because it is "the future" at this same time.
The correctness of our reason is easy to accept.
And you've already accepted the necessity.

མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག །བྱམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་ལྟར་
བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་
ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་གང་ཞིག །མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

As for the third of the definitions above, [that of "the present,"] suppose
someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.
It is so something which is present-time in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it is something which, in the time of the water pitcher, has
begun and not yet stopped.
It is so, because it is both (1) something which has begun in the time of
the water pitcher and (2) something which has not stopped in
that time.

རང་རིས་རྟགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་བྱས་པར། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། མ་འབྲེལ།

Our side would answer that the first part of this reason is not correct.

And then the other side would come back with,

Consider then this same thing.
It is too something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it is something which has finished beginning in that time.

To this we'd answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

།འདས་མ་འོངས་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་དབྱུང་བ་ནི། སྤྱིར་འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད་མེད་དེ། འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པ་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ད་ལྟར་བ་
ཡིན་པས་བྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Here next is an analysis of the question of whether the past and the future exist or not. Generally speaking there exist no definitions for "the past" or "the future," because the past and future are not things which even exist. This is because, anything which can be established as existing must always be existing in the present [according to this school of Buddhism].

གཞི་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་འཇོག་ན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པའི་
དུས་སུ་དགགས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་དང་བུམ་པའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དོན་གཅིག

If though we were to establish the meaning of "the past" relative to a specific point of reference, we could say that the definition of its past relative to the time of a specific water pitcher could be given as follows:

Something which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already started; and which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already ended as well.

This and "the pitcher just before the pitcher" amount to the same thing.

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པ་དང་དུས་མཉམ་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of its present relative to the time of a specific water pitcher then could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) something which has already come into existence by the time of the water pitcher; and (2) which is simultaneous to the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of its future relative to the time of a specific water pitcher, finally, could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) in the act of starting at the time of the water pitcher; and (2) not yet started at the time of the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་མ་འོངས་པ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པ། བུམ་པ་ལ་སློམ་
ཏེ་འདས་པ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག

The following all amount to the same thing:

the not-yet-coming of the water pitcher;
the cause of the water pitcher;
its past at the time of the water pitcher; and
its past relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Not-yet-coming" and "future" are the same word in Tibetan (ma-'ongs-pa).]

བུམ་པའི་འདས་པ། བུམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པ། བུམ་པ་ལ་
སློམ་ཏེ་མ་འོངས་པ་རྣམས་དོན་ཅིག

The following also all amount to the same thing:

the passing of the water pitcher;
the result of the water pitcher;
its future at the time of the water pitcher; and
its future relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Passing" and "past" are the same word in Tibetan ('das-pa).]

སྐྱིར་འགགས་པ་མེད། ཞིག་པ་མེད། སྐྱི་ཁ་མ་མེད། སྐྱི་བཞིན་པ་མེད། སྐྱི་བ་ལ་

མངོན་དུ་ཕྱོགས་པ་མེད།

Generally speaking, there is no such thing as something which has stopped. And there is nothing which is about to begin. Neither is there anything which is in the act of beginning, nor is there anything which is approaching the state of beginning.

དུ་བ་འདས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་འགགས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་མ་འོངས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་ཁ་མ་
ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཡོད།

There does exist though the passing of the smoke; and the stopping of the smoke; and the smoke's not yet coming, and the smoke's being about to begin; and the smoke's being in the act of beginning; and the smoke's approaching the state of beginning.

སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱོགས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། སྐྱེ་ཁ་མའི་དུ་བ་
མེད། འགགས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། ཞིག་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། འདས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། མ་
འོངས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད།

There is though no such thing as smoke which is approaching the state of beginning. Neither is there any smoke which is in the act of beginning; nor any smoke which is about to begin; nor smoke which has stopped; nor smoke which has been destroyed; nor smoke which is past; nor smoke which is future.

དངོས་པོ། མི་རྟག་པ། རྐང་ཅིག་མ། འཇིགས་བཞིན་པ། འགགས་བཞིན་པ།
འདས་པ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱོགས་པ། ཞིག་པ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱོགས་པ་ནམས་དོན་གཅིག་

The following all amount to the same thing:

- a working thing;
- a changing thing;
- a momentary thing;
- a thing which is in the act of being destroyed;
- a thing which is approaching the past;
- a thing which is approaching its destruction.

དམ་བཅའ་འདི་དག་ནི། རིགས་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་སོ།།
གཞན་ལ་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཏེ། བྱི་བྲག་སྐྱ་བས། འདས་པའི་ལས་དང་། མ་འོངས་པའི་
ལས་སོགས་ཁས་ལེན་ཅིང་། ཐལ་འགྱུར་བས། ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོར་བཞེད་པ་སོགས་
བཞེད་ཚུལ་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་བྱབ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།།

These assertions [about the nature of time] are all presented in accordance with the beliefs of the "Logician" group within the Sutrists School. They would not necessarily be acceptable to any other school of Buddhism. The Detailists, for example, do accept ideas such as past karma and future karma, while the Necessity group entertains unimaginably profound positions such as the one that states that the destruction of something is a working thing.

Formal logic subject:
A Discussion of Incorrect Logical Statements

The following presentation on incorrect "logical" statements is excerpted from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

།གཉིས་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ལོག་ཕྱོགས་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྐྱང་བཤད་པ་ལ།
མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་
ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་ཚུལ་གསུམ་མ་ཡིན་པ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྐྱང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་
ཟེར་ན།

Here is the second major division of our presentation, in which we explain the opposite of a correct reason: that is, incorrect reasons. We proceed in two steps: the definition of such reasons, and their various divisions.

The first of these we'll discuss in terms of disproving our opponent's beliefs, and then establishing our own beliefs. Here is the first.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

"Any reason where the three relationships fail to hold" is the definition of an incorrect reason.

མི་འཐད་དེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་མེད་པའི་སྤྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་བྱུང་ན། ཉགས་ཡང་
དག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་སྤྱིར།

This though is mistaken, for there is no such thing as an incorrect reason: everything which exists is a correct reason [to prove *something*].

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་མ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our own position. The definition of an incorrect reason for a particular proof is:

A reason for a particular proof where the three relationships fail to hold.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་ནི། སྤྱིར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་མེད་ཀྱང་། གཞི་ལ་སྐྱར་
ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། མ་བྱུང་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིག་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། མཚན་གཞི་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་
རིགས་པ་འགོད་པ་དང་བཞི།

Here secondly are the various divisions of incorrect reasons. Although there is not, generally speaking, any such thing as an incorrect reason, we can say that there do exist the following types of incorrect reasons in specific contexts:

- 1) Contradictory reasons for specific proofs;
- 2) Indefinite reasons for specific proofs; and
- 3) Wrong reasons for specific proofs.

We will discuss the first of these in four steps: definition; divisions; classical examples; and supporting arguments.

དང་པོ་ནི། སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཀྱང་ཡིན། སྐྱ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་སྐབ་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་འགའ་
རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing is:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason does hold for proving that sound is an unchanging thing; and (2) the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven also holds for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because it is a made thing.]

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་སྐབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་རྟགས་དང་།
མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་རྟགས་གཉིས།

Here secondly are the divisions.

Contradictory reasons can be divided into two kinds: those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, and those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, [covering or not].

གསུམ་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བྱས་པ་སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་སྐབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་རྟགས་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་རྟགས་ཡིན།

Here thirdly are the classical examples. "Something that was made" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound is not a changing thing. "Something which is a particular example of the general type called 'made things'" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in proving the same thing.

བཞི་པ་སྐབ་བྱེད་འགོད་པ་ནི། བྱས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབ་པའི་
མི་མཐུན་སྤྱོད་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགལ་ཏྟགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་
འགལ་ཏྟགས་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མི་ཏྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། བྱོད་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Next is the fourth category: the supporting arguments.

Consider "something that was made."

It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of
dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound
is not a changing thing,

Because it is both (1) a contradictory reason for proving this particular thing,
and (2) anything which is changing is also it.

བྱས་པའི་བྱེད་བྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྟགས་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་ཏྟག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྟགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ས་
ཚོས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཏྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་བྱབ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་ངེས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

And consider "something which is a particular example of the general type
called 'made things'."

It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of
dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in a proof that sound is not
a changing thing,

Because it is a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging
thing.

And this is so because (1) the relationship between this reason and the subject
of the particular proof holds; and (2) it is definitely the case that the
positive necessity between it and the quality to be proven is
diametrically false.

གཞན་ཡང་། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་ཏྟག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྟགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་
མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་ཏྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Consider, moreover, this same example.

It is so a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing,
Because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.

ཁོ་ན་དེ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འགལ་རྟགས་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་འགལ་རྟགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

So does there exist then a contradictory reason for proving that sound
is a changing thing?

Because there does exist a contradictory reason for proving that sound
is an unchanging thing.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་
གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཅུང་
ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And you could never agree [that there did exist a contradictory reason for
proving that sound is a changing thing],

Because anything which is an incorrect reason for proving that sound is a
changing thing must be either (1) an indefinite reason for the particular
proof or (2) a wrong reason for the particular proof.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པས་
བྱུང་ཅིས་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If there exist the three relationships for any particular proof, then there must exist a correct reason for the particular proof.

ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་རྟག་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider all knowable things.

There must then exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing,

Because the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging thing.

བྱུང་པ་ཁས། མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཡོད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've already accepted that it necessarily follows.

Suppose then that you say that it's not correct [that the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].

They do too exist, because (1) there exists a relationship between the reason and the subject for this particular proof, and (2) there exists the positive necessity for the proof, and there exists the reverse necessity for the proof.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱུང་པ་དེ་སྐྱ་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first part of our reason here is correct, because the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when "something made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་རྟགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when "something made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing].

Consider this same thing [that is, "something made"].

The relationship does too hold with it,

Because it is a contradictory reason for the particular proof.
And that's true because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a
changing thing.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཚོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། སྐྱེ་ཏུག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the second reason is a correct one, because that one thing which is both
an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary satisfies the
positive necessity in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་ཏུགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་ཏུགས་ཚོས་
གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག། བྱོད་སྐྱེ་ཏུག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that this is not correct.

Consider this same thing [that one thing which is both an existing
phenomenon and something which is not momentary].

It does too [satisfy the relationship of positive necessity],

Because (1) there does exist a correct similar example which covers both the
reason and the quality to be proven, in this particular proof where that
"one thing" we mentioned is used as the reason; and (2) this "one thing"
can be verified, through a valid perception, as something that fits only
the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within a proof that
sound is an unchanging thing.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་གྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། བྱོད་གྱི་ཏུགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་
ཏུགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Now the first part of our reason is correct, because "unproduced, empty space"
would be a correct similar example which covers both the reason and
the quality to be proven in this particular proof, where the "one thing"
we mentioned is used as a reason.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱོན་ཏྟག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the second part of our reason is correct, because "that one thing which is both an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary" is something that fits only the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within this particular proof.

And this is because it is, in fact, the definition of something which is unchanging.

གོང་གི་གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཚོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The third part of our reason above, [that there exists the reverse necessity for the proof,] is also correct. This is because that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary fulfils that same necessity.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོན་ཀྱི་
ཏྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཏྟགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་དང་མི་ལྡན་པའི་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་
ཡོད། བྱོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Now suppose you say that our last reason is not correct.

Consider this same thing [that is, that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary].

It does so fulfil the reverse necessity for the proof that sound is an unchanging thing,

Because there does exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof in which it serves as the reason; that is, an example which possesses neither the reason nor the quality to be proven for the particular proof. And it can also be verified, through a valid perception, that it only does not fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། བྱོན་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཏྟགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་པར་

ཐལ། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟོན།

Suppose finally that you agree to the original statement: [that is, you agree that there must exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].

Consider then sound.

It is rather so, that there exists no correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing;

Because it is not something which is unchanging.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་
སྟོན་མ་ཚེས་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྟོན་སྐྱབ་
ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་སྟོན། ཟེར་ན་མ་སྐྱབ་བོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It must then be so, that there is something for which all three relationships hold, in proving that sound is an unchanging thing; Because there is something which fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for this proof; and there is something which fulfils the positive necessity for the proof; and there is something which fulfils the reverse necessity for the proof.

To this we reply, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

གཉིས་པ་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་བཤད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།
དང་པོ་ནི། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་སྟོན་མ་ཚེས་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་
སྐྱབ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་སྐྱབ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། ལྷོད་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་

མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our explanation of an indefinite reason; we will proceed first with a definition, and then with the various divisions of this reason. Here is the first of these.

The following is the definition of an indefinite reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does hold; (2) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does not hold; and (3) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing doesn't hold either.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because there is no such thing as antlers on a rabbit's head.]

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་།
དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་
དང་། མཚན་གཞི་གཉིས་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions. This kind of reason can be divided into two: unique indefinite reasons for a particular proof, and common indefinite reasons for a particular proof. We will discuss the first of these two in two steps: its definition, and a classical example for it.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་མ་ངེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། གང་ཟག་དེས་བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་མ་ངེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something which is a unique indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has yet to verify either one of the following: that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། མཉན་བྱ། སྐྱ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པ། སྐྱའི་ལྷོག་པ་
ནམས་རེ་རེ་ནས། སྐྱ་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་དང་། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Here secondly are some classical examples.

The following are all both unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is an unchanging thing, and unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is a changing thing:

- something you can hear;
- the reverse of all that is not sound; and
- the reversal of sound.

གཉིས་པ་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་
ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་
པ་ལ་ལྷོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ལྷོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་པ་དང་། གང་ཟག་དེས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ལྷོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་གང་
རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

We will discuss the second type, common indefinite reasons, in two steps as well: definition, and divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of a common indefinite reason is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either verified (a) that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or (b) that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། ལྷག་
ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། དེ་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

Here is the second. These types of reasons may be divided into three: those which are direct indefinite reasons for a particular proof; those which are uncertain indefinite reasons for a particular proof; and those indefinite reasons which are neither of the first two. Again we will discuss the first of these in terms of its definition and its divisions.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་པའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something which is a direct indefinite reason is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has verified that it fits both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱིས་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་།
དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་
པའི་དེ་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་
གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་
ཀ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་བཞི།

Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. They come in four different types:

- 1) Those direct indefinite reasons that cover both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof;
- 2) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of similar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of dissimilar cases;
- 3) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of similar cases; and
- 4) Those same kinds of reasons that go both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases for the particular proof.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། རི་བོང་རུ་མེད་པ་དེ། སྐྱ་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡང་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་
ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་།

Here are respective classical examples for each of these types.

- 1) The fact that there are no such things as rabbit antlers would be a direct indefinite reason that covers both the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing, and the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.

མི་ཏྟག་པ་དེ། ཏུང་སྐྱ་ཚོལ་བྱུང་ཏུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་།

2) "Changing thing" would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of similar cases in a proof that the sound of a conch shell is something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.

མི་ཏྟག་པ་དེ། ཏུང་སྐྱ་ཚོལ་བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་
དང་། མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་།

3) "Changing thing" would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of dissimilar cases in a proof that sound of a conch shell is not something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as its group of similar cases.

དབང་ཤེས་དེ། ལྷ་བ་གཉིས་སྐྱང་གི་དབང་ཤེས་མངོན་སུམ་ཏུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་
དང་། མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན།

4) "Sense consciousness" would be a direct indefinite reason that goes both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases in a proof that a sense consciousness which thinks there are two moons [where there is only one] is a direct [valid] perception.

༩ གཉིས་པ་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་ཡང་། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་།
དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་ལས་དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྐྱུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་སྟོབས་ཚོས་ཅན་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟེག་གིས།
བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་ནས། མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་
ཚོམ་ཟབ་དང་། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་སྟོབས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་ནས། མཐུན་

ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པ་དེ། རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our discussion of uncertain indefinite reasons; we will repeat the two steps of their definition and their divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of something's being an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is the following:

That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either (a) already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not; or else (b) already verified that it does fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། ཡང་དག་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་། འགལ་
བ་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གཉིས་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. There are two: correct uncertain indefinite reasons and contradictory uncertain indefinite reasons.

རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོམ་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་མ་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་ནས། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་དེ། རྩོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་ཡང་
དག་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of something's being a correct uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and

the reason for the particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་ནས། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་བ་
ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of something's being a contradictory uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ངག་སྐྱབ་དེ། ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་
ངོར། ངག་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྷས་བྱིན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དང་པོ་དང་།

Here are some examples, in the order we gave the definitions. An example of the first would be giving "because he is making pronouncements" as a reason for proving that John, who is making pronouncements, is not an omniscient being—and giving this reason to someone who doubts the existence of an omniscient being.

ཡང་དེ་དེའི་ངོར་ངག་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྷས་བྱིན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

The same reason presented to the same person to prove that John, who is making pronouncements, is an omniscient being would be an example of the second type.

གསུམ་པ་དེ་གཉིས་གང་དུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་

ཡང་། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། མཚན་གཞི་གཉིས་ལས།

Here thirdly we'll explain those common indefinite reasons which are neither the direct nor uncertain types. Again we proceed in terms of definition and classical example.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྤྱན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་
དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་དང་། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་མེད་
པར་ངེས་པ་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱན་
མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something being a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified either that it fits only the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it only doesn't fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུ་རོ་ད་ལྟ་བུ་དེ། ཁ་ནང་བུ་རམ་གོང་བུའི་སྣང་དུ་བུར་
གཟུགས་ད་ལྟ་བུ་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱན་མོང་བའི་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡིན།

Here secondly is our classical example. "[Because there is a] taste of sugar in the present time" is a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types in a proof that a lump of sugar in one's mouth has the visible appearance of a lump of sugar in the present time.

གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ། །མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་ལས།

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་མ་ཡིན་
པ་དེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here third is our presentation on wrong reasons. Again we proceed in two steps of definition and divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of a wrong reason for any particular proof is:

That which (1) has been put forth as a reason for a particular proof, but (2) for which the relationship between the subject and the reason does not hold.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། དོན་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། རྗེ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། རྗེ་ལ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་
གསུམ་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions of wrong reasons for particular proofs. There are three different types:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong relative to meaning.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong relative to a state of mind.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent.

དང་པོ་ལ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་
མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། རྟགས་ཚོས་ཐ་དད་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས། གཞི་རྟགས་ཐ་དད་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། གཞི་ཚོས་ཐ་དད་
མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། རྟགས་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྤྲོད་ཏུ་འགོང་
ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་
གཅིག་ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་ལ་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་བདུན།

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

The first of these may itself be divided into seven different types:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the reason is non-existent.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the subject is non-existent.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong because the reason and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
- 4) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the reason are indistinguishable from one another.
- 5) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
- 6) Reasons which are wrong because the reason does not pertain to the subject in the way it has been said to in the statement of the proof.
- 7) Reasons which are wrong because some part of the reason fails to belong to the subject under consideration.

The following are respective examples of these types of reasons, in particular proofs:

སྐྱེས་བུ་ཚེས་ཅན། ལྷག་བསྐྱེད་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རི་བོང་རྩ་ས་བོ་ལྷག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

- 1)
Consider a particular person.
They are a suffering being,
Because they have been impaled on a rabbit's antlers.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ། ལྷག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་
གཉིས་པ་དང་།

- 2)
Consider the antlers on the head of a rabbit.
They are a changing thing,
Because they were made.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ། མི་ཏྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

3)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is a changing thing.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ། སྒྲ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བཞི་
པ་དང་།

4)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is sound.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྒྲ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ལྷ་པ་
དང་།

5)
Consider sound.
It is sound,
Because it is something which was made.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྟག་སྟེ། མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་བཟུང་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་
ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲུག་པ་དང་།

6)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that you see with your eyes.

སྟོན་ཤིང་ཚེས་ཅན། སེམས་ལྡན་ཡིན་ཏེ། མཚན་མོ་ལོ་མ་ཁུམ་ནས་ཉལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།
ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བདུན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།།

7)

Consider a fruit tree.

It must be a conscious thing,

Because its leaves curl up at night and seem to sleep.

གཉིས་པ་སྐྱོལ་ལྗོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ། དྲགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་
ཚོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཚོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཚོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་
པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། གཞི་དྲགས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཚོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས། ཤེས་འདོད་ཚོས་ཅན་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་བཞི། མཚན་
གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

This brings us to the second kind of wrong reason: the one that is wrong relative to a state of mind. Here there are four different types:

- 1) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the reason.
- 2) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the subject.
- 3) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the connection between the subject and the reason.
- 4) Reasons that are wrong because there is nothing that the opponent has yet to understand.

The following are respective examples of these four, for particular proofs.

ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ངོར། ལྷ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། ཤ་ཟ་
ཚད་མའི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚོ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

1) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that "flesh-eaters" [a kind of ghost] actually exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because flesh-eaters are something which can be cognized through valid perception.

དྲི་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་དོར། །དྲི་ཟའི་སྐྱེ་དབྱེངས་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་
རྟག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཉིས་པ་དང་།

2) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that "smell-eaters" [spirits in the *bardo* or inbetween state] actually exist:

Consider the song of the smell-eaters.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.

མ་བྱ་གང་ན་ཡོད་མ་ཤེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་དོར། །དེ་སྐྱལ་གསུམ་གྱི་དབྱས་ན་ཚོས་
ཅན། མ་བྱ་ཡོད་དེ། མ་བྱས་སྐྱོགས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

3) The following proof, presented to a person who doesn't know where a particular peacock is:

Consider that mountain vale over there.
There must be a peacock living there,
Because we can hear a peacock crowing.

དཔལ་ལྡན་ཚོས་བྲག་གི་དོར། །སྐྱ་ཚོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བཞི་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

4) The following proof, presented to the glorious Dharmakirti:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.

གསུམ་པ་རྗེལ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་བྱུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ། ལྟོས་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་
མ་བྱུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། ཕྱི་རྗེལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་བྱུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། ལྟོས་
རྗེལ་ཕྱི་རྗེལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་བྱུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་གསུམ་ལས།

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

Here thirdly is our explanation of reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent. There are three different kinds of these reasons:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong relative to the proponent.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong relative to the opponent.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong relative to both the opponent and the proponent.

Here are respective examples for these three types of reasons, in particular proofs.

གྲངས་ཅན་པས་སངས་རྒྱས་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ཚེས་ཅན། སེམས་མིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལྷོ་
འཇིག་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

1) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a Numerist [of member of the Sanghya, a non-Buddhist school of ancient India]:

Consider the intellect.
It is something devoid of mind,
Because it is something which starts and stops.

གཅིར་བྱ་པས། སངས་རྒྱས་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ལྷིང་ཚེས་ཅན། སེམས་ལྡན་ཡིན་ཏེ།
ལྷོ་བལྟས་ན་འཆི་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་གཉིས་པ་དང་།

2) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a member of the Unclothed [or Jain school of ancient India]:

Consider a fruit tree.
It must have a mind,
Because it dies when you peel its bark.

གྲངས་ཅན་གྱིས་རྒྱང་འཕྲུན་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ། མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་
བཟུང་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

3) The following proof, presented to a member of the Rejectionist [Lokayata] school by one of the Unclothed [Jain] school [both non-Buddhist groups of ancient India]:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something you see with your eyes.

The forms of debate:
The traditional debate year

The following annual calendar for Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery gives a good picture of the schedule of study followed by all monks in the geshe program at the monastery. It is a traditional schedule which developed at the original Sera Mey in Lhasa, Tibet, over the centuries; since the rebuilding of Sera Mey in south India, the schedule has been reinstated—with a certain number of variations from the one used in Tibet—and is now followed closely, with some exceptions due to the need to work in the monastery cornfields and so on. Below is a translation of the annual calendar as it is currently posted on at the main temple of the monastery; the notes and some amendments to the calendar were completed with the help of Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin, a former abbot of the monastery.

**Annual Calendar of Debates,
Examinations, and Other Special Events
at Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery
Bylakuppe, South India**

Schedule of Regular Dharma Sessions

The following are the eight traditional "dharma sessions" (chos-thog) that make up the standard periods of monastic study at Sera Mey Monastery. The first Tibetan month, by the way, normally falls in February or March of the western calendar. The dates below are the same for any given year, independent of the day of the week, and follow the waxing and waning of the moon.

Session One: The Earlier Dharma Session of Spring (*dPyid-chos dang-po*)

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Starting assembly: 26th of the first Tibetan month

First firewood break: 27th and 28th of the first Tibetan month

The "firewood break" (shing-slong), or literally "time for requesting firewood from sponsors" follows immediately after the starting assembly (yar-tsogs). This assembly features prayers for the success of the session, and is attended by all monks who intend to participate for this period. It is also during this assembly that young monks who have been deemed ready by the abbot, the debate master, and their house teacher undergo the ceremony of initiation into the debate park. These "newbies" are known as sarshuk (gsar-zhugs), or "newly entered." They are expected to demonstrate their commitment to the debate session through perfect attendance, and especially serious study and debate, for the entire length of the session.

In Lhasa, a head-count was taken during the starting assembly in order to determine the cooking and other needs. During the next two days, teams of monks would go out to help find firewood for the monastery kitchen, based on the head-count.

The first day of the firewood break was devoted to visiting lay communities in the countryside outside of Lhasa city to ask for firewood; families in these villages knew what day to expect the monks, and considered it an honor to prepare a good supply of wood in advance. On the second day the monks would travel to Lhasa city proper to request fuel. This supply of wood would have to last about two weeks, until the "mid-term firewood break" (rked-pa'i shing-slong).

Great debate examinations: *tsokrampa geshe* examinations, 28th to the 30th of the first Tibetan month

During specific sessions, intense debate examinations are held for candidates standing for various degrees at the monastery. The most well known of these degree titles is the geshe. The word "geshe" (kalyāṇa mitra in Sanskrit, or dge-bshes in Tibetan) literally means "spiritual friend," and is a term from the earliest days of Buddhism in India. Later, great masters among the first Tibetan Buddhists—the Kadampas—were called "geshe" out of respect for their learning and high level of practice.

As monastic institutions began to form in Tibet, the word "geshe" came to be used as a title. It was originally used in the early "Big Three" monasteries of Sangpu (gSang-phu), Kyormo Lung (sKyor-mo lung), and Gadong (sGa-gdong). Sangpu, for example, was founded around the middle of the eleventh century.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Sangpu had two colleges within the confines (or gseb) of the monastery as a whole (known as the gling); early geshe candidates had to make their debate defense at a combined assembly of the two, and came to be known as lingse geshes, a corruption of the word lingsep (gling-gseb). The Great Dictionary of the Tibetan Language and other sources take the word lingse to mean gling-bsre, or a defense before the "combined" (bsre) assemblies of the two colleges in the monastery (gling). In either case, the point is the same.

At Sera Mey, there are typically four lingse geshe degrees conferred per year: these come in two pairs known as the "summer lingse" and the "winter lingse." Geshe of this rank go through an examination process within their own monastery, as described in a previous reading for this course. During some of their defenses, these and other geshe candidates are required to provide an elaborate series of refreshments, involving some served to the entire assembly of their monastery. This ceremony is known as the "Thirteen-Course Tea and Broth" (Ja-thug bcu-gsum).

During other defenses, lingse candidates need only provide a series of ten tea offerings on the day when they undergo a special part of their examination which involves reciting a great many pages of scripture from memory. This test is called a geshe shepa (dge-bshes bshad-pa); and since the major refreshments of tea and broth are not served to the entire assembly this time, the presentation is known as a "dry recitation" (skam-bshad).

Below the rank of lingse geshe is the rikrampa (rigs rams-pa), and the next higher rank after the lingse is the tsokrampa (tsogs rams-pa). In both cases, the word rampa refers to the veritable myriad (rab-'byams, shortened to rams-pa) number of great Buddhist classics that a geshe must master. The word tsok in tsokrampa refers to the Session of the Great Assembly (Tsogs-chos), an annual meeting in Lhasa city of the six great colleges. Here there are two each for the "Great Three" monasteries of later times: Sera, Ganden, and Drepung, all founded around the opening of the fifteenth century. Representatives from Deyang (bDe-yangs) monastery would also attend this gathering, during which the candidates for the tsokrampa rank would have to defend their knowledge.

The Great Assembly traditionally began on the 20th of the second Tibetan month, and ended on the 30th. This is the time it would take to complete the examination of one or two tsokrampa candidates from each college per year.

Candidates for the highest rank of geshe, the hlarampa (hla rams-pa), are examined during the Great Prayer Festival, or Munlam Chenmo. This festival was instituted by Je Tsongkapa in the 15th century as a great dharma celebration for the New Year. Since it was held in the capital city of Lhasa

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

(Hla-sa), these geshes became known as hlarampa. Each of the six colleges normally nominates two candidates per year for the rank of hlarampa, although on some occasions it may be as many as four.

First actual debate session: begins 1st of the second Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 5th and 6th of the second Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 7th of the second Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 18th of the second Tibetan month

The "Auspicious Conclusion" (Shis-brjod) is a day of prayer and celebration for the successful end of another dharma session; it is marked by special recitations known as "pronouncing" (brjod) the "auspiciousness" (bkra-shis, the "trash" in "trash" delek"). These prayers are done in a unique melody or yang (dbyangs). On this day too, the abbot of the monastery will often deliver a special dharma teaching.

Intersession break (Chos-mtsams):

19th of the second Tibetan month to the 7th of the third Tibetan month

Session Two: The Great Dharma Session of Spring (dPyid-chos chen-mo)

Starting assembly: 8th of the third Tibetan month
First firewood break: 9th and 10th of the third Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: summer *lingse* geshes, 11th to the 12th of the third Tibetan month
First actual debate session: begins 13th of the third Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 22nd and 23rd of the third Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 24th of the third Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 7th of the fourth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 8th of the fourth Tibetan month to the 16th of the fourth Tibetan month

Session Three: The Earlier Summer Dharma Session (dByar-chos dang-po)

Starting assembly: 17th of the fourth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the fourth Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 20th of the fourth Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: (none)
Second actual debate session: (none)

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Auspicious conclusion: 1st of the fifth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 2nd of the fifth Tibetan month to the 16th of the fifth Tibetan month

Session Four: The Great Dharma Session of Summer (*dByar-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the fifth Tibetan month

First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the fifth Tibetan month

Great debate examinations: summer *lingse* geshes ("dry recitation") and *rikram* geshes; 20th to the 23rd of the fifth Tibetan month

First actual debate session: begins 24th of the fifth Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 2nd and 3rd of the sixth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 4th of the sixth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 15th of the sixth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 16th of the sixth Tibetan month to the 16th of the seventh Tibetan month; includes *rikram* geshe exams, summer *lingse* geshe exams, *rikchung* pre-geshe exams, and *rikdra* inter-monastic debates

The rikdra (rigs-grva) inter-monastic debates begin on the last day of the sixth Tibetan month and last until the 15th day of the seventh Tibetan month. During this time, thirty debaters from Sera Mey debate with thirty counterparts from the sister monastery of Sera Jey in the main assembly hall (tsogs-chen) shared by both monasteries for major events such as the biweekly monks' purification ceremony, or sojong (gso-sbyong).

During this time, pairs of debaters match off twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening, for fifteen days. In a typical session, the proponent (snga-rgol) will be responsible for a lengthy recitation of scripture from memory, after which his opponent (phyi-rgol) is charged with posing a difficult series of formalized debate questions. In Tibet, the combined monasteries of Sera Mey and Sera Jey had joint holdings of property, and the income from these would be used during this session to supply all the monks attending with gifts of Tibetan pastries (kabse) and roasted barley flour, or tsampa.

It is also during this time that the rikchen (rigs-chen), or advanced pre-geshe debates, are held. Here a student who intends to take a higher geshe degree engages in a difficult and highly formalized debate against a similar candidate from the sister monastery. Other students in the monastery during this time are engaged in special examinations, administered by the abbot and debate master of their home monastery, during which they are required to recite, from memory, about 100 pages of scripture.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Session Five: The Water Dharma Session (*Chab-zhugs chos-thog*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the seventh Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the seventh Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 20th of the seventh Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: (none)
Second actual debate session: (none)
Auspicious conclusion: 30th of the seventh Tibetan month

The "Water" Session (Chab-zhugs) is possibly given this name due to the fact that, during the period following the especially intense Great Session of Summer, students in the geshe program finally have enough time to relax and "enter the water" (chab-zhugs), or take a nice slow bath. The rikchung and rikchen (preliminary and advanced pre-geshe debates) have been completed, as have the grueling rikdra inter-monastic debates, and memorization exams. Students would be allowed take breaks in special parks throughout out the monastery, and traditional folk-dance troupes would come there at times, to perform the "goddess" plays (lha-mo).

Intersession break: 1st of the eighth Tibetan month to the 7th of the eighth Tibetan month; this is the main "water break"

Session Six: The Dharma Session of Medicine Buddha (*sMan-bla chos-thog*)

Starting assembly: 8th of the eighth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 9th and 10th of the eighth Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 11th of the eighth Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 22nd and 23rd of the eighth Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 24th of the eighth Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 7th of the ninth Tibetan month

This session takes its name from the fact that an extensive Medicine Buddha rite is held on the 11th of the eighth month.

Intersession break: 8th of the ninth Tibetan month to the 16th of the ninth Tibetan month

Session Seven: The Great Dharma Session of Autumn (*sTon-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the ninth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the ninth Tibetan month

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Great debate examinations: winter *lingse geshe* examinations, 20th and 21st of the ninth Tibetan month

First actual debate session: begins 22nd of the ninth Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 2nd and 3rd of the tenth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 4th of the tenth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 16th of the tenth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 17th of the tenth Tibetan month to the 16th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Session Eight: The Great Dharma Session of Winter (*dGun-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the eleventh Tibetan month

First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the eleventh Tibetan month

The great examinations: 20th to the 23rd of the eleventh Tibetan month; debate examinations for the winter *lingse geshes* and *hlarampa geshes*, the former presenting their "dry recitation"

First actual debate session: begins 24th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 12th and 13th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 14th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 16th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Intersession break

This break features further examination of winter *lingse geshes*, the Tibetan New Year, and the Great Prayer Festival; it begins on the 17th of the twelfth Tibetan month and ends on the 25th of the first Tibetan month.

Annual Special Events

Passing On of Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (*mKhas-grub dgongs-rdzogs*)

14th day of the fifth Tibetan month

Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568) was an illustrious scholar from Sera Mey who wrote many of the monastery's textbooks. On special days like this, the monastery will be covered at night in strings of brightly colored electric lights that look like our Christmas-tree lights.

Summer Offering to the Two Dharma Protectors (*Chos-skyong nam-gnyis kyi dbyar-gsol*)

15th day of the fifth Tibetan month

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

This particular day every year is known throughout Tibet as the "Day of Auspiciousness throughout the World" ('Dzam-gling spyi-bzang). At Sera Mey, the occasion is used as an opportunity to thank the dharma protectors of the monastery for their help, and to request that they continue their sacred deeds. The two protectors here are Chamsing (lCam-sring) and Taok (Tha-'og). The protector Chamsing is shared with other monasteries, while Taok is a unique protector for Sera Mey. Please note that these two protectors have nothing to do with the current dharma protector controversy.

Rikchung (Pre-Geshe Degree) Debates

25th to the 28th of the sixth Tibetan month

First team

Proponent takes the subject "Turning of the Wheel," opponent takes "Book of Maitreya": 25th of the sixth Tibetan month

Each of the subjects mentioned here are important topics from the Ornament of Realizations, spoken to the realized being Asanga by Lord Maitreya around 350 AD.

Second team

Proponent takes "Sutra and Commentary," opponent takes "Final End": 26th of the sixth Tibetan month

Third team

Proponent takes "Wish for Enlightenment," opponent takes "Path of Preparation": 27th of the sixth Tibetan month

Fourth team

Proponent takes "Three Refuges," opponent takes "Buddha Nature": 28th of the sixth Tibetan month

Summer Examinations

8th of the seventh Tibetan month

Extensive Medicine Buddha Rite

11th of the eighth Tibetan month

Great Winter Examinations

8th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

Assembly of the Great Offering Ceremony for the Prayer of Maitreya
(Byams-smon sgrub-mchod chen-mo yar-tsogs)
25th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Khen Rinpoche notes that, in Tibet, this entire ceremony took nearly a month. The 17th of the eleventh month marks the opening ceremony for the session, and is followed by two days of a firewood break. The 20th and 21st are marked by the "dry recitations" for the winter lingshe geshes, and then the next three days are examinations for the hlarampa candidates. Finally, on the 25th, the actual prayer begins: all of the monks together recite the entire relevant work by the Buddha from memory. At Sera Jey, the recitation for this period is the Prayer of the Deeds of Samanta Bhadra (bZang-spyod smon-lam), also by Lord Buddha. The Prayer of Maitreya continues until the 13th of the twelfth Tibetan month.

Great Torma Offering of the Twenty-Ninth (dGu-gtor chen-mo)
29th of the twelfth Tibetan month

This is one of the year's biggest prayer ceremonies; the next day is the last day of the year, the new (black) moon (gnam-gang).

Presentation of the Debate Ground Schedule (Chos-grvar tsogs-gtam 'bul-yun)
16th of the third Tibetan month; 26th of the fifth Tibetan month; 16th of the eighth Tibetan month; and 26th of the ninth Tibetan month

On these four dates of the year, the debate master (dge-bskos) stands in the assembly of the debate park to announce the schedule for the coming period. He also outlines the duties that different members of the monastery will be expected to fulfill during this time, and reviews the general rule of behavior for the monastery from the monastery constitution (rtza-khrims, also known as a bca'-yig). This document for Sera Mey was written by His Holiness the Eighth Dalai Lama, Jampel Gyatso (1758-1804); copies were very rare following the invasion of Tibet. A complete carving was located and supplied to Sera Mey several years ago by Asian Classics Input Project staff at the Oriental Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg, Russia.

**The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning**

Supplement to Reading Ten

རིགས་པའི་འགྲོ་སྤངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part Three

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Korwa la ta yupay chir

A: Because the cycle of pain does have an end.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Tak madrub

B: Wrong.

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་མེད་པར་བཤམ།

Korwa la ta mepar tel

A: Are you telling me the cycle of pain doesn't have an end?

འདོད།

Du
B: Right.

མིང་དེ།

Me de
A: Why not?

འཁོར་བ་ལ་སྔོན་གྱི་མཐའ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Korwa la ngun gyi ta mepay chir
B: Because the cycle of pain has no front end.

ཁྱེད་པ་མ་བྱུང་།

Kyappa ma jung
A: That doesn't mean it can't have an end!

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་ཡོད་པར་བྲལ།

Korwa la ta yu par tel
B: Are you telling me the cycle of pain does have an end?

འདོད།

Du
A: Right.

ཡོད་དེ།

Yu de
B: Why so?

འཁོར་བ་ལ་སྤྱིའི་མཐའ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Korwa la chiy ta yupay chir

A: Because the cycle of pain has a back end.

ཡོད་དེ།

Yude

B: Why so?

བདག་འཇོན་གྱི་གཉེན་སྣོབས་ལྷན་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Dakdzin gyi nyenpo top den yupay chir

A: Because there is a powerful antidote that will smash our habit of seeing things as self-existent.